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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the biological and economic consequences of modifying the 
species selectivity properties of fishing gears in a multispecies context. The objective is 
to examine whether modifying the species selectivity properties can contribute to 
rebuild overexploited stocks. To meet this objective, conceptual and empirical 
bioeconomic models were constructed. The conceptual model was used to investigate 
the qualitative impacts and the empirical model was used to derive the quantitative 
impacts of modifying the species selectivity properties of the gear. 
In the conceptual part of this study, a stylized model was developed to analyze the long-
run equilibrium bioeconomic properties of modifying the species selectivity properties 
of the gears. The study examined two polar cases, namely when the gears were perfectly 
non-selective and perfectly selective. 
The analysis showed that there was a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding the 
impact of technological improvement. Policy prescriptions for rebuilding stocks varied 
dramatically depending on the type of technology employed and the presence of 
biological interrelationships. In the perfectly non-selective gear case, rebuilding 
strategies would benefit from decreasing the catchability of the overexploited species as 
long as the stocks were biologically independent. In the presence of biological 
interrelationships, decreasing the catchability yielded ambiguous results. Other policies, 
such as increasing the catchability of accompanying species, and simultaneously 
decreasing the catchability of the target species and increasing the catchability of the 
accompanying species also generated ambiguous results. 
In the empirical part of the study, a bioeconomic model of the Georges Bank 
multispecies fishery was constructed. The model had four species groups (roundfish, 
flatfish, elasmobranchs, and pelagics) and three gears types (otter trawl, gillnet and 
longline). The model evaluated the long-term biological and economic implications of 
changing the gear design or configuration (technology-based changes) and the creation 
of a tax-subsidy program (market-based changes). 
Model results suggested that technological and market-based programs could aid in the 
rebuilding process; however, by themselves they are insufficient to recover the stocks. 
Rebuilding the overexploited roundfish and flatfish stocks requires significant reduction 
in fishing effort. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Problem statement 
The development of marine fishing technology has long been recognized to be a 
double-edged sword (Bell, 1978, Cunningham et al, 1985). Technological advancement, 
while allowing for factors of production to be used more efficiently, also tends to 
deplete open access resources. 
The reasoning and dynamics are identical to the open access paradigm. The adoption of 
new technology by fishermen raises productivity and improves profitability but also 
acts as an incentive for newcomers to adopt new technology and enter the fishery. The 
absence of property rights breeds competition among fishermen to harvest the fish 
before others do. Fishermen have no incentive to conserve the resource for their own 
use nor to invest in the resource, for instance, by allowing it to grow larger since 
someone else can harvest any un-caught fish. This competition leads to a race to fish, 
which in aggregate, not only depletes the resource but also decreases each fisherman's 
economic performance. Decreasing economic returns, in tum, create an additional 
incentive for fishermen to continue to improve their gear's efficiency in pursuit of 
higher profits. 
This cycle repeats itself until the fishery becomes overexploited and over-capitalized. In 
short, technological improvement sets forth two opposing forces. On one hand, it raises 
the productivity of factors of production, but on the other hand, by exhausting the fish 
stocks, it lowers overall productivity. Not surprisingly, Whitmarsh (1990) points out that 
"Perhaps, the most fundamental issue as far as policy is concerned is the need to 
monitor the advance of fisheries technology and, where possible, to forecast its future 
time path." 
Clearly understanding the impact of the technological change on harvesting practices 
and on the environment is instrumental to improving fisheries management. The 
management of multispecies fisheries is notoriously complex because managers not 
only have to understand the impact technological change has on the selectivity 
properties of fishing gears but also on the biological characteristics of the fishery. 
Changes in a multiproduct firm's technology can modify the species selectivity 
properties affecting transformation and substitution possibilities. Many species occur in 
mixed-species aggregations, resulting in significant by-catch interactions among 
fisheries directed towards a particular target species or species group. Similarly, 
technological improvements can yield excessive fishing pressure that may disrupt 
predatory and competitive interactions. While these changes may not necessarily lead to 
loss of species diversity and ecosystem resilience, they may stress fishing communities 
(Gudmundsson and Sutinen, 1998). The Georges Bank ecosystem, for example, has 
undergone dramatic changes in species composition and abundance. Following the 
overexploitation of the valuable groundfish resources, low value elasmobranch 
resources flourished. Trawl survey indexes from Georges Bank show that dogfish and 
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skates abundance increased from roughly 25 percent in weight in 1963 to almost 75 
percent in weight in recent years. 
Despite the growing recognition of the need to understand the impacts of technological 
advancement, the fisheries economics literature has given little attention to this issue. 
Whitmarsh (1990) studied the factors influencing technological diffusion. Whitmarsh 
(1998) explained how the technological progress in the presence of free access 
conditions leads to the "fisheries treadmill'', where fishermen in spite of adopting new 
efficient technology, are unable to obtain a lasting increase in profits. Cunninghan et al 
(1985) and Anderson (1986) examined the long-run effects of improving the 
catchability coefficient in an open access, single species fishery. Remarkably, little 
attention has been paid to the impact of technological change in a broader ecological 
context. 
1.2. Goal, objective, approach and methods 
The goal of this work is to understand the biological and economic consequences of 
modifying the species selectivity properties of fishing gears in a multispecies context. 
The objective is to investigate whether modifying the species selectivity properties can 
contribute to rebuilding overexploited stocks. To meet this objective, a conceptual and 
an applied bioeconomic model were constructed. The theoretical model was used to 
investigate the qualitative impacts whereas the empirical model was used to derive the 
quantitative impacts of changing the species selectivity properties of the gear. 
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Comparative statics method was used to describe the marginal impacts of three different 
policies. The first policy considers reducing the catchability of the overexploited target 
species while the second policy considers increasing the catchability of the 
underexploited accompanying species. The third policy considers a simultaneous 
combination of both. For expository purposes, the analysis focuses on perfectly 
selective and perfectly non-selective technologies in the presence and absence of 
biological interactions. 
Later, a bioeconomic model that couples the salient ecological and economic features of 
the Georges Bank multispecies fishery is constructed. A numerical simulation model 
that incorporates multiproduct firm technology with a biomass dynamic model is used 
to evaluate the long-term biological and economic implications of selected policies. 
These policies include changes in the gear design or configuration (technology-based 
changes) and the creation of a tax-subsidy program (market-based changes). Under a 
tax-subsidy program, taxes would discourage fishermen from targeting overexploited 
species while subsidies would encourage fishermen to target underexploited species. 
After conducting a range of policy simulations, the main results are discussed. Finally, 
conclusions and policy implications of this research are presented. 
1.3. Organization of dissertation 
The remainder of this piece has six chapters. Chapter 2 presents a brief overview of the 
structure of the Georges Bank fishery. This chapter provides a background on the 
resource, industry structure and recent management history. Chapter 3 introduces the 
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conceptual model, which investigates the bioeconomic impacts of modifying the species 
selectivity properties of fishing gears in a multispecies fishery. The conceptual model 
evaluates rebuilding strategies in the presence of perfectly selective and perfectly non-
selective technologies, including the cases where the stocks are biologically 
independent and interrelated. Chapter 4 describes the specification and estimation of the 
components needed to develop a bioeconomic model. Chapter 5 describes the 
bioeconomic model and discusses the main results. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions 
and policy implications of the research. 
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Chapter 2: Overview of the Fishery 
2.1. Introduction 
The development of management policies requires an understanding the relationships 
between the ecosystem and human activities. The status of the resource, structure of the 
industry, and management history are integral components of the fishery, which need to 
be accounted for in the formulation of policy. The objective of this chapter is to review 
the recent changes in the marine ecosystem and the experiences in regulating the New 
England groundfish fishery as the backdrop for our study. The following section 
describes the recent changes in the Northwest Atlantic ecosystem. Next, an account of 
the harvesting sector is provided. The last section reviews the management history. 
2.2. Overview of Fishery Resources 
The Northwest Atlantic shelve have supported many commercially important fisheries 
for centuries. Within this region, the Georges Bank area supports one of the highest fish 
production rates in the world. The high primary and secondary production rates are 
linked to the topographic and hydro graphic features of the Bank. The water mass over 
the Georges Bank plateau is well mixed and isothermal throughout the year allowing 
continuous nutrient regeneration (Fogarty and Murawski, 1998). Scientists have 
observed that even though Georges Bank is an open system, production is tightly 
bound, with most of the fish production being consumed by other fish species 
(Sissenwine et al., 1984, Fogarty and Murawski, 1998). This feature has maintained 
overall biomass and production levels relatively constant, even though significant 
fluctuations on the species level. While fisheries management often requires 
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information at the species level, aggregating species into species groups provides a 
synoptic illustration of the dynamics of the marine ecosystem which otherwise may be 
overlooked (NMFS, 1998). 
Since the 1960's, the Georges Bank ecosystem has undergone significant changes in 
species composition and yield (Figure 1 ). The increased distant water and domestic 
fishing pressure disrupted the existing trophic interactions (i.e., competition and 
predation) and changed the structure of the exploited marine assemblages. 1 The heavy 
exploitation of valuable groundfish resources (gadoids, and flatfish) in the 1960's and 
1970's resulted in record high catches and record low abundance. The aggregate index 
for this group declined by almost 70% between 1963 and 1974. Sharp declines were 
observed in the haddock, silver and red hake, and most of the flatfish stocks. In the mid 
and late 1970's, the stocks appeared to increase following stricter management regime 
imposed by ICNAF and the Magnuson Act. Haddock and cod showed a sharp increase 
in biomass. The abundance and recruitment of flatfish also increased substantially. 
Consequently, the aggregate index showed an increasing trend peaking in 1978. In the 
early eighties, the aggregate index dropped again following a sharp increase in fishing 
effort and recruitment overfishing. In 1987 and 1988 the index reached the lowest 
values since 1963 (NMFS, 1998). 
Meanwhile, the elasmobranch population (spiny dogfish and skates) rapidly grew. 
Standardized trawl surveys show that dogfish and skates catches increased from 25 
1 Assemblage refers to a group of species which are distributed in the same geographic areas and habitat type for 
most of the year, sharing common environmental regimes and feeding areas (Overholtz and Tyler, 1986) 
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percent (by weight) in 1963 to nearly 75 percent in the late 1980's (NMFS, 1996).2 
Since the early 1990' s, the elasmobranch biomass index declined reflecting the 
increased fishing pressure on this resource. NMFS scientists have noted that while 
minimum biomass estimates for the spiny dogfish stocks are high, mature females may 
already be overexploited. This may threaten the stock in the future given the low birth 
rates and long gestation period of this specie. Herring and mackerel stocks were 
overexploited in the 1960's and 1970's but since have recovered to record levels. The 
pelagic index has markedly increased since 1983, peaking in 1994. 
Collie and DeLong (1999) note that while these shifts are attributed to high harvest 
rates, predation is an important factor controlling the dynamics of the fish community. 
Several studies have studied the impact of species interactions in the dynamics of fish 
communities. Grosslein et al (1980) documented moderate to high dietary overlap 
between spiny dogfish and gadoids, and silver and white hakes, and between little skate 
and haddock, yellowtail flounder and winter flounders. 
2 Since 1963 the Northeast Fishery Science Center has conducted surveys to generate abundance indexes and monitor 
resource trends. Survey data is very valuable for monitoring trends in population size since unlike catch-per-unit-
effort data from commercial or recreational fisheries, its catchability does not change markedly over time. 
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Figure 1: Trends in aggregate biomass indexes for major fish assemblages. 
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Overholtz and Tyler (1986) proposed a model where juvenile haddock competitive 
pressure on food resources kept the growth rate of other species at low levels. 
Following intense harvesting pressure on haddock and poor haddock recruitment, a 
competitive release mechanism allowed other species to increase in number and 
biomass. Initally, yellowtail flounder and longhorn sculpin populations dominated. 
Thereafter, skates and windowpane flounder dominated the system. Spencer and Collie 
(1996) proposed a stochastic predator-prey model, which incorporated an alternative 
prey. Their study examined how fishing mortality rates, predation rates and 
environmental variability affected the equilibrium and dynamics of the Georges Bank 
haddock and spiny dogfish system. More recently, Collie and DeLong (1999) 
constructed a dynamic production model to examine species interaction between four 
species groups, which included gadoids, flatfish, elasmobranch, and pelagics. They 
9 
found that the most important interactions were predation of gadoids and elasmobranchs 
on pelagics. They also found some evidence to support apparent competition between 
elasmobranchs and gadoids. 
2.3. Overview of Fishing Industry 
The Northeast region's commercial oceanic and estuarine fisheries generated US$ 869 
million (ex-vessel) worth of seafood in 1993. Of this total, finfish generated 35% the 
revenue for the region (NMFS, 1994). The New England groundfish fishery is 
characterized by the diversity of its fishing operations, gear types, vessel sizes and 
prosecuted species. The New England fleet employs several gears including otter 
trawls, gill nets, longlines, pots and traps, among others.3 
In 1993, there were 1,347 vessels in the fishing fleet. Otter trawl is dominant gear in 
fleet. One thousand and forty otter trawls were in operation in 1993 landing 129.7 
thousand tons of seafood valued at US$ 187 million. Most of revenue was derived from 
cod (20%), Loligo squid (12%), winter flounder (8%), American plaice (8%), yellowtail 
flounder (7%) and monkfish (7%). During the same year, the gillnet and longline fleet 
had 244 and 229 vessels, respectively. The gillnet fleet landed 22.7 thousand tons of 
seafood valued at US$ 24.8 million while longline fleet landed 7.66 thousand tons of 
seafood valued at US$ 29.7 million. Most of gillnet revenue was derived from cod 
(33%), pollock (14%), and monkfish (10%) whereas most of the longline revenue was 
3 
The New England fleet consists of those vessels based in the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut. 
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attributed to swordfish (31 %), tilefish (16%), bigeye tuna (16%), and cod (13%) 
(NMFS, 1994). 
The New England fleet is divided into inshore and offshore sectors. The inshore sector 
consists of small vessels (5-50 tons) and employ 2-3 crew. In 1993, their average 
revenue per day absent was US$ 886. Due to their small size, these vessels usually fish 
close to shore and rarely go to offshore grounds. The effort of these boats is 
concentrated in summer months since they tend not to fish in rough weather. Their 
fishing trips usually last one day, but they can go on 2-3 day trips. Since the inshore 
vessels' trips are short, smaller vessels tend to be opportunistic, ready to profit from 
price changes and species availability (Doeringer and Terl<la, 1995). Vessels correspond 
to some extent with port size; that is, smaller vessels tend to be housed in smaller ports 
spread throughout New England. For instance, Chatham's geography (narrow inlet and 
distance from major ports) discourages larger vessels from operating from this port. 
The offshore sector consists oflarger vessels (51-150+ tons) that employ between 3 and 
15 crew. The number of crew has declined sharply following reductions of days at sea 
brought about by Amendments# 5 and 7. These larger boats tend to fish year around. 
The continuing poor condition of the groundfish stock forced captains to thin their 
crews and begin targeting other fisheries like dogfish, herring, mackerel, shrimp, and 
other species that do not fall under groundfish rules (Canfield,1997). The larger vessels 
tend to based in the ports of New Bedford, Gloucester, Boston, Pt. Judith, Portland, and 
Rockland. The species composition varies significantly with port. This situation not 
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only reflects species abundance in the different grounds but also the degree of fleet 
specialization among the different ports. For example, in New Bedford, scallops and the 
main groundfish (cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder) account for most of the 
landings, whereas in Pt. Judith lobster, Loligo squid, silver hake, monkfish, scup and 
butterfish accounted for most of the landings. 
2.4. History of the New England Groundfish Fishery 
2.4.1. Early Times 
The harvesting of groundfish has a long tradition in North America dating back to 
colonial times. The development of the cod fishery was a leading factor of the European 
settlement in North America. Cod fishing was not only a source of food for the locals, 
but was also an important commodity. Dried salted cod was an internationally traded 
commodity. Dried salted cod production peaked in the 1880's and then declined due to 
advent of steam-powered boats, competition among other food products, and the 
appearance of fresh fish outlets (Parsons, 1993, Murawski, 1996).4 
Prior to the development of a formal system of collecting fishery statistics in the 1930's 
and 1940's, fluctuations in stock abundance were assessed from anecdotal reports and/or 
from trends in landings (Serchuk, and Wigley, 1992). In the early 1870's, the short 
supply of Gulf of Maine cod led to the first study of the impact of human activities on 
fishery resources (Baird, 1874 as reported by Serchuk and Wigley, 1992). In 1913, the 
first study on the impact of otter trawl fishing on the abundance of fish stocks of 
4 Steam-powered trawlers were able to deliver a steady year-around supply of fresh fish. 
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Georges Banks was conducted. The analysis revealed that cod, haddock, and hake in 
Georges Bank were not being overfished (Alexander et al., 1915 as reported by 
Serchuk, and Wigley, 1992). The study, however, did raise concerns about excessive 
discards if the otter trawl fleet expanded significantly. Scientific evidence indicated that 
the new gear was extremely destructive and discarding was prevalent. 
During the tum of the century, new technologies rapidly changed the fishery. Schooners 
were soon replaced by steam-powered trawlers. By the 1930's, there were over 300 
trawlers in the fishery (Murawski, 1996).5 The development of refrigeration, filleting 
and canning in 1920's contributed to the fast development of the groundfish resources 
and eventually led to the demise of the haddock stock in the 1930's (Hoagland, Kite-
Powell and Schumacker, 1996). 
Prior to the 1900's, haddock landings had been relatively low since it did not preserve 
well when salted. However, improved cold storage, marketing, and distribution made 
the industry switch from salt dried cod to haddock. Haddock landings continued to 
increase as the demand grew (Murawski, 1996). Unfortunately, the increased fishing 
pressure soon collapsed the haddock resource as landings dramatically fell from 
120,000 tons in 1929 to 28,000 tons in 1934. During this time, cod landings decreased 
and haddock, redfish, and other species commanded higher prices in the domestic 
market. 
5 Interestingly, the Canadian trawl fleet never exceed 4 vessels by the J 930's because of the opposition of the inshore 
sector, and Canadian policy to maintain the largest possible labor force employed in the fishery (Parsons, 1993). 
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The collapse of the haddock fishery prompted new research to investigate causes of the 
crises and recommend potential solutions. Scientists confirmed earlier work by 
Alexander, which showed the negative impact of discarding of juvenile haddock. One 
study estimated that for the 37 million pounds of haddock landed in Boston, 70-90 
million juvenile haddock were discarded dead at sea. Although no estimates are 
available, large quantities of cod are believed to have been discarded (Serchuk and 
Wigley, 1992). Scientists recommended increasing trawl mesh size, but the industry 
rejected this proposal. 
In the 1930's, the redfish fishery was initiated. The U.S. landings peaked in the 1942 at 
60,000 metric tons, and then declined as the fishery expanded to the Scotian Shelf, 
peaking at 120,000 metric tons in the 1950's. Murawski (1996) notes that the fishery 
was fished down to moderate levels in the Gulf of Maine during the 1930'and 1940's, 
and the stock collapsed in the mid-1970's following the return of the fleet from Canada. 
U.S. redfish catches oscillated between 14,000 to 15,000 metric tons in 1978-79, and 
dropped to 530 metric tons in 1991. 
Until the 1940's, flatfish landings were dominated by winter flounder, witch founder 
and American plaice. Subsequently, yellowtail flounder became the most important 
flatfish. Y ellowtail landings and abundance however decreased substantially during the 
1940's and 1950's. Although, the reasons for the decline are not known, warm water 
temperatures are believed to have affected recruitment. In the 1960's, when the water 
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temperatures were cooler and increased m yellowtail abundance and landings was 
observed (Muraswki, 1996). 
Prior to the Second World War, the New England fleet was large and not very 
profitable. Thereafter, it became very prosperous as the war effort required the supply 
of large amounts of protein, and rationing increased the consumption of fish. The fleet 
became more active as many large fishing vessels were used in the military activities 
such as mine-sweeping. 
2.4.2. ICNAF Era 
During the l 940's, the United States and Canada began expressing concern about the 
conservation of marine fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic and the potential impact of 
foreign fleets on domestic fishermen. This concern led to the establishment of the 
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) in 1949, and 
effectively came into force in 1951 (Table 1). ICNAF's objective was to investigate, 
protect, and conserve fisheries of the NW Atlantic in order to maintain maximum 
sustainable catch from each species. Originally Canada, the United States, and a few 
European nations were its only members. Fishing effort initially was moderate and 
ICNAF managed the fishery by controlling the size of first capture. Mesh size 
regulations were first imposed in 1953. 
In late 1950's, Northwest Atlantic fisheries underwent a dramatic and uncontrolled 
expansion. The arrival of new distant water fleets led to a precipitous increase in 
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landings. The USSR factory fleet engaged in "pulse fishing", a practice where a large 
amount of fishing effort is directed to a particular species in a given area until its 
abundance is reduced to a low level. USSR catches increased from 17,000 metric tons 
in 1956 to 370,000 metric tons in 1962, to 853,000 metric tons in 1965, finally peaking 
at 1,357 ,000 metric tons in 1973. During the same period, the tonnage of fishing vessels 
increased form 400,000 metric tons to a peak of 1,500,000 tons in 1974 (Parsons, 
1993).6 
In the early 1960s, ICNAF recognized that mesh size regulations were not sufficient to 
control fishing mortality as long as fishing effort continued to increase (Anthony and 
Garrod, 1986). Attempts to discuss effort regulation failed in 1965, 1966, and 1967. In 
1968, it was reported that cod in subarea one and haddock in subarea five were 
'demonstrably overexploited', and by-catch problems were recognized from the very 
beginning in some fisheries. 
Rapid changes in technology continued to improve the fishing efficiency resulting in a 
tremendous increase in fishing effort and capacity. The total tonnage of vessels fishing 
in the NW Atlantic (excluding boats less than 50 feet) went from 400,000 tons in 1959s 
to a peak of 1,500,000 tons in 1974. Despite the increased effort level, total landings 
continued to decline from 4,600,000 metric tons in 1968 to 4,200,000 metric tons in the 
early 1970's. The pulse fishing strategy of the distant water fleets resulted in the 
collapse of many stocks such as the haddock, silver and red hakes, Atlantic mackerel, 
and Georges Bank herring (NEFSC, 1995). 
6 Excludes boats under 50 metric tons. 
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Table 1: Management of New England groundfish fishery. 
Year 
1949 
1953 
1970 
1971 
1972-1976 
Management measures implemented 
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) 1s 
established. 
Establishment of minimum mesh size for otter trawl (4 1/2 inches). 
Haddock spawning area closures (March through May). 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for haddock implemented. 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for yellowtail flounder implemented. 
T ACs for all regulated stocks established. 
T ACs assigned by country. 
"Second tier" TA Cs where the sum of national species TA Cs had to be less than the 
sum of individual countries ' . TA Cs to allow for species interactions and by-catch. 
Extension of haddock spawning area closures (February- May). 
1976-1977 Declaration of Extended Jurisdiction by Canada and the United States. 
Fisheries on Georges Banks no longer regulated by ICNAF. 
Canadian and American fishermen continue to harvest in overlapping area of 
Georges Bank claimed by both countries. 
1977-1982 U.S. Fishery Management Plan for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder based on 
quotas (annual, quarterly, by vessel classes, and lastly, trip limits) . 
Minimum otter trawl mesh size (5 1/8 inches) 
Seasonal spawning closures for haddock 
Canadian TA Cs for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder 
1982-1985 Interim U.S. Fishery Management Plan for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder. 
All direct controls (quotas) on fishing mortality eliminated by the United States and 
replaced by indirect controls (minimum mesh size of 51/2 inches, minimum 
landings sizes for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder, seasonal closed areas 
retained, etc.) 
Canada retains TAC system 
1984 World Court establishes maritime boundary, " Hague line" across Georges Bank. 
1986 U.S. Northeast Multispecies Management Fishery Management Plan extend 
management to a complex of groundfish species, including cod, haddock, flounders, 
hakes, and other species. Establishes acceptable levels of spawning potential for 
individual stocks. Also, imposes minimum fish sizes, 
mesh size restrictions, and closed haddock spawning areas. 
1991-1994 Amendment No. 4 to the Northeast Fishery Management Plan establishes 
overfishing definitions, harvest rates above which recruitment overfishing would 
occur. 
Stock assessment of cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder establish that recruitment 
overfishing is occurring and that stocks continue to decline. 
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Group of conservation organizations files suit based on continued over-exploitation 
of groundfish resource. 
Canada develops and individual transferable quota (ITQ) system for some segment 
of the fleet. 
Amendment No. 5 implemented to address overfishing of groundfish resource. 
1994 Regulations included days at sea reductions, moratorium on new vessels, eastern 
haddock closed area expanded and closed (January-June), 500 lb. trip limit for 
haddock, minimum trawl mesh size of 6 inches, and mandatory logbooks. 
Canadian TACs for cod and haddock adjusted to achieve fishing rates below F0.1• 
Secretary of Department of Commerce takes emergency action in December 
permanently closing two areas on Georges Bank and one in southern New England 
to all fishing gears harvesting groundfish, including scallop dredges. 
1996 Amendment No. 7 to the Northeast Multispecies Plan mandates further days at sea 
reductions, expands limited entry to include groundfish otter trawl and gillnet from 
45 to 30 ft., raises haddock trip limits, and establishes "target" TAC quotas for cod, 
haddock, yellowtail flounder and other species 
Sources: Fogarty and Murawski, 1998, Wang and Rosenberg, 1998, OECD, 1996. 
In 1971, a global TAC for haddock in division 4X and subarea five (i.e. Scotian Shelf, 
Gulf of Maine, Georges Bank, and Southern New England) was first established 
together with a Scheme of Joint Enforcement to ensure catch compliance. Additionally, 
there was a provision that stated that the directed fishery should cease whenever the 
accumulated catch (directed catch plus by-catch) reached 80 percent of the quota, 
anticipating that the by-catch after the closure would be 20 percent. Mesh size limits, 
closed spawning areas, and a closed area-season for haddock division 4X were also in 
place. The TAC for haddock went from 18,000 tons in 1970 to 12,000 tons in 1972. 
Despite a continued increase in fishing effort from 1968 to 1974, the total catches in 
NW Atlantic declined to about 4.2 million tons (MMT) in the early 1970s (from 4.6 MMT 
in 1968). 
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In 1972, ICNAF's MSY objective was changed to the optimum utilization of stocks. In 
the same year, catch quotas were allocated between countries. The allocation of catch-
quotas among countries was new and restrictive, so cheating and mis-reporting occurred 
(Anthony, 1990). Non-contracting parties fished in the area but their catches were not 
considered when allocating quotas. Each country was initially responsible for 
enforcement within its own fleet, but later enforcement among countries was limited to 
above the deck examination of catch only. North Americans inspectors were dissatisfied 
with the system since they felt that infractions by distant water nations went 
unpunished. ICNAF management work was also hampered by poor and limited 
information for assessments, inaccuracy of catch reporting and time lags obtaining data 
and use of MSY or F max did not provide sufficient safeguard against errors in 
assessments due to these factors. Catches reflecting abundance continued to decline 
dramatically between 1970 and 1975. 
In 1973, it became obvious that single-species quotas were not reducing fishing 
mortality. 7 After a series of meetings, ICNAF decided to implement a 'second-tier 
scheme' to deal with excessive fishing and by-catch problems. The second-tier TAC 
procedure set a TAC for each country and was always to be less than the sum of the 
country's catch quotas for individual species. This forced each country to direct its 
fishing towards the species that was the most valuable to that country so that unwanted 
by-catch, which counted against the total second-tier quotas, was not taken (Anthony 
7 The number of stocks under TA Cs grew from four in 1972, to 24 in 1973. 
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and Murawski, 1986). There were several indications that the second-tier quota scheme 
was effective in reducing the level of overall by-catch and helped to control landings on 
a species basis to be less than the TA Cs. 8 The adoption of the second-tier scheme led 
some countries to redirect their fisheries to minimize or reduce by-catch. By reducing 
the by-catch of species with small allocations, countries were able to catch higher 
proportions of their second tier quotas than if fishing patterns used in previous years 
were employed. The second-tier quota scheme was abandoned in 1977 when the US 
extended its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. 
In 1976, ICNAF called for a 40 percent reduction in effort by non-coastal states 
(relative to 1972-73 levels) with specific stock quotas largely responding to the 
imminent implementation of extended jurisdiction. ICNAF also adopted Fo.1 for setting 
TACs and agreed to give coastal states a higher percentage of shares of the overall 
quotas. The quotas were often exceeded due to the multispecies nature of the fisheries 
and non-selective properties of gear; however, by 1975 and 1976, stocks were 
beginning to recover. 9 Actual reduction in fishing effort was less than the 40 percent 
targeted; it appears that as much as 1/3 of the reduction occurred between 1973 and 
1976 in subareas two, three, and four. ICNAF ceased to exist shortly after the United 
States and Canada extended jurisdiction. In addition to the difficulties of managing a 
multigear and multispecies fishery, ICNAF had a reputation for being slow, awkward 
8 Parsons (1993) argues that it was not in place long enough to assess its effectiveness. 
9 The major groundfish stocks on Georges Banks and Southern New England increased by 86 percent from 1974 to 
1977. Groundfish abundance in all of subareas two, three and four decreased by more than Y2 between 1967 and 
1975, they remained stable in 1975-1976, and then more than doubled between 1976 and 1984. 
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and often incapable of implementing regulations contrary to the interests of any of its 
members (Eckert, 1979). 
2.4.3. Magnuson Era 
In 1976, Fisheries and Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) was enacted. The 
Act (subsequently renamed the Magnuson Act) gave the U.S. government authority to 
regulate and manage marine fisheries between 3 to 200 miles from the coastline. Under 
this Act, the New England groundfish fishery became under the United States 
jurisdiction and the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) was given 
the responsibility of its management. 
On March 15 1977, the Council implemented its first Groundfish Fishery Management 
Plan (FMP), which was developed to protect and enhance the severely overexploited 
stocks of cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder. The plan called for annual catch quotas, 
closed spawning areas, mesh-size restrictions, minimum fish sizes, and trip limits for 
yellowtail flounder. The groundfish plan was essentially the resumption of the 
management scheme in effect under ICNAF. 10 
At the beginning, the Council set annual quotas, or Optimal Yields (OYs), at levels 
which would promptly recover the stocks. Fishermen resisted them since they felt that 
with the departure of the foreign fleets there was little need for management 
10 
ICNAF largely regulated its fisheries by allocating catch quotas by species and geographic area, closed spawning 
areas, and minimum-mesh size. 
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(Hennemuth and Rockwall, 1987). Furthermore, some stocks like haddock appeared to 
be recovering and making a strong comeback. 
Soon after of the implementation of the FMP, it became clear that the annual cod and 
haddock quotas would be met in the first five months of 1977. In June 1977, concerns 
over the possibility of market gluts, price declines, and having an idle fleet for half the 
year, led the Council to implement quarterly quotas, haddock trip limits, additional 
catch restrictions on yellowtail flounder west of 69° longitude, and new haddock by-
catch regulations (Anthony, 1993). The Council's intention was to spread the catch over 
the year and minimize potential user conflicts (Appolonia, 1978). Quarterly quotas soon 
proved to have its limitations too. Since the fleet was so diverse in their fishing capacity 
and capability to operate under different weather conditions and or seasons, some 
segments of the fleets could not harvest their share of the quarterly allocation before 
they were met or exceeded (Appolonia, 1983). To counter this situation the Council 
allocated quotas to specific vessel classes. This was steered at increasing the change that 
each vessel would have an opportunity to harvest their fair share. In July 1977 the US.-
Canadian Reciprocal Fishing Agreement was signed. The arrangement allocated Canada 
17 percent of cod quota, 20 percent of the haddock quota, and 1 percent of the flounder 
quota. As result the cod quota was met in August of 1977 and the directed fishery was 
closed (Anthony, 1990). 
Between 1979 and 1982, the abundance of principal groundfish species had declined by 
53 percent, while fishing trips increased by 47 percent. Fishing mortalities for cod and 
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haddock increased dramatically (nearly doubled between 1977 and 1986). The seasons 
became shorter as the number of vessels (and vessel size) and trip rose. The lack of 
control on the number of participants proved to be disastrous. Between 1977 and 1980, 
the fishing fleet increased from 836 vessels to 1,316 vessels (57% increase). This surge 
in capacity was fueled by a sense of optimism, which reigned in the fishery. Fishermen 
believed that since the foreign fleet was gone, large amounts of fish would be available 
to them. Easy financing and government subsidies only aggravated matters. The failure 
to control catches required an increasing number of regulations. Discarding, under-
reporting and mislabeling catches became rampant during this time. Halliday and 
Pinhom (1997) observe that between a quarter and half of all the fishermen operating on 
Georges Bank frequently violated fishing regulations. Disagreement and poor 
communication between scientists, managers, and fishermen resulted in a loss in 
confidence in the program and mistrust. The plan was finally replace in March of 1982. 
In 1982, the Council implemented the Interim Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic 
Groundfish. The Council believed that quota management program was not necessary 
for rebuilding the resources; instead it relied indirect methods of controlling fishing 
mortality such as minimum fish sizes, mesh-size regulations, spawning area closures, 
and seasonal closures for protection of resources (Anthony, 1990). The plan was a 
stopgap measure until a more encompassing plan could be established (Halliday and 
Pinhom, 1997). The focus of the plan was to maintain stock sizes and enhance the 
prospects of spawning of cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder while reliable data could 
be collected on the fish stocks and harvesting practices (Halliday and Pinhom, 1997). 
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The main groundfish stocks, however, continued to decline. Effort declined on Georges 
Bank, but continued to rise in Gulf of Maine and Southern New England. Despite 
decreasing effort on Georges Bank, CPUE and landings declined. 
The interim plan was replaced by the Fishery Management Plan for the Northeast 
Multispecies fishery in 1986. The goal of this plan was allow the fishery to operate with 
minimum intervention while safeguarding reproductive potential of the stocks. The 
main goal was to control fishing mortality, primarily of juvenile fish as to maintain 
adequate spawning potential (Halliday and Pinhom, 1997). The plan contained a series 
of regulations that included minimum mesh sizes, enlarged closed areas, and greater 
restrictions on small mesh fishing. In the following years, fisheries regulation was 
strengthen by a series of amendments. 
In 1987, Amendment # 1 increased minimum fish sizes and enlarged the areas were 
large mesh size regulations were in effect. This amendment also scheduled a mesh size 
increase from 5.5 to 6 inches. The groundfish resources continued to decline in this 
period. In 1989, Amendment# 2 dropped the scheduled mesh size increase in favor of 
by-catch limits. The plan also increased minimum fish sizes and expanded large mesh 
areas to cover identified spawning grounds and seasons. In the same year, Amendment 
# 3 was introduced which created a flexible area action system to protect juvenile fish. 
In 1991, Amendment # 4 established more stringent minimum fish sizes, mesh size 
restrictions, and closed haddock spawning areas. Amendment # 4 also recognized the 
need to develop and implement rebuilding strategies for the principal groundfish stocks. 
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The failure of indirect control to prevent overfishing resulted in environmental groups 
suing the Department of Commerce in 1991. The suit eventually led to Amendment# 5. 
In 1994, Amendment # 5 was introduced. The goal of the Amendment was to reduce 
fishing mortality to a level, which will increase the percentage of maximum spawning 
potential for cod and yellowtail flounder to 20% in 5 years and to 30% for haddock in 
1 o years. The plan called for a moratorium on new entry and a reduction in fishing 
effort by 50 percent over 5-7 years. The Council also required fishermen to keep and 
submit log records, to accept sea-observers, and banned certain gears. 
The groundfish resource continued to decline. In 1994, 17 percent of Georges Bank was 
closed. On June 1994, Amendment # 6 established 500-lb. haddock possession limit. In 
1996, Amendment# 7 was implemented. The amendment instituted additional restrains 
on fishing effort as the number of days at sea were further reduced. The amendment 
also established target quotas, stringent days at sea controls, minimum fish sizes, closed 
haddock spawning areas, mesh size restrictions, and permanently closed areas for fish 
habitat. These measures have resulted in marked reductions in fishing mortality for four 
main New England groundfish stocks (Georges Bank cod, haddock, and yellowtail 
flounder, and Southern New England yellowtail flounder). The latter of the three stocks 
has recently changed from overexploited to fully exploited. 
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Model 
3.1. Introduction 
Traditionally reducing the species selectivity properties of the gears has been advocated 
for rebuilding overexploited stocks. On the surface, such policies are expected to 
recover dwindling stocks by reducing fishing effort and thus allowing the stocks to 
recuperate. While these policies may be sensible in a single species fisheries, it is 
unclear their impact in a multispecies context. Well-intentioned policies may generate 
un-intended consequences given the complex biological, economic and technological 
interrelationship present in multispecies fisheries. 
The goal of this chapter is to qualitatively derive the biological and economic 
consequences of modifying the species-selectivity properties of fishing gears. To 
achieve this goal we draw on the method of comparative statics. Comparative statics 
allows us to investigate how a system changes from one equilibrium position to another 
in response to changes in one variable. For the purposes of this chapter, we only 
examine selected rebuilding scenarios. However, the results are sufficiently general to 
contemplate other management scenarios. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows . The next section reviews the implications 
of modifying the species selectivity properties drawing on production theory. The third 
section introduces the bioeconomic framework. The fourth and fifth sections analyze 
bioeconomic impacts of modifying the species-selectivity properties of fishing gears in 
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a single and multispecies fishery context. The last section summarizes the main results 
and discusses policy implications. 
3.2. Production Possibility (Transformation) Frontier 
Fishing, like most economic activities, turns inputs into outputs. During the production 
process, fishermen are faced with a set of alternative output combinations for a fixed 
amount of inputs given the existing technology. The set of maximum feasible output 
combinations is often referred as the production possibility (transformation) frontier. 
Figure 2 shows the production possibility frontier for a fishing vessel that harvests two 
species. 
Mathematically, we can express it as 
where e is fishing effort (an aggregate input), xi is the stock size of species i, and hi is 
the harvest of species i. The stock sizes are assumed to be constant. 
The slope of the tangent line to a point of the frontier is the rate at which one output is 
substituted by another at a given input level. Thus, moving along the frontier reflects the 
rate of technical substitution (RTS). The rate of product transformation (RPT) is defined 
as the negative of the slope of the product transformation curve. 
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Figure 2: Production Possibility Frontier 
ho 1 
To derive the RPT, the production function needs to be totally differentiated 
acp acp 
de=-dh1 +-dh2 (3.2) 8h1 · 8h2 
Since a small change in de is zero when the factor level is fixed (i.e., moving along the 
frontier). Then the above relationship reduces to 
(3.2') 
where the RTS 12 is equal to the ratio of marginal physical productivity of x in the 
production of h2 to the marginal productivity of h1. Economic theory tells us that the 
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profit maximizing output level (h 0 1 and h 0 2) is found where the marginal rate of 
technical substitution equals the outputs price ratio. Conceptually, modifying the 
species selectivity properties of the gears involves changing the shape of the production 
frontier (figure 2). For instance, if we were interested in reducing the catchability of 
species 1 we would modify the technology as to shift inward the lower part of the 
production possibility frontier. Conversely, if we were interested in increasing the 
catchability of species 2 we would modify the technology as to shift outward the upper 
part of the production possibility frontier. 
3.3. The Model 
To investigate the impact of improving the species-selectivity properties of the gear, we 
assume a stylized open access fishery where fishermen are allowed to choose the most 
efficient gear configuration and effort levels as to maximize profits. The fishing fleet's 
profit function is given by 
n n 
rr = LP;h; -c(e) = LP;q;er xf -c(e) (3.3) 
i=l i=l 
where p; is the price of species i, h; is the harvest rate of species i, e is the rate of fishing 
effort (i.e., labor and capital devoted to harvesting), q; is the constant catchability 
coefficient of species i, x; is the stock size of species i, c(e) is the harvest cost function, 
and fl and y are constants. 
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Clark (1985) uses the coefficient on the stock size to capture the relationship between 
fish density and population size. 11 The f3 represents the output-stock elasticity, that is, 
the percentage change in the output due a to percentage change in the stock size. The 
output-stock elasticity embodies the impact the stock size and fish density relationship 
has on harvesting costs. The low values imply that harvesting costs are less dependent 
on stock size. A stock-output elasticity of zero indicates that harvesting costs are 
independent of the stock size. Although we recognize that fishermen's ability to select 
the harvest mix (i.e., target) is a function of the technology and relative prices, for 
present purposes, we assume that relative prices are constant. 12 Furthermore, we assume 
that the effort and population dynamics are given by 
n 
e = k(LP;q;x; - ce) 
i=I 
n n 
X; =G(x;)- Lh; =G(x;)- Lq;exf 
i=I i=I 
(3.4) 
\;/ i (3.5) 
where x; and e are the rate of change of the fleet's effort and population size of species i, 
and G(x;) is the growth rate of species i, Ce is the marginal cost of effort, and k is a 
constant. The friction parameter, k, captures the system's inability to adjust effort 
instantaneously both at the individual vessel level and at the fleet level through entry 
and exit. We also assume that the growth function has the following curvature 
properties 
11 
In Clark's formulation, f3's greater than one were found to correspond to demersal fisheries whereas 0 $ {3$ I were 
found to correspond to pelagic schooling fisheries. This formulation, however, is not necessarily fishery- specific. 
Hanneson (1983), Flaaten (1987), and Eide et al., 1998 use this Cobb-Douglass formulation as gear specific instead. 
Eide et al., (1998) indicate that active gears such bottom trawls and gears which attract fish such as longlines and 
hand lines tend to have low f3 values. Gill nets, on the other hand, were found to possess f3's closer to one. 
12 
For a discussion on this issue see Campbell and Nicholl ( 1994). 
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G(x;) > 0 V 0 < X; < K, 
G(O) = G(K) = 0, A 
G x, x, (x;) < 0 V X; > 0 
In the following sections, we present the long-run impact of modifying the species 
selectivity properties of the gear both in a single and multispecies context. Although we 
do not discuss the effects of improving the catchability in the short-run, we introduce 
both short-run and long-run results in appendix A. 13 
3.4. Technical change in a single species fishery 
To investigate the long-run implications of modifying the catchability coefficient it is 
useful to start our analysis examining a single species fishery. For this case we assume 
that the bionomic conditions are specified by 
(3.6) 
x = G(x) - qexf3 (3.7) 
To solve for the long-run impacts of modifying the species selectivity properties of this 
system, we set equations 3.6 and 3.7 equal to zero (i.e., equilibrium) and differentiate 
with respect to q, the catchability coefficient. To ensure that a stable equilibrium exists, 
we restrict the sign of specific terms based on dynamic stability considerations. 14 The 
use of these stability conditions is important since it allows us to make determinate 
qualitative inferences about comparative statics results. In our case, these conditions 
determine that the sign of the denominator be positive in the comparative statics results 
(Appendix B). 
13 For the purposes of this chapter, the difference between short-run and long-run is that in the long-run the stock size 
adjusts to a new equilibrium whereas in the short-run there is no change in the stock size. 
14 
This method is also know as the "correspondence principle" (Samuelson, 194 7). 
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Solving for the long-run impact on effort of modifying the species-selectivity properties 
of the gear, we find that 
de 
dq {3pq 2xf3 x(/3-1) -(Gx - {3qex<f3-I)) cee 
(+) 
The long-run impact on the stock size is given by 
(+) 
r-"------. 
dx -xf3(pqxf3 +ceee) 
dq {3pq 2xf3x<f3-I) -(Gx -{3qex<f3-l) )cee 
(+) 
The long-run impact on the harvest rate is given by 
(+) 
r-"------. 
dh -x 13 Gx(pqxf3 +ceee) 
dq {3pq 2 xf3 x<f3-I) -(Gx -{3qex<f3 - l) )cee 
(+) 
(3.8) 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
A summary of the long-run impacts of improving the catchability coefficient in a single 
species fishery is presented in table 2. 
Table 1: Long-run impacts of improving the catchability in a single species fishery. 
Exploitation level de/dq dx/dq dh/dq 
Underexploited(Gx<O) (+) (-) (+) 
Maximum sustainable yield (Gx=O) No change (-) No change 
Overexploited (Gx>O) (-) (-) (-) 
Until now the exposition has focused on the mathematical derivation of the long-run 
impacts on effort, stock size, and harvest rates of modifying the species selectivity 
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properties of the gear. The attainment of these new equilibria, however, has been 
assumed to have occurred instantaneously. While the technique employed provides 
valuable insight into the long-run effects, it neglects the dynamic adjustments between 
equilibria. The understanding of this transition is useful since many of the variables do 
not adjust instantaneously. The population size, for example, will not adjust 
immediately to increased levels of effort. In fact it will take several time periods to 
equilibrate to new effort levels. Similarly, the presence (absence) of rents will not 
necessarily result in rapid entry (exit) of vessels into the fishery as there are significant 
start-up costs and capital is not malleable. 
For expository purposes, we assume that the fleet is initially in long-run bionomic 
equilibrium (point A in figure 3). At this equilibrium the fleet's long-run average 
revenue of effort, ARlR(X0), intersects the short-run average revenue curve, ARE 
SR(X0) , and the marginal cost of effort, MCE. The long-run average revenue curve, 
ARl \X0) , describes how the fleet's total revenue varies per unit of effort produced 
when both effort and stock size have fully adjusted. The short-run average revenue 
curve, ARESR(X0) , also known as the stock-constant average revenue curve, captures the 
fleet's average revenue over a shorter period of time, where effort is allowed to vary but 
stock size is held fixed. In other words, the period of time is too short for the stock size 
to adjust to new effort levels. Lastly, the marginal cost of effort, MCE> shows how costs 
increase by employing an additional (marginal) unit of effort. In the panel below, the 
curve labeled PEC, the population equilibrium curve, describes the relationship between 
long-run population size and effort. 
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Now Jet us assume that there is a reduction in the catchability coefficient, which makes 
harvesting less efficient. In the short-run, we expect that revenue will decrease as the 
fleet's short-run average revenue of effort shifts downwards, decreasing effort to point 
B. At this effort level, the marginal cost of effort, MCE, is equal to the new short-run 
(stock-constant) average revenue of effort curve, ARESR'(X0). Although the ARlR and 
PEC shift when the catchability coefficient is changed, the fishery is not in equilibrium 
in the short-run. The PEC shifts outwards because more effort is needed to maintain the 
stock at any given size. Similarly, the lower portion of the ARE LR rotates outwards, as 
more effort is needed to produce the same amount of revenue formerly generated. As 
the stock size declines, the short-run average revenue of effort increases. The fleet 
reaches a new effort equilibrium where the short and long-run average revenue curve 
intersect with the marginal cost of effort yielding a new equilibrium effort (E1) and 
stock size (X1) levels (see, point C in figure 3). In short, reducing the catchability 
coefficient results in a long-run increase in effort and stock size. 
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Figure 3: Reduction in the catchability coefficient 
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3.5. Technical change in a multispecies fishery 
When considering the impact of modifying the selectivity properties of the gear, it is 
useful to distinguish between two polar cases: perfectly selective and perfectly non-
selective fishing technologies. Perfectly selective technologies grant fishermen perfect 
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control of the harvest mix. In other words, fishermen can catch (target) specific species 
or species group. Conversely, perfectly non-selective technologies do not allow 
fishermen control over the catch composition. In reality, the selectivity properties of 
most gears fall between these categories. Squires and Kirkley (1991), for instance, have 
shown that non-selective technologies such as trawls have a mo.dicum of flexibility 
depending on the species harvested. Nevertheless, this categorization provides us with 
clearer understanding of how improving the selectivity impacts different types of 
harvesting technologies. 
The adoption of improved technology has been instrumental to the rise and demise of 
many fisheries. Excessive fishing pressure has been linked to changes in the food web 
structure and species composition. In our model, we consider how technology impacts 
the fish community structure. In particular we investigate multispecies fisheries that are 
biologically independent and interdependent. We focus on these scenarios because we 
want to derive qualitative insights for developing rebuilding strategies and establish 
benchmarks to investigate to what extent shifts in the community structure are 
dependent on fishing activities and biological interactions. 
While the derived theoretical results are sufficiently general to investigate a wide range 
of cases, our exposition will focus on three specific rebuilding strategies. 
a) Reducing the target species catchability. Gear restrictions, such as, limitations 
on mesh size, number of hooks per line, and dredge size are often adopted for 
36 
rebuilding overexploited fisheries. These policies contribute to the rebuilding 
process by decreasing the fishing pressure on the target species, allowing the 
stocks to recover. 
b) Increasing the non-targeted species, or accompanying species, catchability. It 
has been argued that these policies increase the economic returns from the 
accompanying species by making their harvest less expensive. These policies 
are expected to divert some effort away from the target overexploited species. 
c) Simultaneously decreasing the target species catchability and increasing the 
accompanying species catchability. This policy, when feasible, is preferred 
because any losses in profitability caused by reductions in the catchability in the 
target species can be at least partially offset by increasing economic returns from 
the accompanying species. 
3.5.1. Perfectly Selective Technology 
3.5.1.a. Biologically Independent Two-Species Fishery Case 
We assume that either one fleet harvests two species simultaneously or that two 
independent fleets individually harvest one species. Additionally we assume that the 
fleet(s) is (are) operating under open access conditions and that the long-run equilibrium 
the following conditions hold 
e. = k .(p ·q ·xP - c (e . e ·)) = o 
1 1 1 r 1 e; '' J (3.11) 
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(3.12) 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
where e; and ej are the effort levels devoted to harvesting the target species i and the 
accompanying species j , respectively. Also, we assume that the fleet(s) are 
economically interrelated. The fleet(s) marginal cost of effort is dependent on the 
amount of effort devoted to each species. For instance, if we attenuate fleet i's 
catchability coefficient, we also reduce the opportunity cost of effort devoted to 
harvesting species i. The opportunity cost of effort is the forgone benefits for employing 
the effort in the next best alternative. Since fishery j has now a higher opportunity cost 
of effort, some effort is transferred from species i to species j as to maximize the 
economic returns per unit of effort. This transfer of effort increases the marginal cost of 
effort of harvesting species i (ce.i) and decreases the marginal cost of effort of harvesting 
species j (ceJ). The new equilibria is reached when each fleet's long-run average 
revenue curve equals their respective marginal cost of effort at the new equilibrium 
stock sizes and effort levels. Lastly, throughout the analysis, we assume that the target 
species i is overexploited, and the accompanying species} is underexploited. 
To investigate the long-run consequences of improving the catchability coefficient in 
biologically independent two-species fishery, we set equations (3.11)-(3.14) equal to 
zero and differentiate them with respect to q;. Since we are only interested in stable 
equilibrium results we draw on stability conditions to determine unambiguous 
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qualitative results. The effects of modifying the catchability of species i are shown in 
appendix C. 
Initially, we consider the case where we reduce the catchability of the overexploited 
species i. Comparative statics results show that the long-run effort on the overexploited 
species i increases while the long-run effort on the underexploited species j decreases 
(Figure 4). In the long-run both stock sizes increase. The intuition of this case is as 
follows. We begin by assuming that the fleets are in long-run bioeconomic equilibrium 
at point A and A', respectively. Decreasing the species i's catchability causes fleet i's 
short-run (stock-constant) average revenue to fall reaching point B, decreasing fleet i's 
short-run effort level. In contrast, fleet j's short-run average revenue curve remains in 
the original position; however, fleet j's MC(ej.ol e i,o)' shifts to B' as if receives some 
effort from fishery i. 
As more effort is transferred from fishery i to fishery j, the costs of fishery i increase, 
shifting the MC(E;,olEj.o)' to the left. This marginal cost curve shift further reduces 
fishery i effort level to point C. Similarly fishery j's costs decrease, and fishery j effort 
level increases to C' (respect to A). As mentioned above, the marginal cost curves shift 
because of economical interdependencies. Changing species i's catchability coefficient 
shifts the population equilibrium curve, PEC, outward. 
As the harvesting rate of species i decreases, its size stock begins to recuperate raising 
fleet's i short-run average revenue curve. The increase in species i stock size, causes 
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fleet i's profitability to increase drawing effort back from the accompanying species j 
fishery and also rotates outward the lower portion of species i's long-run average 
revenue curve. This shift in effort releases some of the fishing pressure from species j, 
which then starts to increase as well. The effort transfer shift target species, shifts 
species i and j marginal cost of effort curve to right and left, respectively. Once both 
populations stabilize both fleets' short and long-run average revenue curves intersect 
the new marginal cost of effort curve reaching a new long-run effort and stock size 
equilibria at D and D'. In the long-run, effort devoted to the harvest of species i 
increases to Eu while the effort devoted to the species j decreases to Ej.1. The long-run 
both stock sizes increase to x;, 1 and Xj. 1 • 
Next we consider the case where we improve the catchability of the underexploited 
species j. In the long-run, the effort level on overexploited species i decreases and its 
stock size increases. On the other hand, the long-run effort level on species j decreases 
and its stock size decreases (figure 5). 
The economic reasoning is as follows. Increasing species j's catchability raises fleet j's 
short-run average revenue curve from A' to point B' and increases short-run effort. As 
the opportunity cost of effort increases some is transferred from fishery i to fishery j. 
Fleet i' s short-run average revenue curve remains in its original position but the effort 
level diminishes as its marginal cost of effort shifts to the left (point B). As more effort 
is transferred, fleet j's marginal cost curve shifts to the right to point C'. As before, 
changing the catchability of species j shifts the PECj outwards. 
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Figure 4: Decreasing the catchability coefficient of the target species. 
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The increased harvesting pressure on species j, decreases species j's stock size and 
increases species i's stock size. The increase in species i's population, increases fleet i's 
profitability and draws effort away from fleet). This raises (drops) fleet i's (j's) short-
run average revenue curve and shifts the marginal cost of effort curve to the right (left). 
Eventually, both fleets' stock size and effort level settle into a new long-run equilibrium 
at D and D'. In the long-run, species i's population size increases and its effort level 
decreases. In contrast, in the long-run, species j's stock size decreases and its effort 
level increases. 
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Figure 5: Increase in the catchability of the accompanying species in the selective case. 
$ 
I 
I 
: MC(EufEj. 1) 
I 
I 
I 
$ 
MC(E1.ii,Eu ). 
I . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~--__:.._-1-_ _,_1----'-:'_,,C_' ___ ARE(X j.o)"' I I 
I 
~----c,-'----7"°--t--7~--- ARE(X1.J" 
1------7"0:.,......~.,,....=-f-:---'.....--- ARE'"(X,,o)s•· 
E 
PEC1 
x j.1 -----r----- -- --r;/~ 
" : 
-----------'--I 
X j .O I' I' 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" ,,"PEC;' 
E 
Lastly, we consider the impact of regulations that simultaneously increase the 
underexploited species j's catchability and decrease overexploited species i's 
catchability. Comparative statics results show ambiguous results for both effort levels 
and speciesj's stock size. However, species i's stock size increases. As in the previous 
case, the fleet i's effort is initially drawn into the accompanying species j causing the 
species j's (i's) short-run average revenue curve to fall (rise). As the profitability of 
fleet j 's declines because of diminishing stocks, fleet i's profitability increases due to 
mcreasing stocks. As result, fleet i draws back some effort initially taken by fleet j. 
Ultimately both fleets adjust to a new stock and effort equilibria. As before, altering the 
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catchability coefficient causes the lower portion of the long-run average revenue curve 
of species i (j) to rotate outward (inward). The extent of shift determines the magnitude 
and sign of the species i and j effort level, and species j stock size. Species i stock size 
increases ambiguously. 
3.5.1.b. Biologically Interdependent Two-Species Fishery Case 
In the preceding analysis, we assumed there were no biological interactions between the 
harvested species. An open question is how do the results change when biological 
interdependencies are present, in particular predator-prey relationships. To explore this 
case we introduce a vector of interdependent stocks as arguments in the growth 
functions such that 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
(3.18) 
where Xis a vector of biologically interdependent stock sizes, G(x) and H(x) are the 
growth function of species i and j, respectively. Applying the comparative statics 
technique, we obtain the long-run equilibrium effects on effort and stock size (see, 
Appendix D). Throughout we assume that species i is the prey while the species j is the 
predator. 
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The first case is where we reduce the catchability of the overexploited prey species i. 
Comparative statics results show that in the long-run both stock sizes increase and that 
the impact on both effort levels is ambiguous. The reasoning for this result is as follows. 
Reducing the catchability of the prey species i reduces fleet i's profitability. Therefore, 
some of the prey effort is drawn to predator fleet j. The prey stock size increases in 
response to reduced harvesting and predatory pressure. As the prey becomes more 
abundant, the prey fleet i's profitability increases and some of the effort is drawn back 
from the predator fleet j. This effort transfer relieves some of the harvesting pressure 
from predator stocks, which now have a more abundant food source. This increased 
food availability allows the predator stock size to increase. Eventually, both stocks 
settle to new higher stock size equilibrium. The long-run impact on effort levels is 
ambiguous because it depends on the relative magnitudes of predatory response and the 
economic value of the two species. Flaaten (1991), for instance, has shown that when 
the prey is inexpensive to harvest compared to the predator there is the possibility that 
the predator may not be harvested under open access conditions. 
We next examined the case in which the selectivity of the underexploited predator 
species j is increased. In this case, comparative statics results show that in the long-run 
the impact on both effort levels and predator stock size is ambiguous. The prey 
population size, however, increases. The third case examined was where the selectivity 
of the predator species j is increased and the selectivity of the prey species i is 
decreased. Comparative statics analysis showed inconclusive long-run results for both 
effort levels and for the predator stock size. The prey stock size increased. The 
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economic reasoning for these two cases follows the logic of the first case. As mentioned 
earlier, the ambiguity of some results is due to the relative magnitudes of economic and 
biological interactions, which determine the sign and extent of long-run impacts. 
3.5.2. Non-Selective Technology 
3.5.2.a.Biologically Independent Two-Species Fishery Case 
So far, we have considered the impact of modifying the catchability coefficient when 
the technology is selective. Remarkably, all three policies in the biologically 
independent, perfectly selective gear case contribute to rebuilding the stocks. The issue 
we examine in this section is whether the effectiveness of these policies will hold in the 
biologically independent, perfectly non-selective case. 
To examine this case we assume that the fishery is in the long-run equilibrium where 
the following conditions hold 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
(3.21) 
To explore the long-run consequences of modifying the catchability coefficient in a 
biologically independent two-species fishery, we set equations (3.20)-(3.22) equal to 
zero and differentiate them with respect to q;. The derivation of the effects of changing 
the catchability of species i is shown in appendix C. Throughout the analysis we assume 
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that species i is the overexploited targeted species while the species j is the 
underexploited accompanying (non-targeted) species. 
First, we investigate the impact of reducing the catchability of the overexploited target 
species i' s. Comparative statics results indicate that reducing the target species i's 
catchability increases long-run effort and the target species stock size. The 
accompanying species stock size, on the other hand, decreases. The economic reasoning 
is straightforward. 
Starting where the fishery initially is in long-run equilibrium, the fleet's short-run and 
long-run average revenue of effort curve intersect the marginal cost of effort curve 
(point A in figure 6). Note that the long-run average revenue curve is kinked. Reducing 
the catchability coefficient of species i , lowers the fleet's short-run average revenue 
curve, and, thus, decreases short-run effort to point B. The change in catchability 
coefficient shifts outward species i's population equilibrium curve, PEC; ', as more 
effort is needed maintain any stock size. 
The increased harvesting pressure lowers accompanying species j's stock size. Species 
j's population equilibrium curve is not altered since there is no change in its catchability 
coefficient. As the target species i stock size increases, the fleet's short-run average 
revenue curve rises reaching a new higher equilibrium at ARE (x;,J,Xj.J)sR. The top 
portion of the long-run average revenue curve rotates inwards and the lower portion 
outwards. The new long-run and short-run average revenue curve of effort intersects 
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marginal cost of effort curve at point C. This new long-run equilibrium results in a 
higher long-run effort level (E1) and target stock size (xu ), and lower accompanying 
stock size (XJ.J ). 
Figure 6: Reduction in the catchability coefficient of the target species. 
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Second, we analyze the case where we improve the catchability of the underexploited 
accompanying species j. In this case, comparative statics results show that long-run 
effort increases and both stock sizes decrease. The economic reasoning for this case is 
as follows. Increasing the catchability of the accompanying species, raises the fleet's 
short-run average revenue curve, and thus, short-run effort. 
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Figure 7 shows how the short-run average curve increases from ARE (x ;,o ,xj,O )SR to ARE 
(x ;,o,Xj.o) SR'. This increased short-run effort results in lower short-run stock sizes. After 
the initial increase in effort, harvest rates become unsustainable. This lowers the fleet's 
short-run average revenue curve as both stocks begin to decline. Simultaneously to 
change the catchability coefficient the population equilibrium curve, PEC j, shifts 
inward and the lower part of the fleet's long-run average revenue curve rotates inward. 
Eventually, the system settles into new bioeconomic equilibrium where the short and 
long-run average curve intersect the marginal cost of effort curve. This new equilibrium 
yields lower long-run effort levels, and population sizes. In this case, policies that 
increase the catchability of accompanying species will not aid the rebuilding process. 
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Figure 7: Increase in the catchability of the accompanying species in the non-selective 
case. 
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Third, we consider the case where we simultaneously increase the catchability of the 
accompanying species and reduce the catchability of the target species. Comparative 
statics results show that in the long-run, effort increases while the accompanying 
species stock size decreases. The long-run impact on the target stock size is ambiguous. 
The intuition of this case is similar to that presented in the prev10us cases. The 
ambiguity, however, arises from the magnitude of the impact each species has on the 
fleet ' s average revenue curve. The long-run impact on the target stock depends on the 
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magnitude of the shift in the population equilibrium curve. If there was a significant 
change in the catchability of the target species i, this would cause a notable outward 
shift in the population equilibrium curve, which in tum would result in a larger 
population size. Conversely, if the reduction of the catchability of the species i was 
minimal then its stock size could either increase or show no change, depending on the 
extent of the shift in the population equilibrium curve. The population size of the 
accompanying species j, however, will always decrease since the population 
equilibrium curve shifts inward. 
3.5.2.b. Biologically Interdependent Two-Species Fishery Case 
Now we incorporate biological interactions into the perfectly non-selective technology 
case. To explore this instance we introduce a vector of interdependent stocks as 
arguments in the growth functions such that 
(3.22) 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
where x is a vector of biologically interdependent stock sizes, G(x) and H(x) are the 
growth function of species i and j, respectively. Applying the comparative statics 
technique, we obtain the long-run equilibrium effects on effort and stock size (Appendix 
D). 
so 
Here we revisit the same extensions discussed in the earlier sections, however, we 
incorporate predator-prey relationships to examine how these new results differ from 
the biologically interdependent, perfectly selective case. In the latter case, it was found 
that in the long-run the prey stocks increased unambiguously, however, the long-run 
impact on the predator stock size varied depending on the case considered. 
First, we consider the case where we reduce the catchability of the overexploited target 
prey species i. Comparative statics analysis yields ambiguous results on long-run effort 
and long-run prey and predator stock sizes. To understand these results, we need to 
know how the predator stocks vary with changes in prey abundance. 
Setting equations (3.23) and (3.24) equal to zero, we obtain 
G(x) = H(x) 
q;X; q j x j 
Differentiating the above equation with respect to the stock sizes, we obtain 
(3.25) 
By inspection it is clear that the sign of the marginal increase in the prey abundance 
(species i) is ambiguous given the assumptions of this case. In the numerator, for 
instance, the first and second terms are positive while the last term is negative. 
Therefore, the increases (decreases) in prey abundance do not necessarily translate into 
higher (lower) predator abundance. 
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We observe that by decreasing the catchability of the target prey stock, the short-run 
profitability and effort decrease. As the prey abundance begins to increase, several 
scenarios are possible. Larger prey stocks could provide additional food to the predator, 
thus, increasing the abundance of the latter. The increased stock will result in greater 
profits, leading to larger effort levels. The increased effort could, depending on the 
magnitude of the reduction in the prey's catchability, decrease the predator's abundance 
to a greater extent. Thus, in the long-run, effort levels and prey stock size could increase 
while the predator stock size could decrease. Alternatively, if predation rates were 
sufficiently large as to consume any gains from stock rehabilitation, increased predator 
stock levels could further depress prey stocks and the profitability of the fleet. Lower 
profits could result in further lower effort levels. Eventually, the fleet could achieve a 
new long-run equilibrium with lower effort and prey stock size and a higher predator 
stock size. 
The second case is where the catchability of the predator is increased. Comparative 
statics results show that in the long-run effort increases and the predator stock 
decreases. The impact on the prey stock, however, is unclear. The reason for this result 
is that by increasing the catchability of the predator, the prey stock size increases. This 
increase in prey abundance increases the fleet's profitability and effort level. This effort 
increase further diminishes the predator stocks. The impact on the prey stock, however, 
depends on the relative strength of the offsetting effects of predation and harvesting 
pressure. 
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The third case examined is where there is a simultaneous increase in the catchability 
coefficient of the predator species and reduce the catchability of the prey species. In this 
case, the long-run effects on effort and stock size are ambiguous. As in the previous 
cases, the ambiguity results from the relative magnitude of decreasing predation rates 
and increased harvesting pressure. 
3.6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have discussed, in qualitative terms, the bionomic impacts of 
modifying the species selectivity properties of the selective and non-selective gears in a 
multispecies fishery. We consider the cases where the fishery is biologically 
independent and biologically interdependent. Our analysis shows that there is a 
considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the qualitative impact of technological 
improvement. Not surprisingly, the level of uncertainty increases when biological 
interrelationships are introduced. In the perfectly non-selective gear case, the number of 
effects with ambiguous signs increased from one to seven in the presence of predator-
prey relationships. Similarly, in the perfectly selective gear case, the number of effects 
with ambiguous signs increased from three to eight. 
The major thrust of this piece, however, is to consider policies that can contribute to 
rebuilding overexploited stocks. Our analysis shows that policy prescriptions vary 
considerably with the type of technology employed. When regulating non-selective 
gears, managers interested in rebuilding stocks should focus on reducing the 
catchability of the target species (table 3). Policies intended to divert effort towards 
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accompanying species can wind up further decreasing the stock of the overexploited 
species. Policies that simultaneously decrease the catchability of the target species and 
increase the catchability of the accompanying species yield ambiguous results. In the 
presence of predator-prey relationships, none of the policies yield unambiguous results. 
Managers have greater leeway when regulating perfectly selective gears. Restricting the 
catchability of the target species, or increasing the selectivity of the accompanying 
species, or a combination of these policies, can contribute favorably to the rebuilding 
efforts. The presence of a biological interaction does not add ambiguity to the 
rebuilding process. However, it does not yield clear-cut results on the impact on the 
accompanying species (Table 4). Although no general results could be obtained for 
some of the cases, uncertainty could be reduced on a case by case basis by the use of 
numerical simulations. Bioeconomic outcomes could be significantly different 
depending on the relative strength of the biological and economic terms. 
These results have useful implications for rebuilding New England groundfish stocks. If 
managers were interested in recovering the overexploited stocks policies should be not 
only species specific but also gear specific. When regulating non-selective gears, such 
as trawlers and gillnets, managers should focus on policies that reduce the catchability 
of target species. Decreasing the selectivity of target species will contribute to 
rebuilding the stocks while increasing long-run effort. 
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Another consideration in regulating non-selective gears is the notion that fishermen, in 
some cases, can choose the catch composition in response to relative prices (Kirkley 
and Strand, 1988; Squires and Kirkley, 1991; Campbell and Nichols, 1994). We, 
however, assumed that prices were fixed in this study. Nevertheless, if fishermen can 
select to some extent the catch mix, then it is possible to create a system of incentives 
that would allow fishermen to manage stocks on an individual basis (Sissenwine and 
Kirkley, 1991,Campbell and Nicholl, 1994). This implies that market-based 
mechanisms may have a role in rebuilding the stocks. For instance, to expedite the 
groundfish rebuilding process a program could be instituted where groundfish catches 
(prey) are taxed and pelagic and /or elasmobranch catches (predators) are subsidized. If 
fishermen cannot select their output mix then the catch is technologically determined 
and such methods would not be effective. Taxes and subsidies would provide no 
protection to overexploited species and, under certain conditions, could lead to 
extinction (Costa Duarte, 1992). 
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Table 3: Main results from the perfectly non-selective multispecies technology case. 
Decreasing the selectivity of target Improving the selectivity of Decreasing the selectivity of target 
species accompanying species species and improving the selectivity 
Effort Target Accompanying Effort Target 
of accom£!l~~~cies 
Accompanying Effort Target Accompanying 
stock stock size stock stock size stock stock size 
size size size 
Biologically (+) (+) (-) (+) (-) (-) (+) (U) (-) 
Ind~endent 
Biologically (U) (U) (U) (+) (U) (-) (U) (U) (U) 
Interrelated 
Table 4: Main results from the perfectly selective multispecies technology case. 
Decreasing the selectivity of target species Improving the selectivity of accompanying Decreasing the selectivity of target species and 
species improving the selectivity of accompanying 
SJ>_ecies 
Effort Effort Target Accomp. Effort Effort Target Accomp. Effort Effort Target Accomp. 
on On stock on on stock on on stock 
target Accomp. size Stock size target Accomp. size Stock size target Accomp. size stock 
stock Stock stock stock stock stock size 
Biologically (+) (-) (+) (+) (-) (+) (+) (-) (U) (U) (+) (U) 
Ind~endent 
Biologically (U) (U) (+) (+) (U) (U) (+) (U) (U) (U) (+) (U) 
Interrelated 
Another implication for managing New England groundfish stocks is that perfectly 
selective gears provide greater flexibility. Fishermen's ability to allocate effort between 
species until the marginal revenue per unit of effort is equal among species expands the 
suite of options available to the manager. In fact, all three gear modification policies 
considered under both biologically dependent and biologically interdependent 
conditions contributed to the rebuilding of the groundfish stocks. Analogous to the non-
selective case, managers can also make use of market-based mechanisms. Costa Duarte 
(1992) notes that when fishermen can perfectly select their catch, a tax (subsidy) policy 
would be appropriate since it would lower (increase) the marginal revenue from the 
overexploited species and transfer effort to the accompanying species. 
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Chapter 4: Econometric Estimation 
4.1 Introduction 
Most multispecies models assume that the output (species) mix of multiproduct firms is 
fixed in proportions. This specification is extremely restrictive since fails to recognize 
that the harvest mix may be a function of relative prices as well as technology. 
Depending on the type of technology, fluctuations in market prices may induce firms to 
modify the harvest mix. Failing to recognize that fishermen may be able to respond to 
relative prices has important implications for management. 
In this chapter, we examine the technology of the New England fishing fleet, which 
operates in Georges Bank. The model serves as a basis for empirically testing-to what 
extent, if any, fishermen can select the composition of their catch. The estimates are 
then used in chapter five to develop an empirical bioeconomic model. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In the second section, we describe 
alternative approaches to modeling multiproduct firm's technology. The third section 
presents the profit maximizing duality-based approach to examine the underlying 
characteristics of the technology. Section four describes the estimation procedure and 
section five describes the statistical results. The last section summarizes the main results 
and limitations. 
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4.2 Approaches to modeling firm's technology 
The finn 's technology can be derived from two distinct but equivalent approaches. The 
primal approach explicitly solves the firm's production optimization problem. Under 
this approach, the usual behavioral objective is profit maximization. After solving for 
the first order conditions, output supply and input demand curves can be derived. This 
approach has been prevalent in fisheries economics literature for decades (see, for 
instance Clark, 1990). Most of the work under this approach has focused on comparing 
the different forms of exploitation such as open access and optimal management. 
A limitation of the primal approach is that fails to introduce profit-maximizing behavior 
on the part of the fishermen into the estimation of production functions. In other words, 
production functions simply describe relationships between outputs and inputs (Dupont, 
1988). Prices do not play a significant role in the description of the technology. 
Furthermore, input-output relationships are usually in fixed proportions. 
An alternative to the primal approach is the dual approach. Under a dual approach, we 
assume that fishermen have solved the optimization problem and that the solution yields 
an indirect objective function. Since the indirect profit function represents the maximum 
profit associated with given output and factor prices, the fishing vessel's technology can 
be derived by applying the envelope theorem. 15 The optimal levels of output and factors 
are a function of output and factor prices. The dual approach yields output supply and 
15 
The envelope theorem states that a change in the maximum value of a function brought about by a change in the 
parameter of the function can be found by partially differentiating the function with respect to the parameter (when 
all other variables are taken at their optimal values). 
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factor demand equations by partially differentiating the indirect objective function with 
respect to output and input prices, respectively. 
Mathematically, 
m n 
n= IPiQ~(P,W)-IW;E~(P,W) (4.t) 
where P is a vector of m output prices, Q is a vector of m outputs, Wis the vector of n 
input prices, and E is a vector of inputs. 
More compactly, 
7t = n(P, W) (4.2) 
Applying Hotelling's lemma (i.e., differentiating the profit function with respect to 
price P;), we obtain 
an . 
BP= Q; (P,W) 
I 
(4.3) 
where Q; is the i 1h output supply equation. 
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Similarly, partially differentiating by the input price we obtain 
air =-E .• (PW) 
aw. I ' 
I 
(4.4) 
where E; is the i1" factor demand equation. 
While the dual approach does not offer more insight than the primal approach, it is often 
a more convenient way to estimate technological relationships. The primal approach 
uses quantities as arguments while the dual approach uses prices as arguments. The dual 
approach has the advantage that when we statistically _estimate technological 
relationships, the potential of simultaneity bias is avoided since input and output prices 
are assumed to the exogenous; however, this is not usually the case with quantities. 
Also, the dual approach is useful in generating a functional specification for a consistent 
set of output supply and factor demand equations for econometric estimation (Beattie 
and Taylor, 1993). To recover all the relevant economic information about the 
technology from the indirect profit function a series of regularity conditions must be 
met. Regularity conditions require that the profit function be continuous, twice 
differentiable, bounded, linearly homogenous and convex in input and output prices, 
and increasing and concave in the fixed factors. 
4.3 The Model 
To estimate the multiproduct fishing vessel's technology we drew on the duality 
framework. We assumed that fishermen maximize profits (revenue) in two stages as 
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hypothesized by Squires and Kirkley (1991). In the first stage (short-run), fishermen 
maximize revenue, while at sea, by selecting the most valuable output mix for a given 
level fixed inputs, and relative output prices. During the fishing trip, vessel inputs are 
largely fixed and cannot be readily modified (Kirkley and Squires, 1991). Therefore, 
profit (revenue) maximizing is an appropriate behavioral objective for a fishing trip 
once the fishing grounds have been decided (Kirkley and Strand, 1988). In the second 
stage (long-run), we assume that fishermen choose the effort level that minimizes costs 
(and thus maximizes profits) by selecting the optimal capital stock. 
We modeled the short-run, revenue maximizing stage where fishermen decide on its 
output mix given a fixed level of inputs, weather and stock constraints, and relative 
output prices. McFadden (1978) has shown that revenue maximization is equivalent to 
profit maximization when inputs are fixed. Chambers (1988) observes that revenue 
maximizing is a true economic problem since firms for a fixed input bundle can choose 
to produce an array of outputs. 
To examine fishing vessel technology a specific functional form must be selected. The 
selection of the functional form was governed by a number of issues. An initial 
consideration may be the number of parameters to be estimated since insufficient data 
may prevent the adoption of richer and more complex specifications. Second, the 
researcher must be careful in choosing a specification that imposes restrictions on the 
hypothesis to be tested. For instance, the use of the normalized quadratic imposes 
homothetic input-output separability (Dupont 1990). Third, the investigator may want to 
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select a specification that yields direct estimates of output quantities as opposed to 
shares. For instance, the Leontief specification uses quantities as dependent variables 
whereas the translog specification uses shares as the dependent variable. Lastly, the 
investigator may desire analytical solutions rather than numerical approximations, 
which can be very unstable. 
An important consideration in selecting a specification is the ability to test a certain 
hypothesis, in our case fishermen's ability to target or select their harvest mix. A 
commonly tested hypothesis is the presence of non-jointness-in-inputs. A production 
process that is non-joint-in-inputs does not require all inputs to produce all outputs. 
Under the revenue-maximizing framework, fishermen maximize benefits by selecting a 
point on the product transformation frontier where the marginal rate of transformation 
equals the relative price of the outputs. If the technology is non-joint-in-inputs then a 
separate production function exists for each output (or set of outputs) since there are no 
technological or cost tradeoffs between the different production processes. This 
suggests that producers maximize the production of outputs and that the supply of the 
individual outputs is inelastic. Since the supply of outputs is inelastic the output mix is 
technologically determined. 
Graphically, the proportion of each species harvested depends upon the effort level but 
not on relative prices (Figure 8). Since fishermen harvest in fixed proportions the 
product transformation curve traces the output expansion path. From an economic 
63 
perspective, this case is trivial since it can be easily converted to a single product case 
by defining a new composite input and a new composite price. 
More interesting is the joint-in-inputs case. A technology that is joint-in-inputs requires 
all inputs to produce all outputs. Jointness-in-inputs suggests the presence of 
technological and cost interrelationships in the production process. Since joint-in-inputs 
technologies are not necessarily inelastic, fishermen may have some control over the 
harvest mix. In other words, technologies that are joint-in-inputs allow fishermen to 
select (target) their output composition (species mix) in response to market conditions. 
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Estimation 
The estimation of the multiproduct firms technology requires the fulfillment of 
regularity conditions. Unfortunately, a significant share of the applied economic 
production work frequently violates these conditions, particularly the theoretically 
expected curvature conditions. 16 Our empirical results were no different. Our estimates 
failed to conform to economic theory. Violations in the curvature conditions were 
manifested in the wrong signs on the own-price elasticities of supply. 
In this section, we review the different specifications that we tried in our search for 
theoretically sound estimates. We estimated a non-homethetic generalized Leontief 
profit function and two forms of the normalized quadratic profits functions (i.e., non-
constant and constant returns to scale) on an annual level. Finally, we estimated the 
non-homethetic generalized Leontief profit function on a trip level. 
Initially, we selected a non-homothetic generalized Leontief profit (revenue) function to 
characterize the economic and technological interactions of the multiproduct firms. 17 
Kirkley and Strand (1988) originally used this specification to describe the harvesting 
technology of the New England fishing fleet. The Leontief functional form is a flexible 
functional form. Flexible functional forms are second order numerical or differential 
approximations to an Uflknown function. Chambers (1988) observes that the advantage 
16 F . 
or instance, ifthe profit function is not convex this suggests that output supply and factor demand 
functions are not well-behaved since they could have the wrong slopes or show discontinuities or kinks. 
17 
The non-homothetic nature of the function arises from the effort-squared term which allows for a non-linear 
relationship between effort, outputs, and revenue. 
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of a flexible functional form is the ability to place few restrictions on the estimates. This 
allows the researcher to derive relationships directly from the data rather than from the 
chosen functional form. In other words, flexible functional forms allow the data to 
"speak". In the case of the Leontief functional form, the flexibility of the form permits 
the investigator to derive non-constant substitutions relationships between outputs. 
However, the Leontief functional form imposes linear homogeneity in prices. This 
restriction does not preclude us from examining important characteristics of the 
technology such as separability and non-jointness (Kirkley and Strand, 1988). 
Mathematically, the non-homothetic Leontief profit (revenue) function can be expressed 
as 
n = :La;E 2 + LL f3 if (P;Pj )112 E + LLX;K DKP;E + L8;X ;P;E + LLS;, F,P;E (4.5) 
i i j i k ; ; s 
Applying Hotelling's Lemma, we obtain the input-compensated supply functions 18 
where R; is the revenue function, Q ; are landings of species i, P; is the price of species i , 
E is effort measured as days absent, and X; is the stock size of species i, Dk is the port 
18 Th . 
e input-compensated supply functions only consider substitution and complementarity effects among output 
pairs since the input endowment is fixed . 
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dummy which captures the regional effects relative to the port of New Bedford, 
Massachusetts. Fs are the quarterly dummies for winter, spring, and fall. Symmetry was 
imposed by the restriction /3u =f3F for i-:t:-j. 
Firm level input-compensated supply functions were estimated for the gillnet, longline, 
and otter trawl gears that operate in the Georges Bank multispecies fishery. Landing, 
revenue and vessel characteristics data was obtained from the National Marine Fisheries 
Service Weightout File. Species landed were aggregated into five categories: roundfish 
(cod, haddock, and silver hake), flatfish (yellowtail and winter flounders) , 
elasmobranchs (spiny dogfish and skates), pelagics (mackerel and herring), and 'other 
species ' or miscellaneous group. This last group was set equal to total landings minus 
the sum of the other groups. In cases where the landings for the species' groups were 
zero, they were assigned an arbitrarily low value of 0.01 kg. Implicit ex-vessel prices 
for the species groups were estimated by dividing the total revenue by the quantity 
landed. 
The data used ranged from 1989 to 1993. The fleet was subdivided by tonnage classes 
to reflect different operational strategies, capital stock and location of fishing grounds. 
Smaller fishing vessels tend to harvest inshore, whereas larger fishing vessels tend to 
harvest offshore. The otter trawl fleet was divided into four tonnage classes: 5-50 GRT, 
51-100 GRT, 101-150 GRT, and 151+ GRT. The gillnet and longline fleets were not 
subdivided by tonnage classes because of the small number of observations present in 
the larger tonnage classes. 
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The input-compensated supply equations were estimated usmg Zellner's seemingly 
unrelated regression technique and iterated to convergence (Squires and Kirkley, 1991). 
Each individual input-compensated supply equation was tested for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. To correct for heteroscedasticity we assumed that error variance was 
proportional to the effort-squared. Therefore, we normalized all the input supply 
equations by effort. While this approach did not remove all the heteroscedasticity 
present, it reduced the number of equations with this problem. The effort normalization 
also reduced the level of multicollinearity present. We tried to reduce the 
heteroscesdasticity by normalizing by different vessel characteristics, but our attempts 
proved unproductive. 
Following Kirkley and Strand (1988) we estimated an annual model where the species i 
total annual landings by vessel were the dependent variable. Theoretically, we expected 
that the sign on the effort term to be positive. The effort-squared term could be 
negative, zero, or positive depending whether the technology exhibited decreasing, 
constant, or increasing returns to scale. Similarly, we expected positive own-price 
elasticities. Our initial estimates consistently violated the theoretically expected 
curvature conditions since all the own-price elasticities were negative. 
As an alternative to the non-homothetic Leontief functional form, the non-constant 
returns to scale normalized quadratic form was tested. The advantage of this form is that 
convexity can be imposed without losing the flexibility of the functional form. While 
the proper curvature conditions can be imposed globally on the Leontief functional 
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form, the restrictions are too stringent for applied work. 19 Dupont (1988) first used this 
normalized quadratic form in a fisheries context to study rent dissipation in the British 
Columbia salmon fishery. 
The normalized quadratic profit functional form is given by 
Applying Hotelling's lemma we obtained the associated supply equations. For i=l the 
output supply is given by 
For #1 the supply equations are given by 
19 . 
For instance, the imposition of concavity in the cost function rules out complementarity between input pairs 
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where P; are prices, Zj are the fixed factors (effort and stock size), and a and ~ are 
predetermined pararneteres. The price of roundfish, P1, and Z1, effort, where the 
arbitrarily chosen as numeraires. 
Attempts to use this specification with five outputs (i.e., species groups) and five inputs 
(i.e., four stock sizes and effort) were thwarted by the presence of perfect 
multicollinearity. The multicollinearity arose from the terms where annual estimates of 
stock abundance were multiplied together. 
Contingent on these results, a variant of the normalized quadratic was utilized. This 
flexible functional form imposes constant returns to scale and requires one less free 
parameter than a flexible functional form. Grafton (1992) first used this specification in 
fisheries context to study rent capture in the British Columbia sablefish fishery. 
The normalized constant returns to scale quadratic profit (revenue) function was defined 
as 
(4.10) 
where a is a predetermined parameter. Symmetry was imposed by setting the 
coefficients ay=aji. Diewert and Wales (1987) observe that a can be a priori preset by 
the observer without losing flexibility. Following Grafton (1992), we arbitrarily set the 
(Diewert and Wales, 1987). 
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predetermined parameter, a, equal to l/E1, where E1 is the first observation of the input 
(i.e., effort). 
Applying Hotelling's lemma the associated supply equations can be derived. For i=l 
the output supply for the normalized price is given by 
(4.11) 
For i=2,3, .. N the supply equations are given by 
(4.12) 
For the normalized quadratic revenue function to describe the underlying technology, 
several conditions must be met (Diewert and Ostensoe, 1988). First, the profit function 
must be linearly homogenous. The price of roundfish (P1) is used as the normalizing 
price which guarantees homogeneity of degree zero in the outputs. Second, the profit 
function must be convex in prices. Convexity in prices can be established when the 
matrix of all au is positive semidefinite. A sufficient condition for a positive definite 
matrix is that all the eigenvalues be non-negative. 
Following the estimation, properties of the technology were examined. The resulting 
Parameters were checked for convexity in prices. Because the eigenvalues of the 
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different fleets were not all non-negative, the function was not found to be globally 
convex. There are several reasons why convexity may be violated including data 
aggregation, inadequate data variation and multicollinearity (Dupont, 1990). 
Since all output supply equations were non-convex, all equations were 
reparameterizated to impose convexity. Wiley, Schmidt and Bramble (1973) developed 
a method where convexity is imposed by replacing the au matrix by a lower triangular 
matrix D and its transpose such that A= DDT.zo The au parameters can be retrieved from 
app=(d/+d/+d/ ), 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 di d 2 d4 d7 
0 a ff a fe a fP a fo di 0 0 0 0 0 0 d3 d s ds 
0 a fe aee aep aeo = d2 d3 0 0 0 0 0 0 d 6 d9 
0 a!P aep a PP a po d4 d s d 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 dlO 
0 afo aeo apo aoo d7 ds d9 dlO 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The reparameterization of the A matrix requires a non-linear estimation technique since 
the profit function becomes non-linear in the parameters. These samples were estimated 
using maximum likelihood. Initially, the parameters were estimated using the Newton 
and Marquadt methods in SAS. Since the parameters failed to converge, the Davidson-
Fletcher-Powell algorithm in SHAZAM was used instead. When using a numerical 
optimizer, caution must be exercised because the method may converge to a local 
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optimum other than the global maximum. For this reason, the model was re-estimated at 
different starting values (i.e., one and five). Maximum likelihood estimates for most of 
the cases were close in magnitudes but not identical suggesting that the surface of the 
function was flat. 
Reparameterization had two main effects. First, it imposed the theoretically proper 
curvature conditions in some but not all of the supply equations. The small magnitude 
of some of the au parameters may have contributed to approximation errors. Second, 
many of the estimated elasticities (and, thus curvature conditions) were highly inelastic 
(very close to zero). 
A major difficulty with these estimates was the lack of stock abundance term necessary 
for the bioeconomic model. The presence of perfect multicollinearity in non-constant 
returns to scale normalized quadratic formulation prevented us from adopting stocks 
sizes as explanatory variables. Rather than incorporating stock sizes in the cost function, 
which would have been ad hoc, we resorted to re-estimating the non-homethetic 
generalized Leontief functional form on a trip rather than an annual basis. In the 
following section, we describe the results from the trip level non-homothetic 
generalized Leontief functional form. 
4.4 Results 
Trip level input-compensated supply equations were estimated usmg Zellner's 
seemingly unrelated method. As before, we corrected for autocorrelation and 
20 
The first column and row of the A matrix are zeros because of linear homogeneity. 
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heteroscesdaticity by normalizing all the equations by effort. This partially mitigated the 
heteroscedasticity problem. 
The generalized R2 for the system of equations pnor to the correction for 
heteroscedasticity varied between 0.97 and 0.16. Table 5 shows a high R2 for the gillnet 
fleet and a medium to low R2 for the otter trawl and longline fleets (Table 5). The 
generalized R2 was computed 
(4.13) 
where Lo(L1) is the sample maximum log-likelihood when all the slope coefficient are 
constrained to zero (unconstrained) and N is the sample size. 
Table 5: Goodness of fit for selected fleets and tonnage classes 
Fleet 
Otter trawl 
Gillnet 
Longline 
Tonnage class 
5-50 GRT 
51-100 GRT 
101-150 GRT 
151+ GRT 
All 
All 
0.59 
0.23 
0.16 
0.66 
0.97 
0.49 
To assess the ability of fishermen to target, we examined whether the technology was 
non-joint-in-inputs. The econometric restriction for overall non-jointness-in-inputs 
requires all cross-price coefficients /3ii =O for all} not equal to i. Non-jointness-in-inputs 
for individual outputs, Qi, requires that /3ii =O for all j not equal to i. We also tested 
whether ports, seasons, and abundance as individual groups were statistically 
significant. 
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4.5.1. Results from the Otter trawl fleet 
4.5.1.l Estimation of the 5-50 tonnage otter trawl fleet 
We first analyzed the technology of the smaller vessels of the otter trawl fleet. The 
Wald, Likelihood ratio and Lagrange multiplier test failed to reject overall non-
jointness-in-inputs as well as individual species group's non-jointness-in-inputs (table 
6). Both port and season dummies as individual groups were found to be statistically 
significant whereas stock sizes as a group were not. These results were surprising 
because of all tonnage classes, we expected 5-50 GRT to be the most responsive to 
price changes. Kirkley and Strand (1988) rejected overall non-jointness-in-inputs for 
this segment of the fleet but observed that some species such as cod and mixed 
flounders were non-joint-in-inputs. 
As Kirkley and Strand (1988) observe, the operational strategy of this fleet is not well 
known and likely to vary significantly across ports. For instance, New Bedford has 
traditionally harvested mostly scallops and groundfish species, whereas Pt. Judith has 
always fished a wider range of species. The level of species aggregation may be also 
response for these counter-intuitive results. The high level of species aggregation can 
confound harvesting strategies by obscuring fleet's price responsiveness. The presence 
of low-value silver hake in the high-value roundfish group (which includes cod and 
haddock) likely biases some of the results. Furthermore, not all species are harvested 
together since they are necessarily present in the same fishing grounds. 
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Table 6: Statistical tests for the harvesting technology of the otter trawl fleet (5-50 
GRT) 
Test No. of Wald Reject? L.R. Reject? L.M. Reject? 
independent 
restrictions 
Overall 10 14.50 N 14.49 N 14.49 N 
non-jointness 
Roundfish 4 6. 11 N 6. 11 N 6. 11 N 
non-jointness 
Flatfish 4 8.86 N 8.84 N 8 . 84 N 
non-jointnes 
Elasmobranch 4 1. 81 N 1 . 81 N 1 . 81 N 
non-jointness 
Pelagic 4 7.64 N 7.63 N 7.63 N 
non-jointness 
Miscellaneous 4 4.81 N 4.81 N 4.81 N 
non-jointness 
Port 30 581 . 10 y 581.11 y 581.11 y 
dummies 
Season 15 56 . 55 y 56.55 y 56 . 55 y 
dummies 
Stock 4 0.86 N 0.86 N 0 . 86 N 
size 
Contingent on these results we re-estimated the input-compensated supply equations. 
However, we left stock size as an explanatory variable in spite of its statistical 
insignificance because we needed them for the simulation. Also, since some of the stock 
sizes showed negative signs, meaning that as stocks increased the fishing vessels would 
harvest less of them, we restricted them to be positive. 
The re-estimated individual supply equations for roundfish, flatfish, elasmobranch, 
pelagic and miscellaneous species had an R2 of 0.176, 0.316, 0.06, 0.266, and 0.228, 
respectively. Table 7 reports the estimated parameter values for input-
compensatedsupply equations. All of the effort terms (Pi's) and effort-squared terms 
(ai' s) showed positive and negative signs, respectively. The effort or own-price 
estimates (Pi's) were statistically significant for roundfish, flatfish and elasmobranch 
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groups, whereas the effort-squared estimates were only statistically significant for the 
miscellaneous species group. Since the technology was non-joint the cross-price terms 
were omitted in the re-estimation. 
About fifty percent of the port dummies were statistically significant. Most these 
statistically significant estimates corresponded to the roundfish, flatfish, and 
miscellaneous supply equations. Notably, fishing vessels operating from the ports of 
Rhode Island, Gloucester, and Boston were shown to land more roundfish than those 
vessels from New Bedford. The higher landings rates were statistically significant at the 
10% significance level for Rhode Island ports, and at the 5% significance level for 
Gloucester and Boston. This phenomenon is explained by the presence of high 
concentrations of silver hake in the roundfish group. In 1993, Pt. Judith and Gloucester 
were ranked the number one and two, respectively in whiting revenues. In contrast, 
New Bedford boats had the highest flatfish landing levels from New Bedford. This 
situation reinforces the distorting impact of silver hake when interpreting roundfish 
supply estimates. The fleet operating from the port of Chatham harvested less 
elasmobranchs than the New Bedford fleet. The statistically significant negative 
relationship was not surprising because it was not until late 1993 that this fleet started 
targeting spiny dogfish (MAFMC, 1993). Fishing vessels from Rhode Island ports 
landed more pelagics than their New Bedford counterparts. This relationship was 
expected given the multispecies nature of this fleet. The Rhode Island port dummy was 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Only two of the season dummies were 
statistically significant. 
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None of the stock abundance estimates were statistically significant. Restricting these 
parameters to be positive decreased the magnitude of flatfish, elasmobranch, and 
pelagic abundance estimates as these become essentially zero. 
Table 7: Parameter estimates of the supply functions of the otter trawl fleet (5-50 GRT). 
Quantities sul!l!_lied of 
Roundfish Flatfish Elasmobranchs Pelagics Other 
~ecies 
Effort 26921 .27* 40380.04* 7379.488* 28.40943 30550.69* 
(3638.6) (2553.0) (2769.4) (778.8) (3102. 9) 
Effort-squared -659.93 -546.779 -274.925 -54.7771 -
(356.1) (293.1) (332.0) (80.6597) 824.601** 
(360.2) 
Stock size 11.56475 1.01E-6 1.01E-6 1.01E-6 -
(25.0920) (.) (.) (.) 
Rhode Island 21911 . 55** -21471.2** 1371.342 31950.25* 39377.56* 
(8782.5) (8650.7) (8013.6) (2780.5) (9053.4) 
Gloucester 25713.97* -38339 . 4* -8978.88 2026.795 4686.713 
(7568 .5) (5884.4) (6937.3) (1729.8) (7779.7) 
Boston 8200.672 -38353.7* -10299. 8 251.8448 1737.626 
(7621 .7) (6411 .1) (6955.2) (2014.3) (7861.0) 
Ptown -18699.6* -39095.5* 260.6731 130. 0317 -24967.3* 
(2984.6) (2503.9) (2712. 7) (775.7) (3054.8) 
Chatham -22369.5* -39216.9* -6632. 91* 174.6506 -29039.9* 
(2686.3) (2230.2) (2453.8) (689.3) (2764.7) 
Other MA -24313.3* -39297.4* 6152.152 156.981 -29219.2* 
(9350 .5 ) (7957.1) (8524.6) (2515.5) (9632.2) 
Quarter I -3775.79 1361.836 -1932.66 292.3569 1234.596 
(2448.5) (1958 .4) (2232.1) (593.0) ( 2512. 1) 
Quarter II -1931 . 54 1924.967 -1573.72 41.45193 4668.148* 
(2283.9) (1805 .5) (2088.8) (538.7) * 
(2349.4) 
Quarter III -4870.19 2425.395 8197.782* -261.264 1294.316 
(2587.6) (2044.9) (2369.1) (607.7) (2662.4) 
* s1grnficant at 1 % ** s1gmficant at 5%. 
4.5.1.2 Estimation of the 51-100 tonnage otter trawl fleet 
The statistical tests show that this segment of the fleet has the ability to respond to 
relative prices (Table 8). However, the harvesting of flatfish, elasmobranch, and 
miscellaneous species appears to be non-joint-in-inputs. These results unexpected given 
that pelagic landings only accounted for 1.6% of the total landings whereas roundfish 
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accounted for 45.8% of the total landings. This result speaks to one of the limitation of 
the dual approach where some species may be incidentally harvested with the target 
species but their low price discourages fishermen from allocating resources for their 
harvest (Kirkely and Strand, 1988). Port and season dummies as a group were 
statistically significantly different from zero while stock abundance estimates as group 
were not. 
Table 8: Statistical tests for the harvesting technology of the otter trawl fleet (51-100 
GRT) 
Test No. of Wald Reject? L.R. Reject? L.M. Reject? 
independent 
restrictions 
Overall 10 21.36 y 21.36 y 21.36 y 
non-jointness 
Roundfish 4 10 .17 y 10. 17 y 10.17 y 
non-jointness 
Flatfish 4 2.93 N 2.93 N 2.93 N 
non-jointnes 
Elasmobranch 4 1.15 N 1 .15 N 1 . 15 N 
non-jointness 
Pelagic 4 10.42 y 10.42 y 10.42 y 
non-jointness 
Miscellaneous 4 9. 17 N 9 .17 N 9 . 17 N 
non-jointness 
Port 40 523.24 N 523.24 N 523.24 N 
dummies 
Season 15 52. 21 N 52.21 N 52.21 N 
dummies 
Stock 4 7.38 y 7.37 y 7.37 y 
size 
Based on these results we re-estimated the output supply functions imposing restriction 
on stock size variables and on the cross-price coefficients Cf3u) between roundfish and 
pelagic stocks. We restricted the roundfish-pelagic cross-price coefficient because its 
sign was positive, which generated a downward sloping supply curve. To remedy this 
situation be restricted this parameter to be negative. 
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The re-estimated supply curves of roundfish, flatfish, elasmobranch, pelagic and other 
species had R2 of 0.10, 0.128, 0.0024, 0.06, and 0.145, respectively. Parameter 
estimates are presented in table 9. Effort and effort-squared terms exhibited the all 
positive and negative signs, respecively with the exception of the effort-squared term on 
pelagics. A positive sign suggests increasing returns to scale for the pelagic group. 
Ten of the forty port dummies were found to be statistically significant different from 
zero. The fishing vessels operating from Gloucester and Pt. Judith were found to be land 
more roundfish than fishing vessels from New Bedford. The Gloucester and Pt. Judith 
port dummies were statistically significant at the 5% level. This again captures the 
distorting effect on silver hake in the roundfish landings. Between 1989 and 1993, Pt. 
Judith's and Gloucester's silver hake contribution to roundfish landings was of 96.06% 
and 44.76%, respectively. In contrast, New Bedford's silver hake contribution to 
roundfish landings was less than 0.2%. The flatfish supply equation had only Pt. Judith 
as a statistically significant port dummy. The positive sign was unexpected given the 
New Bedford's heavy reliance on groundfish, particularly cod, haddock, and yellowtail 
flounder. One explanation for this is that while New Bedford caught more flounder, 
especially yellowtail flounder, Pt. Judith caught more winter flounder. Thus, the 
estimate may be capturing the relative higher efficiency of Pt. Judith vessels respect to 
New Bedford vessels. Recall that since heteroscedasticity was present, the dependent 
variable was landings per day absent. The pelagic supply equation had two statistically 
significant ports (Gloucester and other Rhode Island) while the elasmobranch supply 
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equation had none. Five of the fifteen season dummies were statistically significant 
while none of the abundance estimates were. 
Table 9: Parameter estimates of the supply functions of the otter trawl fleet (51-100 
GRT). 
Quantity su~~lied of 
Roundfish Flatfish Elasmobranchs Pelagics All others 
Effort 8952.302 1496.814* 1886.48** 53 . 55962 10343.87* 
(5318.7) (394.5) (811.1) (281.6) ( 2611 . 8) 
Effort - - 1729. 61 * -63.9323 -247.058** 10343.87 -795 . 385** 
squared (520.7) (49.0634) ( 100.9) ( 2611 . 8) (324.8) 
Pelagics -1 E-8 
(0) 
Maine 26464.14** -339.202 -1020. 93 205.3809 40697.95* 
( 13312 . 2) (1253 .0 ) (2575.9) (667.2) (8294.6) 
Gloucester 35096.26* -96.8927 -772.462 963.1371* 20681.01* 
(5153.6) (485.7) (998.5) (259.1) (3215 . 4) 
Boston 10847.09 195.9616 -912.496 45.38551 11251 . 17* 
(6149.9) (579.2) ( 1190. 7) (308.4) (3834.3) 
Provincetown -6645.04 - 337.673 333 . 6045 - 28.038 -1664.65 
(3836.9) (361.7) (743.6) (192. 9) (2394.4) 
Dukes -4399.6 615.788 -1082.12 119.6609 1922.778 
( 15433. 8) (1453 .5 ) (2988.1) (773.2) (9621.8) 
Newport 941.309 369.314 206.7435 45.31248 3969.381 
(7181.9) (676.8) (1391.4) (360.0) (4480.3) 
Pt. Judith 63407.32* 8376 . 546* 1881.722 2930.358 56209.89* 
(5498.0) (517.4) (1063.7) (276.7) (3425.3) 
Other RI -2784.6 -538.854 -653.107 -134.8* -4185.23 
(21770.8) (2049.6) (4213.7) (1093 .3) (13568.4) 
Stock 51 . 53025 1.01E-6 1.01E-6 0.36138 
size (37 . 9628) (0) (0) (0.4709) 
Quarter I 
-7380.46 -622.643 -533.294 -1 .3904 -5721.34** 
(3965.1) (373.5) (767.8) 198.6 (2472.5) 
Quarter II -3957.21 -935.603* -509.005 -88.0273 -7925.34* 
(3613.9) (340.7) (700 . 4) 181. 2 (2255 . 2) 
Quarter III 2563.43 -740.094** 1273.239 -269.77 -6119.54* 
(3634.2) (342.5) (704.2) 182. 1 (2267.4) 
*significant at 1 % ** significant at 5%. 
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4.sJ .3 Estimation of the 101-150 tonnage otter trawl fleet 
Statistical tests indicate that 101-150 tonnage class is joint-in-inputs. The presence of 
jointness-in-inputs indicates the presence of technological and cost tradeoffs. Table 10 
shows that port, season, and stock dummies as a group are not statistically significantly 
different than zero. 
Table 10: Statistical tests for the harvesting technology of the otter trawl fleet (101-150 
GRT) 
Test No. of Wald Reject? L.R. Reject? L.M. Reject? 
independent 
restrictions 
Overall 10 142.06 y 142.06 y 142.06 y 
non-jointness 
Roundfish 4 68.87 y 68.87 y 68.87 y 
non-jointness 
Flatfish 4 110.10 y 110.11 y 110.11 y 
non-jointnes 
Elasmobranch 4 31.59 y 31.59 y 31.59 y 
non-jointness 
Pelagic 4 41 .18 y 41 . 18 y 41. 18 y 
non-jointness 
Miscellaneous 4 16.98 y 16.98 y 16.98 y 
non-jointness 
Port 45 763 . 08 y 763.09 y 763.09 y 
dummies 
Season 15 79.46 y 79.46 y 79.46 y 
dummies 
Stock 4 65.38 y 65.41 y 65.41 y 
size 
A close examination of the parameters showed that some of stock size variables were 
negative and that all of the own-price elasticities (not shown) were negative as well. To 
ensure theoretically consistent results for our simulation we restricted the abundance 
and own-price elasticity estimates to be positive. Rather than adopting Diewert and 
Wales (1988) apporach, which is too restrictive for empirical work, we imposed a 
milder restriction to ensure positive own-price elasticities. For each own-price elasticity, 
we weighted the sum of cross-price coefficients by the sample mean of output prices. 
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While this condition did not ensure global convexity, it did not preclude obtaining 
substitution and complementarity relationships. 
The parameters of the re-estimated supply equations are presented in table 11. The 
individual R2 for the output supply equations of roundfish, flatfish, elasmobranch, 
pelagic, and miscellaneous species were 0.024, 0.027, 0.0032, 0.015, and 0.04 
suggesting a poor fit of the model. Recall that the generalized R2 for the system, prior to 
correcting for heteroscedasticity, was only 0.16. 
All effort and effort-squared terms conformed to theory. Statistically significant cross-
price coefficients indicate jointness particularly in the flatfish and elasmobranch groups. 
Cross-price coefficients suggest that flatfish is a substitute for elasmobranch and 
miscellaneous species while it is a complement to pelagics. The substitutability with 
elasmobranchs was intriguing given the both spiny dogfish and skates are often caught 
as by-catch in groundfish operations. NMFS documents indicate that during this time 
elasmobranch species were often discarded. The substitutability between flatfish and 
elasmobranchs may be explained by the fact that fishermen initially target flounders, 
and when they return they target skates. An increase in the price of flounder may 
encourage fishermen to devote more resources and time to the catch of flounders; thus, 
decreasing the harvest rate of elasmobranchs, which are mainly skates.21 It is 
noteworthy that both pelagic and elasmobranch groups only constitute 2.1 % and 1.9% 
ofthis fleet's landings. 
21 . 
A Provmcetown fishennan offered this explanation. 
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Thirteen of the forty-five port dummies were statistically significant. Vessels from the 
ports of Pt. Judith and Gloucester exhibited statistically higher roundfish landing rates 
than the New Bedford fishing vessels for the same reasons explained earlier. Similarly, 
fishing vessels from Gloucester, Boston, and Newport exhibited statistically lower 
flatfish landing rates than fishing vessels from New Bedford. In the elasmobranch 
supply equation, the ports of Pt Judith and Provincentown were statistically significant 
at the 5 and 10%, respectively; whereas in the pelagic supply equation, the port of Pt. 
Judith was statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Three of the four stock abundance coefficients were statistically insignificant. Only the 
pelagic stock's abundance was statistically significant at the 5% level. Five of the 
fifteen season dummies were statistically different from zero. 
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Table 11: Parameter estimates of the supply functions of the otter trawl fleet (101-150 
GRT). 
Quantity SUJ!J!lied of 
Roundfish Flatfish Elasmobranchs Pelagics Misc. 
Species 
Effort 1551.076* 594.1454* 164.076* - 173.267 1793.49* 
(569.8) (58.5882) ( 41. 6531) (128.0) (494.6) 
Effort - - 150.617** - 12.5852 -11 .0942* -2.8268 - 108. 411 * * 
squared (63.1506) (6.4888) (2. 7057) ( 10. 5648) (53 . 7672) 
Roundfish 36.33482 18.26466 -222.818* 42.17843 
(47.5232) ( 11 . 3206) (53.2825) (56.3957) 
Flatfish - 20.6377** 214.923* -105.15* 
(9.7116) (41.3853) (37.0775) 
Elasmobranch -56 . 8824* 14.97303* 
( 11 . 9488) (5.8147) 
Pelagic -17.4571 
(33.6465) 
Misc. Species 
Maine 9264.756* -40.6156 72.48458 376.5949 13715.49* 
( 1245. 1) (127.9) (53.3011) (207.4) ( 1060 .0) 
Gloucester 3276.413* -234.302* - 49.3124 15.30252 1441.897** 
(739.8) (76.1017) (32.0392) ( 123.8) (629.9) 
Boston 568.2496 -304.044* -42.4398 35.31837 740.4387 
(591.5) (60.7637) (25 . 3293) (98.4802) (503.6) 
Provincetown 30.25201 -121.602 106.966** 35.26444 37.86365 
(995.0) (102.5) (42.8964) (166.0) (847 . 2) 
Dukes - 165. 465 815.9928 -85.2506 73.82621 683.1054 
(5865.4) (602.4) (250.4) (974.1) (4993.6) 
Newport 4.779799 - 130.159** 11.75669 -12. 6042 220.2205 
(568.5) (58.7166) (24.5143) (95.3785) (484.2) 
Pt . Judith 8477.559* 520.8881* 236.0714* 885.6881* 7199.631* 
(728.4) (75.3889) (32.2588) (123.3) (619.9) 
Other State I -233.803 -231.88 -8.335 -79.0295 10156.92 
(10154 . 7) ( 1043. 0) (433.5) ( 1686. 5) (8645.3) 
Other State 415.5655 -296.462 15.52872 -53.0907 267 . 8108 
II (10157 .4) (1043.4) (433.6) ( 1687. 1) (8647.7) 
Stock 1.01E-6 1.01E-6 1.01E-6 0.569556** 
size (0) (0) (0) (0.2363) 
Quarter I -497.485 -122.004** -22.9753 -54.0362 -547.66 
(510 . 1) (52.4087) (21 .9964) (85 . 4387) (434 . 3) 
Quarter II -160.796 - 152.171* -13.0393 72 . 01692 893.579** 
(500.7) (51.5316) (21 .6293) (83.9663) (426.3) 
Quarter III - 393.287 -215.427* 23.56345 -162. 66 -1504 . 45* 
(498.7) (51.2167) (21.3796) (83.1782) (424.5) 
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4.5.1.4 Estimation of the 151 +tonnage otter trawl fleet 
As in the previous case, the larger tonnage classes showed that the technology was 
joint-in-inputs (table 12). Both port and season dummies were statistically significant 
as a group. Abundance and own-price elasticities (not shown) were negative. For the 
purposes of the simulation, we restricted the stock abundance and own-price elasticity 
estimates to be positive. 
Table 12: Statistical tests for the harvesting technology of the otter trawl fleet (151 + 
GRT) 
Test No. of Wald Reject L.R. Reject L.M. Reject 
independent 
restrictions 
Overall 10 284.87 y 283.65 y 282.37 y 
non-jointness 
Roundfish 4 238.72 y 237.05 y 235. 17 y 
non-jointness 
Flatfish 4 72.45 y 72.30 y 72.31 y 
non-jointnes 
Elasmobranch 4 18.64 y 17.62 y 17.07 y 
non-jointness 
Pelagic 4 84.15 y 83.77 y 83.45 y 
non-jointness 
Miscellaneous 4 145.57 y 144.87 y 143.74 y 
non-jointness 
Port 35 2238.9 y 2122.3 y 2082.1 y 
dummies 
Season 15 72.88 y 72 . 67 y 72.49 y 
dummies 
Stock 4 8.76 N 8.39 N 8 .17 N 
size 
The re-estimated output supply equations for roundfish, flatfish, elasmobranch, pelagic 
and miscellaneous species yielded an individual R2 of 0.17, 0.07, -0.01, 0.27, and 0.01, 
respectively. The re-estimated model, showed the theoretically expected signs on all 
effort terms. Significant cross-price variables in the roundfish supply curve indicated 
that flatfish, elasmobranchs and pelagics were complements whereas miscellaneous 
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species were substitutes. This complementarity was not surprising since flatfish and 
elasmobranchs are often harvested together. Kirkley and Strand (1988) also found that 
for vessels of this tonnage class, cod and yellowtail flounder were complements. In the 
production of flatfish, elasmobranch, pelagics and miscellaneous species were found to 
be substitutes. Flatfish was found to be substitute for elasmobranchs (mostly skates), 
pelagics and miscellaneous species. Lastly, elasmobranchs and pelagics were found to 
be complements of miscellaneous species. 
Twenty of the thirty-five dummy ports were statistically significant. Both roundfish and 
flatfish port dummies exhibited the same trends present in smaller tonnage classes. 
Estimates from the elasmobranch supply equation indicate that vessels from Pt. Judith 
landed more elasmobranchs than vessels from New Bedford, while the vessels from 
Maine, Glouscester, Boston, and Newport landed less elasmobranch than vessels from 
New Bedford. In the pelagic group, only the other Rhode Island port was statistically 
significant. The Rhode Island dummy reflects the activity of the fleet operating in 
Quonset Point, which targets pelagics (mainly mackerel) and Loligo squid. None of the 
abundance estimates were statistically significant while four of the season dummies 
were statistically significant. 
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Table 13: Parameter estimates of the supply functions of the otter trawl fleet ( 151 + 
GRT) 
Quantity su~~lied of 
Roundfish Flatfish Elasmobranchs Pelagics Misc. species 
Effort 1026. 124* 336 . 8175* 115 . 0486 54.05242 885.4309 
(343 . 9) (59 . 0625 (86 . 5968) (374.4) (497 . 6) 
Effort - squared -213.25* -1.21341 -5 . 69854* -22 . 5351 -126. 73* 
(24 . 2797) (3.1227) (2 . 1972) (23.8834) (46.3863) 
Roundf i sh 87.31942** 58.96083* 333.404* -237.842* 
(38.8866) (12.3216) (108.3) (52.1611) 
Flatfish -76 . 322* -110.215** -6 . 29598 
( 11 . 3199) (47 .6461) (23.3481) 
Elasmobranch -19.9323 29.50682** 
(14.9285) (7.2681) 
Pelagic -155.197* 
(75.8691) 
Misc. Species 
Maine 2363.51* -284.436* -56.0717** 32.46466 3864.671* 
(278 . 4) (35.7950) (25.0722) (271.3) (534.5) 
Gloucester 1330. 166* -307.38* -69 . 563* 9.759805 798.8908** 
(208.8) (26.7385) ( 19. 0606) (203.2) (400.3) 
Boston 612.0636* -316.57* -72.1222* -24.1633 876.8434** 
( 195. 9) (25 .1333) (17 . 6394) (190.9) (376.2) 
Newport 736.3775 -109.969** -45.3105 72.96831 387.4356 
(417.6) (53 . 5522) (37.4836) (407.5) (801. 7) 
Pt. Judith 6625.9* - 170.433* 65 . 85736** 376.976 1125.521** 
(265.6) (35.7131) (26.7549) (272.1) (498.6) 
Other RI 1073.427 -302.223** -39. 1166 30002.83* 8280.735* 
(831. 6) (106. 7) (74.6536) (812.1) ( 1595 . 7) 
Other State -1114.42 -293.547 108.9576 207.8199 2652.55 
(4311.7) (552.1) (385.6) (4194 . 6) (8278.0) 
Stock 3.572765 8.643869 0.139085 1E-8 
size (2.5084) (6.2434) (0.4477) (0.6048) 
Quarter I 473.7387** -4.07991 -12.1515 27.35761 1059.278* 
(212 . 4) (27 . 3280) ( 19.4040) (208.4) (407.7) 
Quarter II 302.4815 -36.2135 -5.99297 316.5499 -156.693 
(205.3) (26.4380) (18.6667) (205 .0 ) (393.8) 
Quarter III 876.1154* -61.1493** -17.0164 -14.0539 -401.777 
(206.3) (26.4514) ( 18. 5842) (200.7) (395.8) 
4.5.2. Estimation of the gillnet fleet 
The Wald, L.R. , and L. M. test suggested that the gillnet production process is non-
joint. However, the production of flatfish appeared to respond to relative prices (table 
14). Port, season, and abundance estimates as a group were statistically not different 
from zero. 
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Table 14: Statistical tests for the harvesting technology of the gillnet fleet 
- No. of Wald Reject L.R. Reject L.M. Reject Test 
independent 
restrictions 
Overall 10 14.60 N 14.59 N 14.59 N 
non-jointness 
4 6.42 N 6.40 N 6.40 N Roundfish 
non-jointness 
4 9. 71 y 9.71 y 9.71 y Flatfish 
non-jointnes 
Elasmobranch 4 2.45 N 2 . 45 N 2.45 N 
non-jointness 
Pelagic 4 5.43 N 5.43 N 5.43 N 
non-jointness 
Miscellaneous 4 8.67 N 8 . 67 N 8.67 N 
non-jointness 
Port 30 82.78 y 82.77 y 82.77 y 
dummies 
Season 15 201.96 y 201.96 y 201.96 y 
dummies 
Stock 4 7.36 y 7 . 36 y 7.36 y 
size 
The R2 re-estimated supply output curve for roundfish, flatfish, elasmobranch, pelagic 
and miscellaneous species were estimated at 0.1015, 0.0748, 0.1023, 0.0396 and 
0.2057, respectively. Effort terms in general followed theoretical expectations. 
However, only one effort term on elasmobranchs was statistically significant while two 
effort-squared terms on roundfish and miscellaneous species were statistically 
significant. Their negative sign on the effort-squared terms indicates decreasing returns 
to scale. 
Only three of thirty-six port dummies were statistically significant. Statistically, only 
fishing vessels from Chatham and Barnstable landed less elasmobranchs than their New 
Bedford counterparts. This reflects New Bedford increased interest in this fishery. Since 
the early 1990's, New Bedford's fixed gear fleet began targeting elasmobranchs, 
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primarily spiny dogfish. The larger tonnage vessels (51 + GRT) more found to land less 
elasmobranchs, pelagics, and miscellaneous species than the smaller tonnage vessels. 
None of the abundance estimates were statistically significant while six of the fifteen 
season dummies were statistically significant. 
Table 15: Parameter estimates of the supply functions of the gillnet fleet 
Quantit~ su~~lied of 
Roundfish Flatfish Elasmobranch Pelagic Misc. Species 
Effort 1322.798 -144.553 22184.87* 35.67559 3946.528 
(2703.2) (451 .0) (7483.1) (64.2565) (4353.9) 
Effort- squared -103.265** 1.732504 -195.958 -1.09329 -202.296* 
(46.7833) (7.8685) (130.6) (1.0864) (75.9669) 
Maine 3490.731 97.61999 -10445 43.93175 9232.385** 
(2684.1) (451.3) (7489.0) (62.3413) (4357.3) 
Gloucester 2942.576 614.7927 -13822.9 8.127567 4441 .841 
(2677.0) (449.8) (7463.3) (62.3997) (4342.4) 
Barnstable -8.15234 49.34266 - 21450.1** - 10.1377 - 1236. 13 
(3101 .6) (521. 7) (8657.1) (72.0468) (5037.0) 
Chatham -245.772 137.0019 -21579** -21.6092 -2072.63 
(2666.4) (448.4) (7441 . 0) (61 .9085) (4329.4) 
Other MA -79.7915 -41 .4263 -20353.6 51.84492 -1243 
(3494.2) (587.4) (9746.4) (81.4545) (5670.8) 
Other State -937.362 145.0877 -21988.9 -53.6602 -3739.7 
(5282.3) (888.6) ( 14745. 0) (122. 7) (8579.2) 
Large vessel -1296.92 -96.9041 -6981.9* -37.4023** -3044.59** 
dummy (817.4) (137. 5) (2280.8) (19.0014) ( 1327. 1 ) 
Stock 1.885822 1E-8 1E-8 0.049063 
size (5.4255) (0) (0) (0.0304) 
Quarter I 
-869.171 -53.8486 -2317.36 -25.5854** 128.5754 
(529.4) (89.0620) ( 1477 .8) ( 12. 3130) (859.9) 
Quarter II -941.022 267.6565* -1146.69 -48.2157* ' -2481. 87* 
(526.1) (88.5047) ( 1468. 6) (12.2184) (854.5) 
Quarter III 302.2671 -14. 2891 3291.115* -40.3738* - 1089. 11 
(400.1) (67.3183) (1117.0) (9.2886) (649.9) 
4.5.3. Estimation of the longline fleet 
Lastly we estimated the technology of the longline fleet. Statistical test suggested that 
production was non-joint-in-inputs(i.e., there is a separate production function for each 
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species group). Port dummies as a group were statistically significant while season and 
abundance estimates as a group were not statistically different from zero (table 16). 
Table 16: Statistical tests for the harvesting technology of the longline fleet 
Test No. of Wald Reject L.R. Reject L.M. Reject 
independent 
restrictions 
Overall 10 16.13 N 16. 11 N 16. 11 N 
non-jointness 
Roundfish 4 14.71 N 14.68 N 14.68 N 
non-jointness 
Flatfish 4 9.32 N 9.30 N 9.30 N 
non-jointnes 
Elasmobranch 4 2.68 N 2.67 N 2.67 N 
non-jointness 
Pelagic 4 0.62 N 0.61 N 0.61 N 
non-jointness 
Miscellaneous 4 6 .18 N 6.18 N 6 . 18 N 
non-jointness 
Port 30 145 . 15 y 145. 14 y 145. 14 y 
dummies 
Season 15 13.63 N 13.63 N 13.63 N 
dummies 
Stock 4 3.50 N 3.48 N 3.48 N 
size 
Table 17 shows parameter estimates of the re-estimated input-compensated supply 
equations. Two of the five effort terms were negative while two of the five effort-
squared terms were positive. Only the effort term on miscellaneous species was 
statistically significant. 
Four of thirty port dummies were statistically significant. For the roundfish equation, 
the port of Gloucester was statistically significant while for the miscellaneous species 
equation the ports of Gloucester, Chatham, and other Massachusetts were statistically 
significant. Larger vessels (51 + GRT) were found to statistically land more roundfish 
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and miscellaneous species than the smaller vessels. None of the abundance estimates 
were statistically significant while only one season dummy was statistically significant. 
Table 17: Parameter estimates of the supply functions of the longline fleet 
Quanti!I sueelied of 
Roundfish Flatfish Elasmobranch Pelagic Misc. Species 
Effort 749.6613 1.88109 -64.7747 -0.6927 3917.334* 
(606.9) (3.0679) (229.5) (0.6779) (1017.0) 
Effort-squared -34. 9293 -0.0879 2. 116814 0.023613 -40.0317 
(20.7614) (0.0986) (8.6577) (0.0215) (38.3677) 
Maine 136.4355 0.083945 50.68681 - 0.21353 714.8744 
(515.0) (2.4383) (214.5) (0.5324) (950.7) 
Gloucester 1346.681* 0.247839 371.0619 0 . 04008 2645.186* 
(502.1) (2.3806) (208.0) (0.5192) (921. 8) 
Pt own -31 9.43 -0.93487 68.13725 0.149255 -2658.44 
(1057 . 2) (4.9864) (438.8) (1.0891) ( 1944. 6) 
Chatham -20.0979 0.207043 38.57052 0.219146 -3477.52* 
(538.0) (2.5458) (224.0) (0.5565) (992.8) 
Other MA -216.241 -0.37719 27.3486 0.167524 -3636.59* 
(646.3) (3.0415) (267.6) (0.6688) ( 1186. 1) 
Boston 188.2733 0.099133 55.62657 -0.03112 963.258 
(869.6) (4.1214) (362.6) (0.8986) (1606.9) 
Large vessel -631 . 917** -0.22718 8.658852 -0.07961 -2561.15* 
dummy (272.4) (1.2876) ( 113. 3) (0.2815) (502.1) 
Stock 2.324345 0.054482 1 E-8 0.00101 
size (3.8828) 0.4065 (0) (0.000723) 
Quarter I -1 5 . 1093 -1.52695 -25.7652 0.068626 - 264.197 
(180. 7) (0.8515) (74.9004 (0.1860) (331 . 9) 
Quarter II 26.63872 -1.09072 10.66658 0.318993 -527.815 
(192.5) (0.9124) (80.2701) (0.1989) (355.7) 
Quarter III 18.91855 -1.5428 220.8819** -0 . 03712 183.4074 
(244.6) ( 1 . 1699) ( 101. 7) (0.2540) (450.9) 
4.6 Summary 
The econometric analysis suggests the technological and economic interactions vary 
significantly across firms. For instance, the otter trawl fleet showed a wide range of 
technologies. The smaller tonnage classes exhibited non-joint-in-inputs technologies 
while the larger tonnage classes exhibited joint-in-input technologies. The presence of 
jointness-in-inputs in the larger otter trawls evidences the presence of technological and 
cost interrelationships. It also suggests that fishermen can select the catch composition 
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to some extent. Gillnet and longline vessels, on the other hand, exhibited non-jointness-
in-inputs, suggesting that there are no technological and cost tradeoffs during their 
production process. It also evidences that these fleets have a separate production 
process for each species harvested. 
The absence of price responsiveness especially in the smaller otter trawl tonnage class, 
which is known for its opportunistic behavior, is troublesome. This situation 
underscores potential problems with our estimates. One of the most vexing problems 
during the estimation was the consistent presence of downward sloping supply curves 
and negative abundance terms. The empirical literature suggested several reasons for 
theoretically inconsistent results. The first and probably most important reason is 
aggregation. Gates (1974) reports that aggregation bias may yield negative and 
statistically insignificant own-price elasticities. Kirkley and Strand (1988), who 
examined the otter trawl fleet operating on Georges Bank, showed consistent positive 
own-price elasticities of supply. However, their estimates rejected the imposition of 
symmetry, which casts doubts on the robustness of their results. Squires (1987), who 
also examined the New England otter trawl fleet, reports negative own-price elasticities 
of supplies for some of its aggregated species groups. 
Ideally to overcome this problem we could have had disaggregated our species groups. 
Unfortunately, given the scope of the study, which required coupling our estimates with 
an aggregated predator-prey model, we could not disaggregated our species group 
further. Kirkley and Stand (1988) observe that given the high number of species present 
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in the fishery, little can be done to resolve this problem. Moreover, aggregation bias 
may have been exacerbated since some of the individual species within the species 
groups had large price differentials masking the effect of prices. For instance, in 1993 
the haddock ex-vessel price was approximately 1.38 dollars per pound while the silver 
hake ex-vessel price was approximately 0.37 dollars per pound. In hindsight, a better 
way to umavel the operational strategies of the different fleet segments would be to 
stratify the fleet not only by tonnage class but also by port. 
Another limitation was the lack of variability both in prices and stock sizes, which may 
have contributed to multicollinearity. Given that many vessels did not land all species in 
all trips we resorted to placing monthly (or annual depending the case) prices. This may 
have caused coefficients to have the wrong sign or implausible magnitudes. This 
situation was particularly true for the pelagic group. Similarly, the use of annual 
abundance estimates may have further contributed to the poor econometric estimates. 
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Chapter 5: Empirical Model 
5.1. Background 
The objective of this chapter is to develop a bioeconomic model that explicitly accounts 
for multiproduct technological interrelationships. The model investigates the 
implications of modifying the species selectivity properties of the gears using the 
Georges Bank multispecies fishery as a case study. As mentioned earlier, Georges Bank 
has traditionally supported large pelagic and demersal resources. In the 1960's and 
1970's, excessive harvesting by foreign fleets resulted in the over-exploitation of 
pelagic stocks. In the 1980's and early 1990's, intensive fishing by domestic fleets led 
to the decline of several demersal stocks. Simultaneously, the biomass of non-targeted 
species such as elasmobranchs, mainly spiny dogfish and skates, increased. More 
recently, previously overexploited pelagic resources recovered while the abundance of 
elasmobranchs began to decrease. This progression of over-exploitation to previously 
less desirable species has led to extensive changes in the structure of the Georges Bank 
ecosystem. 
In recent years increased awareness of the negative environmental impacts of 
indiscriminate harvesting practices and increased research funding have encouraged the 
development of environmentally friendly gear technologies (F AO, 1997). A large share 
of gear technologists efforts, has been focused on the design of more selective trawl 
gear. In particular, designing new mesh configurations and incorporating selection 
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grids. Also significant amount of work has been devoted to the development of new 
gears. 
Murawski (1990) observes that mesh size selectivity depends on cod-end dimensions 
and other operational factors such as towing speed, fish density, and net fullness. The 
impact of modifying the mesh size will not only depend on the size distribution and 
composition of the catch but also on fish behavior. DeAlteris and Morse (1997) observe 
that when otter trawls are dragged on the bottom, the doors will generate sand clouds 
that herd cod and haddock between the wing ends of the trawl. As the fish become tired, 
cod turn back into the trawl and dives down while haddock will attempt to rise above 
the headrope. Thus, fishermen trying to reduce the haddock bycatch in cod tows, will 
reduce the headrope height to facilitate the escape of haddock. The body shape is 
another consideration. Roundfish have a different body shape than flatfish; thus, 
different escapement rates are expected. Widening mesh sizes does not necessarily 
ensure that smaller sized fish will necessary escape due to clogging. Ueber (1990) 
observers that effectiveness of larger mesh sizes decreases with larger number of 
species. Not surprisingly, Hanna (1990) notes that in multispecies fisheries there is no 
optimum mesh size. An important consideration is that escapement does not guarantee 
survival since fish that successfully escaped through trawls may die shortly after due to 
injuries incurred while passing through the mesh. 
In addition to changing mesh configurations, gear technologists have been developing a 
variety of devices that segregate the catch prior to entering the cod-end of nets (F AO, 
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1997). These devices use a separator grid and escape panels to allow the incidental 
catch to escape. The panel separates fish of different sizes by allowing the smaller fish 
to pass through the grid while deflecting larger fish. These grid systems are widely used 
in shrimp fisheries around the world. 
Also gear technologists have been actively developing alternative technologies. Brewer 
et al. (1994) report that in Australia's northern fish trawl fishery, trials using semi-
pelagic trawls have reduced the level of incidental catch without reducing the catch 
level of target species compared to the traditional bottom trawls. Similarly, the 
development of pots and traps has been shown to be an effective environmentally 
friendly alternative to traditional gears. Weyman (1995) reports that in the Bering Sea 
cod fishery, pots and lines significantly reduced the level of halibut bycatch. It is 
important to observe that in some cases modifying the species selectivity does not 
necessarily require changing the configuration of gear, but could include the 
management actions such as permitted fishing times and/or areas. Management can also 
modify the species selectivity of the gears by requiring additional devices such as 
pingers and bird scaring lines, which minimize the incidental catch of marine mammals 
and seabirds in gillnet and longlines, respectively. 
While the adoption of a specific technology is an important issue in itself, the 
bioeconomic model focuses on the overall impact of modifying the species selectivity 
properties of the gear rather than addressing the specific technology to be used. The 
model is primarily concerned with understanding how improving the species selectivity 
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properties of the principal gears can contribute to the rebuilding the more commercially 
valuable Georges Bank groundfish stocks. 
Despite the important biological and economic implications of rebuilding the 
groundfish stocks, scant economic work has been conducted in this area. Most of the 
empirical work focused on the bioeconomic implications of effort management. For 
instance, Edwards and Murawski (1993) estimated the dissipation of rent from the 
commercial harvest of groundfish resources of New England. They estimated that the 
net economic value of the fishery would be maximized by a 70% reduction in fishing 
effort.22 Overholtz et al. (1995) developed a multispecies model of the New England 
groundfish fishery to evaluate the impact of effort reduction policies. They found that 
significant reduction in short-term effort and catch would triple to quintuple catch per 
unit effort levels in the long-run, especially for haddock and flounder. 
More recently, Thunberg, Helser, and Mayo (1998) examined the bioeconomic impacts 
of targeting different age groups of silver hake in the Northeast. They found that by 
shifting the harvesting pressure to younger age classes, the fleet experienced short-run 
gains at the expense of long-run declines in biomass, which lowered the fishery's value 
and yield. Conversely, they found that by targeting older individuals the value of the 
fishery might improve over present levels with modest reductions in short-run yield. 
Although Thunberg et al. 's work investigated the implication of modifying the 
22 
They estimated that the potential resource rent was approximately US$ 130 million annually. 
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catchability properties of the gear, they did not examine this issue in a multispecies 
context nor did they investigate its impact on fish assemblage compositions. 
5.2. Model Description 
The model simulates the dynamics of a multispecies fishery under a suite of 
management measures. The primary focus of this work is to provide an improved 
understanding of species selectivity changes in a multispecies context. The model 
simulates the interaction between the main fish assemblages and fishing fleets operating 
on Georges Bank. Conceptually, the model is simple. The are two main components, 
one describing the population dynamics of the stocks and the other describing the 
economics of the fleets. The model is organized as a set of interrelated subroutines 
controlled by the main program. 
The biological component is a multispecies aggregated surplus production model. 
Holling I type multispecies interactions are assumed. 23 The fish assemblages are 
selected because of their commercial and/or trophic importance. The main assemblages 
considered were roundfish, flatfish, elasmobranchs and pelagics. The roundfish 
assemblage is composed of Atlantic cod ( Gadus morhua ), haddock (Melanogramus 
aeglefinus) and silver hake (Merluccius bilinearis). The flatfish assemblage consists of 
yellowtail flounder (Limanda ferruginea) and winter flounder (Pleuronectes 
americanus). The elasmobranch assemblage includes spiny dogfish (Squalus acanthias) 
and winter skates (Raja ocellata) and little skates (Raja erinacea), while the pelagics 
23 . 
Functional response describes how the per capita growth rate is affected predation and consumption. In our case, 
we assume that the functional response is a function of stock abundance (i.e., multiply both stocks sizes together) 
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assemblage includes Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) and herring (Clupea 
harengus). 
The stock dynamics are modeled as, 
where r and K are the intrisic growth rate and carrying capacity for species i, and Y is 
yield. a,~, x.,, o, and E are the interaction parameters of the Holling I functional 
response. 
The economic component focuses on three fishing fleets, namely otter trawls, gillnets 
and longliners. Ideally, the fleet dynamics for the entire northeast region (i.e., Gulf of 
Maine, Georges Bank, and Southern New England), rather than partitioning the fleet's 
activity to Georges Bank only, would be modeled. Most of the fishing activity, 
especially of larger vessels, is not confined to one area. In fact, they straddle their 
harvesting operations across several areas.24 Given that only a part of the system is 
modeled, this limits our understanding of the fleets' financial success or failure since 
many of these vessels participate in other areas. The fleets' participation in other areas 
24 Th" . is is particularly true, for Georges Bank where closures forced fishermen to operate in different waters and target 
different species. This model does not consider the impact of closures nor attempts to address fishing location issues. 
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and/or fisheries determines their overall profitability and thus investment and 
disinvestment decisions. Because of this, we did not model the fleets' entry-exit 
behavior but rather restricted ourselves to model total number of days absent. If we had 
modeled the entire northeast region, the fleets' financial viability could have been 
examined and their expected future participation could have been determined. When 
modeling a partitioned fishery, this feature cannot be fully captured. 
In view of the above and the limited entry regime, we moved away from modeling fleet 
dynamics and switching behavior, and focused on developing a simpler model that 
captured days absent as a proxy of fishing effort. Fishing effort expended by the fleets 
was represented as the profit maximizing number of days absent per trip per season 
multiplied by the average number of trips per season taken by each fleet segment. For 
the purposes of this analysis, we used the average number of trips taken between 1989 
and 1993. 
The profit maximizing effort level is obtained by setting the value of marginal product 
of effort equal to the long-run marginal cost of effort and solving for the optimal level 
of effort. Mathematically, the value of the marginal product of effort is given by 
aR I II 112 
- = 2 a.PE+ [3 .. (PP.) +n aE . , , . . I) , 1 
I I j 
(5.1) 
where Q captures season and port dummies and stock abundance. 
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Since the NMFS Weightout database does not provide information on the cost structure, 
cost estimates were obtained from the Sea Sampling database. The variable costs 
included ice, fuel and labor costs. The return to labor was measured as its opportunity 
cost. We assumed that the crew would be employed in manufacturing sector. Estimated 
earnings were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The captain's opportunity 
cost was set 30% higher than the average crewmen opportunity cost. 
We assume that the long-run variable cost function was quadratic, such that 
C=cE+dE 2 (5.2) 
where c and d are parameters on days absent and days absent square. 
Combining the above equations, we solved for the profit maximizing effort level such 
that 
1 "" 1/ 2 E = '°' _ (c- L.L.{3;/P;P;) -Q) 
2L.a;P; d ; j 
(5.3) 
In calibrating the model, the estimated cost parameters were adjusted until the value of 
effort was close to the 1989-1993 mean (Campbell, 1995). Then we mimicked 1989-93 
mean landings by adjusting a;'s and p;;'s within one standard deviation. This allowed 
landings to be calibrated to within 10% 1989-93 mean. 
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5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Introduction 
Simulation runs indicated that without dramatic reductions in effort, roundfish and 
flatfish stocks would collapse soon. At the existing exploitation levels, roundfish and 
flatfish biomass collapsed in year 37 and 41, respectively. In contrast, elasmobranch 
and pelagic biomass continued to increase, stabilizing at 188.8 and 1,784.2 million tons 
respectively. 
We also examined the impact of changing the species selectivity properties and taxing 
overexploited species. Model runs showed that this measures alone did not prevent the 
collapse of the roundfish and flatfish stocks. These measures simply delayed the 
collapse of the roundfish stocks. For example, reducing the roundfish catchability by 
20% delayed the collapse of roundfish stocks by three years. Similarly, imposing a 20 
% tax on roundfish landings pushed the collapse of the roundfish stocks by one year. 
Under both policies flatfish stock continued to collapse in year 41. 
These results suggested that neither policy by itself would reverse the collapse of the 
roundfish and flatfish stocks. Thus, a different approach was needed to ensure the 
sustainability of these stocks. Ideally, we would have run the model until it reached 
some sustainable steady state. Then we would have re-run the model under some policy 
scenario until in reached again some sustainable steady state. Then both steady states 
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would be compared. Unfortunately, given the high exploitation rates, we were forced to 
reduce the overall effort level to generate new steady state stock size levels. 
Simulations runs showed that overall effort had to be reduced by 58% in order to 
prevent the collapse of the roundfish and flatfish stocks. To meet this effort reduction, 
we reduced the number of trips taken by the fleet rather than reducing the fleet size. 25 
At this effort reduction level, roundfish stock sizes stabilized at 840.1 million tons, 
whereas flatfish and pelagic stocks stabilized at 76.4 and 2,221.8 million tons, 
respectively. Elasmobranch stocks collapsed in year 66. Given that the reduction in 
effort recovered the roundfish and flatfish stocks, this work will focus on how effort 
reductions in conjunction with other policies can expedite the recovery of roundfish and 
flatfish stocks. 
5.3.2. Bioeconomic performance of management alternatives 
The behavior of the Georges Bank multispecies fishery was analyzed under two sets of 
policies. First, we considered a policy that would require the fishing industry to adopt 
new gear designs or configurations that modify the species selectivity properties of the 
gear. Second, we considered using market-based mechanisms to induce fishermen to 
change their harvest composition. 
25 
We recognize that there are alternative approaches to reducing effort that may more accurately reflect the fleet 
dynamics. The chosen method may not accurately reflect the dynamics of large vessels since they may not be able to 
cover their fixed costs under days at sea limitation. Furthermore, Aguirre International (1996) observes that "while 
moving into alternative fisheries has been the most preferred response, most of the larger vessels of Gloucester and 
New Bedford have become too specialized and too dependent on family networks for staffing vessels to shift into 
other fisheries without substantial capital investments. Small and medium-sized (30-75 ') vessels have had more 
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Changing the species selectivity properties of the gears has long been advocated. On the 
surface, the adoption of such policy should contribute to the rebuilding of the stocks. 
However, changing the catchability of one species may have adverse spillover effects 
into the other species depending on complementarity and substitution possibilities of the 
gear technology. The presence of biological interrelationships further complicates the 
issue. 
To examine this issue, we followed Campbell and Nicholl's approach. In their 1995 
paper, the authors modified the catchability of the gears by multiplying the parameters 
of supply equation species i by a scalar. Mathematically, 
Applying Hotelling lemma and assuming a two species system, we obtain 
Qi =8(a;E 2 +PiiE+Pijc;J) 1' 2 E+nE) 
I 
(5.5) 
Q . = a .E 2 + R .. E + SR .. (P; ) 112 E + nE 
J J ..., JJ 1-'u P. 
J 
(5.6) 
success moving into alternative fisheries, yet often have been met with hostility as they attempt to enter fisheries 
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where e is the proportion by which the catchability of species i is modified. Note that 
since the ~y's have to be symmetric, theta has to appear in all the supply equations. 
Table 18 presents a summary of the technological change experiments conducted. 
Next, we considered market-based mechanisms or incentive and disincentive programs 
as referred by Sissenwine and Kirkley (1982). The study of market-based mechanisms 
is motivated by two considerations. First, market-based mechanisms are prevalent in the 
resource economics literature. Taxes and subsidies are often advocated for correcting 
market inefficiencies. Taxes have been implemented to prevent the producer from 
exploiting resources too rapidly, whereas subsidies have implemented to encourage 
higher exploitation rates. Under market-based mechanisms, fishing pressure could be 
redirected by changing relative prices. By imposing a tax on the price of an 
overexploited species, fishermen would find harvesting the overexploited species less 
attractive. In contrast, by imposing a subsidy on an underutilized species, fishermen 
would find harvesting the underexploited species more attractive. This effort redirection 
implicitly assumes that markets for the underutilized species will develop. Several 
mechanisms for collecting and redistributing rents have been discussed including 
system of pooled landing fees, price controls, etc. Sissenwine and Kirkley (1982) 
discuss the benefits and shortcomings of each of these market-based approaches in a 
fishery context. 
dominated by families and fleets that have been in those fisheries for generations". 
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A second motivation for market-based mechanisms is that they have been considered as 
a possible policy instrument for New England. The availability of overexploited species 
such as roundfish and flatfish stocks, and underexploited species such as pelagic stocks 
makes New England a good candidate. Moreover, several segments of the fishing 
industry had expressed support for this mechanism. However, this policy was never 
implemented. 
Under our specification the impact of imposing a tax on species i, in a two species case 
would be modeled as 
(5.7) 
2 pi - 't 112 Q . =a .E +A .. E+A .. (--) E+QE J J 1-'u 1-'ij P. 
J 
(5.8) 
where 'tis the tax. Table 19 summarizes the main experiments conducted. 
To gauge the performance of the different scenarios we developed a baseline scenario. 
This benchmark scenario assumed that the current limited entry regime remains in place 
for the duration of the simulation. Throughout the analysis, we normalize the benefits to 
the baseline level. In other words, the NPV index for the baseline scenario is 100%. The 
simulations ran for 100 years and used a 3% discount rate. 
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Given the number of scenarios a description of each outcome is relegated to Appendix 
E. Tables 20 and 21 summarize the economic performance of the models. In addition, 
tables 20 and 21 provide information regarding the number of years that are required to 
achieve the same pre-policy (scenario) revenue in nominal terms. This number of years 
provides an indication of short-term sacrifices the industry must endure for adopting a 
given policy. We also provide the number of years needed under the current scenario 
needed to generate the same amount of discounted benefits than the baseline scenario. 
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Table 1: Summary of technological change policies 
Scenarios Description Parameter change 
Scenario I Reduction in the roundfish species All roundfish supply parameters 
selectivity by 5,10,15, and 20% 
Scenario IT Reduction in the flatfish species All flatfish supply parameters by 
selectivity 5,10,15, and 20%. 
Scenario ID fucrease in the elasmobranch species All elasmobranch supply 
selectivity parameters by 5,10,15, and 20%. 
Scenario N Reduction in the elasmobranch All elasmobranch supply 
species selectivity parameters by 5,10,15, and 20%. 
Scenario V fucrease in the pelagic species All pelagic supply parameters by 
selectivity 5,10,15, and 20%. 
Scenario VI Reduction in the pelagic species All pelagic supply parameters by 
selectivity 5,10,15, and 20%. 
Scenario VIT Reduction in the roundfish species All roundfish supply parameters 
selectivity and increase in by 10 and elasmobranch supply 
elasmobranch species selectivity parameters by 5,10, 15, and 
20%. 
Scenario YID Reduction in the roundfish and All roundfish supply parameters 
elasmobranch species selectivity by 10 and elasmobranch supply 
parameters by 5, 10, 15, and 
20%. 
Scenario IX Reduction in the roundfish species All roundfish supply parameters 
selectivity and increase in pelagic by 10 and pelagic supply 
species selectivity parameters by 5,10, 15, and 
20%. 
Scenario X Reduction in the roundfish and All roundfish supply parameters 
pelagic species selectivity by 10 and pelagic supply 
parameters by 5,10, 15, and 
20%. 
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Table 2: Summary of market-based policies. 
Scenarios Description Parameter change* 
Scenario XI Tax on roundfish catches Roundfish catches taxed at 5, 10, 
15, and 20 % 
Scenario XII Tax on flatfish catches Flatfish catches taxed at 5,10, 
15, and 20 % 
Scenario XIII Tax on elasmobranch catches Elasmobranch catches taxed at 5, 
10, 15, and 20 % 
ScenarioXN Subsidy on elasmobranch catches Elasmobranch catches 
subsidized at 5, 10, 15, and 20 % 
Scenario XV Taxes on pelagic catches Pelagic catches taxes at 5, 10, 
15, and 20 % 
Scenario XVI Subsidy on pelagic catches Pelagic catches subsidized at 5, 
10, 15, and 20 % 
Scenario XVII Tax on roundfish catches and subsidy Roundfish catches taxed at 10 % 
on elasmobranchs catches while elasmobranch catches are 
subsidized at 5, 10, 15, and 20 
Scenario XVill Tax on roundfish catches and subsidy Round fish catches taxed at 10 % 
on pelagic catches while pelagic catches are 
subsidized at 5, 10, 15, and 20 % 
(*) All taxes and/or subsidies are applied on the ex-vessel price. 
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Table 20: Summary of benefits under technological change policies. 
Scenario Description NPV Index Relative to 
Baseline Levels (%) 
I.a. 5% reduction in roundfish selectivity 115.71 
Lb. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity 118.39 
I.e. 15% reduction in roundfish selectivity 118.58 
I.d. 20% reduction in roundfish selectivity 117.39 
II.a. 5% reduction in flatfish selectivity 102.53 
II.b . 10% reduction in flatfish selectivity 104.25 
II.c. 15% reduction in flatfish selectivity 105.54 
11.d. 20% reduction in flatfish selectivity 106.56 
III.a. 5% increase in elasmobranch selectivity 101.01 
IIl.b. 10% increase in elasmobranch selectivity 101.94 
111.c. 15% increase in elasmobranch selectivity 102.8 
III.d. 20% increase in elasmobranch selectivity 103.62 
IV.a. 5% reduction in elasmobranch selectivity 98.90 
IV.b. 10% reduction in elasmobranch selectivity 97.68 
IV.c. 15% reduction in elasmobranch selectivity 96.29 
IV.d. 20% reduction in elasmobranch selectivity 94.66 
Years Needed to Met Years Needed to Match 
Pre-Policy Revenue Baseline Profit Levels 
Levels 
13 70 
11 66 
11 65 
10 66 
21 94 
20 90 
19 87 
19 85 
21 98 
21 95 
20 93 
20 91 
23 >100 
23 >100 
24 >100 
25 >100 
..... 
..... 
VJ 
Table 20 (cont): Summary of benefits under technological change policies. 
Scenario Description NPV Index Relative to 
Baseline Levels (%) 
V.a. 5% increase in pelagic selectivity 98.49 
V.b. 10% increase in pelagic selectivity 96.61 
V.c. 15% increase in pelagic selectivity 94.05 
V.d. 20% increase in pelagic selectivity 89.69 
VI.a. 5% reduction in pelagic selectivity 101.28 
VI.b. 10% reduction in pelagic selectivity 102.40 
VI.c. 15% reduction in pelagic selectivity 103.40 
VI.d. 20% reduction in pelagic selectivity 104.30 
VII.a. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 5% 118.66 
increase in elasmobranch selectivity 
VIl.b. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 10% 118.92 
increase in elasmobranch selectivity 
VII.c. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 15% 119.18 
increase in elasmobranch selectivity 
VIl.d. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 20% 119.43 
increase in elasmobranch selectivity 
Years Needed to Met Years Needed to Match 
Pre-Policy Revenue Baseline Profit Levels 
Levels 
23 > 100 
24 >100 
26 >100 
29 >100 
21 97 
21 94 
20 92 
20 90 
11 66 
11 66 
11 65 
11 65 
Table 20 (cont.): Summary of benefits under technological change policies. 
Scenario Description NPV Index Relative to Years Needed to Met Years Needed to Match 
Baseline Levels (%) Pre-Policy Revenue Baseline Profit Levels 
Levels 
VIII.a. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 5% 118.12 11 67 
reduction in elasmobranch selectivity 
VIII.b. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 10% 117.85 11 67 
reduction in elasmobranch selectivity 
VIII.c. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 15% 117.57 11 67 
reduction in elasmobranch selectivity 
.p. VIII.cl. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 20% 117.28 12 68 
reduction in elasmobranch selectivity 
IX.a. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 10% 118.17 11 67 
increase in pelagic selectivity 
IX.b. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 10% 117.95 11 67 
increase in pelagic selectivity 
IX.c. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 15% 117.73 11 67 
increase in pelagic selectivity 
IX.d. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 20% 117.50 11 67 
increase in pelagic selectivity 
...... 
...... 
Vl 
Table 20 (cont.): Summary of benefits under technological change policies. 
Scenario Description NPV Index Relative to 
Baseline Levels (%) 
X.a. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 10% 118.61 
reduction in pelagic selectivity 
X.b. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 10% 118.83 
reduction in pelagic selectivity 
X.c. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 15% 119.06 
reduction in pelagic selectivity 
X.d. 10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 20% 119.26 
reduction in pelagic selectivity 
Years Needed to Met Years Needed to Match 
Pre-Policy Revenue Baseline Profit Levels 
Levels 
11 66 
11 66 
11 66 
11 65 
Table 21: Summary of benefits under market-based policies. 
Scenario Description NPV Index Relative to Years Needed to Met Years Needed to Match 
Baseline Levels (%) Pre-Policy Revenue Baseline Profit Levels 
Levels 
XI.a. 5% tax on roundfish catches 118.62 12 66 
Xl.b. 10% tax on roundfish catches 118.31 13 66 
XI.c. 15% tax on roundfish catches 117 .74 14 67 
Xl.d. 20% tax on roundfish catches 117.09 14 67 
XII.a. 5% tax on flatfish catches 119.30 12 65 
...... 
XII.b. 10% tax on flatfish catches 119.34 12 65 
°' XII.c. 15% tax on flatfish catches 119.37 12 65 
XII.d. 20% tax on flatfish catches 119.41 12 65 
XIII.a. 5% tax on elasmobranch catches 119.26 11 65 
XIII.b . 10% tax on elasmobranch catches 119.26 11 65 
XIII.c. 15% tax on elasmobranch catches 119.26 11 65 
XIII.d. 20% tax on elasmobranch catches 119.26 11 65 
XIV.a. 5% subsidy on elasmobranch catches 119.26 11 65 
XIV.b. 10% subsidy on elasmobranch catches 119.26 11 65 
XIV.c. 15% subsidy on elasmobranch catches 119.27 11 65 
XIV.d. 20% subsidy on elasmobranch catches 119.27 11 65 
Table 21 (cont): Summary of benefits under market-based policies. 
Scenario Description NPV Index Relative to Years Needed to Met Years Needed to Match 
Baseline Levels (%) Pre-Policy Revenue Baseline Profit Levels 
Levels 
XV.a. 5% tax on pelagic catches 119.28 11 65 
XV.b. 10% tax on pelagic catches 119.30 11 65 
XV.c. 15% tax on pelagic catches 119.32 11 65 
XV.d. 20% tax on pelagic catches 119.35 11 65 
XVI.a. 5% subsidy on pelagic catches 119.24 12 65 
XVI.b . 10% subsidy on pelagic catches 119.22 12 65 
..... 
-....} XVI.c. 15% subsidy on pelagic catches 119.21 12 65 
XVI.d. 20% subsidy on pelagic catches 119.19 12 65 
Table 21 (cont.): Summary of benefits under market-based policies. 
Scenario Description NPV Index Relative to Years Needed to Met Years Needed to Match 
Baseline Levels (%) Pre-Policy Revenue Baseline Profit Levels 
Levels 
XVII.a. 10% tax on roundfish catches and 5% 118.30 13 66 
subsidy on elasmobranch catches 
XVII.b. 10% tax on round fish catches nd 10% 118.31 13 66 
subsidy on elasmobranch catches 
XVII.c. 10% tax on roundfish catches and 15% 118.32 13 66 
subsidy on elasmobranch catches 
XVII.d. 10% tax on round fish catches and 20% 118.32 13 66 
00 
subsidy on elasmobranch catches 
XVIII.a. 10% tax on roundfish catches and 5% 118.29 13 66 
subsidy on pelagic catches 
XVIII.b. 10% tax on roundfish catches and 10% 118.28 13 66 
subsidy on pelagic catches 
XVIII.c. 10% tax on roundfish catches and 15% 118.27 13 66 
subsidy on pelagic catches 
XVIIl.d. 10% tax on roundfish catches and 20% 118.25 13 66 
subsidy on pelagic catches 
5.4. Discussion 
In addressing the modification of the species selectivity properties of fishing gears, we 
attempted to address this issue theoretically and empirically. In chapter three, a stylized 
construct of this issue was developed. While theoretical treatment recognized two types 
of technology, namely perfectly selective and perfectly non-selective, it failed to 
recognize fishermen's ability to respond to relative prices. Several studies have shown 
that fishermen have a modicum of maneuverability to target one or more species. 
To overcome this limitation, we adopted a more flexible specification. This new 
specification allowed us to examine this issue in detail. The scenarios investigated in the 
empirical section fell into two categories: market-based and technologically-based. The 
former focused on tax and/or subsidy programs while the latter focused on changing the 
gear's species selectivity properties. 
An essential consideration for the study of tax and subsidy policies is that these 
mechanisms are commonly advocated in situations involving externalities. This 
situation is particularly relevant for the New England groundfish fishery where several 
studies have shown the need to significantly reduce fishing effort to ensure the 
biological and economic sustainability of the fishery. While one of the goals of this 
work was to investigate strategies for rebuilding groundfish stocks, this work did not 
investigate the socially optimal taxing policies. Clark (1990) observes that there are 
several difficulties associated with taxation in fisheries. First, fishermen unanimously 
oppose them because governments receive most of the rents, leaving fishermen with no 
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rents or, at best, inframarginal rents. Second, the estimation of the optimal tax requires 
managers to know the cost structure of the fleet and biological characteristics of the 
stock, which fluctuate unpredictably. Third, since the optimal tax would have to be 
calculated each year, new legislation would have to be passed for each fishing season. 
The model was design so that the consequences of the vanous policies could be 
investigated in simulation experiments. Throughout we assume that the physical 
environment played no role in the system dynamics. The economic performance was 
evaluated by comparing the NPV indexes with the baseline case, which was set at 
100%. The first set of policies investigated the impact of modifying the species 
selectivity properties of the gears (Table 20). The initial scenarios evaluated the impact 
of reducing the catchability of the overexploited stocks. Simulation results showed that 
reducing the catchability of roundfish yielded more benefits than reducing the 
catchability of flatfish. The economic performance of these scenarios is due to the 
harvest paths prior to reaching steady. Although, roundfish harvest rates are initially 
lower than baseline harvest levels, between years 15 and 20 (depending on the policy) 
they overtook baseline harvest levels. Since discounting favors present consumption 
over future consumption, it is not surprising that NPV indexes are higher than baseline 
levels. 
An important feature of the model is the presence of predator-prey interactions. To 
examine the impact of changing the selectivity properties on these interactions, we 
initially modify the catchability of elasmobranchs species. Elasmobranchs are both prey 
120 
and predators of roundfish and flatfish. We found that by increasing the catchability of 
elasmobranch stocks we moderately increased the economic benefits relative to the 
baseline, whereas when we decreased the catchability of elasmobranch stocks were 
lowered the economic benefits relative to the baseline. These simulation experiments 
indicate that by decreasing the elasmobranch abundance we increase the economic 
performance of the fishery suggesting that elasmobranchs behave as a net predator. 
Next, we examined policies that altered the catchability of pelagics stocks. Pelagics 
species are an important prey item for roundfish. Pelagic stocks were overexploited in 
the 1960's and 1970's, but since they have recovered to record levels. In recent years, 
this fishery has received considerable attention as possible substitute for the 
overexploited roundfish and flatfish fishery. Simulation results showed that by 
increasing the pelagic selectivity the economic performance of the fishery decreased, 
whereas when we decrease the pelagic selectivity the economic performance of the 
fishery increased. These results suggest that redirecting effort towards the pelagic stocks 
may have un-intended consequences, in spite of the record high stock levels. 
We also investigated the impact of modifying the species selectivity properties 
concurrently. We considered the cases where we reduced the roundfish catchability by 
10% and modified (either increasing or decreasing) the catchability of elasmobranchs 
and pelagics. Simulation results reinforced the direction of the results obtained when 
only one policy was applied. However, the changes in magnitude were small. A 
simultaneous reduction in the catchability of roundfish with an increase m 
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elasmobranch catchability marginally improves the economic performance compared to 
a policy that reduces the catchability of roundfish only. Similarly, simultaneously 
reducing the catchability of roundfish and decreasing the catchability of pelagics 
produces marginally better results than solely reducing the catchability of roundfish. 
The second set of policies we considered were market-based programs. In selecting 
incentive-disincentive policies, we first examined taxing roundfish and flatfish catches. 
Based on the scenarios developed, simulation results indicated that a tax policy on 
flatfish catches yielded marginally higher benefits than a similar taxation plan on 
roundfish catches (Table 21). This was surprising since in the technology-based 
scenarios, roundfish generated higher benefits. A closer examination of the harvest 
paths shows that under the flatfish tax scenario, both roundfish and flatfish harvest 
levels exceed baseline levels in year 9; whereas under the flatfish technological change 
scenario, roundfish harvest levels exceed baseline levels in between years 9-84, while 
flatfish harvest levels exceeded baseline levels between years 32 and 36. 
Increasing the tax and subsidies rates on elasmobranchs and pelagics did not 
appreciably change welfare indexes. However, the directions, if any, were comparable 
to our findings from the technological based scenarios. Lastly, we investigated the 
impact of simultaneously taxing roundfish at 10% and subsidizing elasmobranchs and 
pelagics at different rates. Increasing the subsidy rate on elasmobranchs increased 
welfare while increasing the subsidy rate on pelagics decreased welfare (Table 21 ). 
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Again, the welfare changes were minuscule and followed the same patterns than in the 
single policy case (and the technological based scenarios). 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Advances in fishing technology have had profound consequences on the structure of 
marine ecosystems. In Georges Bank, technological change contributed to dramatic 
shifts in species composition. Commercially valuable demersal fish communities such 
as roundfish and flatfish have been displaced by commercially less valuable 
elasmobranch stocks. In recent years, elasmobranch stocks have begun to decline due to 
increasing harvesting pressure. Simultaneously, low-value pelagic species, previously 
overexploited, recovered to record levels. 
In New England, an important policy priority to ensure the sustainable use of fisheries 
resources and the economic viability of the industry is the improvement of the species 
selectivity properties of fishing gears. The development of management measures to 
ensure the sustainable use of fish resources requires an understanding of the 
bioeconomic consequences of modifying the catchability of the gears. 
To shed some light on this important policy concern, this research exammes the 
bioeconomic implications of modifying the species selectivity properties of marine 
gears. This work addresses this issue both theoretically and empirically. In the 
theoretical section, a stylized model was developed to analyze the long-run equilibrium 
bioeconomic properties of modifying the species selectivity properties of the gears. The 
study examined two polar cases, namely when the gears were perfectly non-selective 
and perfectly selective. Within each case, the impact of biological interactions (i.e., 
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predator-prey relationships) was considered. Three policies were considered: a 
reduction in the catchability of the target species, an increase in the catchability of the 
accompanying species, and the simultaneous combination of the above policies. 
The analysis showed that there was a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding the 
impact of technological improvement. Policy prescriptions for rebuilding stocks varied 
dramatically depending on the type of technology employed. In the perfectly non-
selective gear case, rebuilding strategies would benefit decreasing the catchability of the 
overexploited species as long as the stocks were biologically independent. In the 
presence of biological interrelationships, decreasing the catchability yielded ambiguous 
results. Other policies such as increasing the catchability of accompanying species and 
simultaneously decreasing the catchability of the target species and increasing the 
catchability of the accompanying species in the both the absence and presence of 
biological interrelationship generated ambiguous results. 
In the perfectly selective case, overexploited stocks were shown to recover under any of 
the three policies considered both in the presence and in absence of biological 
interrelationships. However, the impact of these policies on the accompanying species 
and effort levels yielded different outcomes depending on the presence of biological 
interrelationships. 
In the empirical section, a bioeconomic model of the New England groundfish fishery 
was constructed to investigate the dynamic behavior of the system when the species 
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selectivity properties of the gear were altered. The model incorporates key predator-
prey relationship of Georges Bank as well as recent advances in dual formulations, 
which in fisheries applied work have been primarily used in a static context. The use of 
dual formulations adds an interesting dimension to this research in that there is growing 
evidence that fishermen who employ non-selective gears can choose the catch mix in 
response to relative prices. 
Simulation results indicate that technology and market-based mechanisms can aid in the 
rebuilding process; however, by themselves are insufficient to recover the overxploited 
roundfish and flatfish stocks. Rebuilding these stocks will require substantial reductions 
in fishing effort. 
The policy implications of our model are two-fold. First, policies that call for the use of 
subsidies to divert fishing effort away from the overexploited stocks do not necessarily 
increase the economic performance of the fishery. For instance, increasing the 
catchability of pelagics actually reduced the economic performance of the fishery. 
Second, attempts to modify predator-prey dynamics yielded modest results. For 
instance, decreasing the pelagic selectivity to increase forage availability modestly 
enhance the economic performance of the fishery. A similar conclusion is obtained 
from modifying the elasmobranchs catchability coefficients. Neither increasing the 
elasmobranch selectivity as a means to reduce predator concentration, nor decreasing 
the elasmobranch selectivity as a means of increase forage significantly augmented 
welfare. 
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These conclusions and policy implications are dependent on the degree to which the 
model is able to describe the interactions between the resource and the harvesting 
sector. In spite of evidence of significant trophic interactions, some predator-prey 
parameters estimates have a high degree of uncertainty (Collie and Delong, 1998). 
Recent stock assessments suggest that some species groups such as elasmobranchs, 
which during the study were underexploited are currently overexploited. Similarly, the 
roundfish group appears to be increasing in spite of its overexploited status. These 
results, while consistent with this model, may show different dynamics. The predator-
prey relationships may be further refined as more data become available. 
Another limitation of this model is that many of the stock parameters present in the 
input-compensated supply equations violated the theoretically proper curvature 
conditions. Imposing restrictions on the parameter estimates in many cases yielded 
parameters in the order lOE-8. This made the input-compensated supply equations 
essentially insensitive to stock changes. Given the insensitivity level of these parameters 
and the uncertainty of some of the predator-prey relationships, further work needs to be 
conducted before these results can be incorporated into management decisions. 
While this study extends earlier works by considering the impact of altering the species 
selectivity properties into a multispecies context, several aspects of this issue remain 
unexplored. For instance, no attempt has been made to incorporate uncertainty into the 
model. Stochastic variability in the form of red noise (variance as a decreasing function 
of frequency) a feature commonly observed in marine environments could be readily 
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incorporated into the predator-prey model. Spencer and Collie (1994) used this red 
noise specification to explain predator-prey interactions between haddock and spiny 
dogfish. 
Similarly, other forms of stochastic variability could be incorporated on ex-vessel prices 
and the fleets harvest mix and cost structure. In addition to increasing the number of 
species being explicitly modeled, a possible extension of the model would be to 
incorporate spatial considerations such as the impact of closures and effort 
redistribution. Spatial models are likely to become increasingly important as essential 
habitat concerns catch the public officials' attention. Finally, while this piece has been 
focused on marine ecosystems, this type of analysis could be extended to land 
ecosystems. The relationship between wildlife game and hunting policies would be one 
example. 
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Appendix A 
To analyze the short-run effect of modifying the catchability coefficient in a single 
species fishery we assume that the industry has the following profit function 
n = pqexfJ -c(e) 
In addition, we assume that the effort dynamics is given by 
Setting the effort dynamics equation to zero and differentiating with respect to the 
catchability coefficient we obtain 
de pxfJ 
-=--
dq cee 
The above relationship states that an increase in the species selectivity properties of the 
gear in the short-run will be directly related to the price of the species, stock size, and 
harvest-stock size elasticity (/3) and indirectly related to the rate of change of the 
marginal cost of effort. 
To examine the impact on yield we differentiate the harvest function 
dh f3 dq /3 (/J-I) dx fJ de 
-=ex -+ qex -+qx -
dq dq dq dq 
Since in the short-run the impact dxldq=O then we obtain 
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Appendix B 
To solve for the local stability conditions we need to estimate the characteristic roots or 
eigenvalues of a linearized dynamical system evaluated at its steady state. Assuming 
that our system is given by pair of first order differential equations 
i = F(x,y) and 
y=G(x,y) 
where the steady state solution is given by (x*, y*) such that F(x*, y*)=G(x*, y*)=O. 
Then the linearized differential equation at the neighborhood of the equilibrium is 
obtained by using Taylor series expansion and retaining the linear term such that 
i = FxCx*,y*)(x-x*) + FY (x*,y*)(y- y*) 
y = Gx(x*,y*)(x-x*)+Gy(x*,y*)(y- y*) 
Rewriting the system in matrix form we obtain 
Solving for the characteristic equation we get that 
detlA-RII= 11 12 =0 [
a -A. a ] 
U21 U22 -A 
Making use of the Routh theorem which states that the real parts of all of the roots of 
the n11z degree polynomial 
are negative if and only if the first n of the following sequence of determinants 
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[b, l, [ :: :: ] , [; 
are all positive. In our quadratic case 
with real coefficients (b 1 and b0) both have negative and real parts if and only if b1 > 0 
and b2> 0. 
This implies that for the system to stable (a11+a22) < 0, and IAI > 0. These are sufficient 
and necessary conditions. Thus, in our case the following conditions must hold 
In the case of a 3x3 matrix modified Routh-Hurwitz conditions reqmre that 
1
2A -11 < o (Murata, 1977). 
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Appendix C 
This appendix reviews the biologically independent case for both the perfectly 
selective and perfectly non-selective technologies. The results show that in some 
instances the impact of changing the catchability coefficient is ambiguous. Thus, to 
derive some unambiguous results and make the analysis more tractable we introduce 
two additional assumptions 
(H -aq .ex<.a-l)) < 0 
x j J J 
for any set of equilibrium values (e*,x1 *,x2*) . These assumptions ensure that the 
individual stock size equilibrium is dynamically stable. 
C. l. Perfectly Selective Technology Case 
(-) 
IHI 
-(+) 
(-) (-) 
IHI 
-(+) 
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(-) (-) 
(a-1) f3 a f3 aH dqj )] (c ap q1.x1. e;X; q1.x1. + c •.• . q;X; p1.x1. , . -•;•, J ' J • J dq; 
IHI 
...._..., 
(+) 
(-) 
,..-"--------, 
kk [((G n,, (/3-1)) a( 2 ) n (f:H) f3 a( a ) dx · ; ,. x· -f"f;e;X; e,.x,. c •.•. c • .• . -c e;e1. -,_Jp;q;x; q;x; Xz p1·q,.x,. +c • .• . e,. 
_ J = l I I ) } }j + 
~ I~ 
(-) 
,..-"--------, dq 
-(+) 
a a (G n,, (/3-1))) J p1·x,. q1.x1. c... x. - JJ'f;e;X; -
'' ' dq; qJx'J p;xf c•1•; Gx ;] 
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
IHI IHI 
- -(+) (+) 
C.2. Perfectly Non-Selective Technology Case 
de 
dq; 
(-) (-) 
kk[ f3a (H (a-1)) aH (G n~ <f3-l))dqJ] 
- ; 1· P;X; x · x · -aq1·ex1· + P 1·X1· x · x . - JJ'f;ex; --
' J J ' dq; 
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Appendix D 
In this appendix, we review the biologically interdependent case for both the perfectly 
selective and perfectly non-selective technologies. 
D.1. Perfectly Selective Technology Case 
(-) 
(-) 
,....-----"---
( ce;•1 p jXJ (Hx, Gx1 -(Gx; - /Jq;e;x }/3-l))H xi ) 
IHI 
.__.,.., 
(+) 
(-) 
IHI 
......... 
{+) 
IHI 
.__.,.., 
(+) 
{-) 
.--------A-----
/3 ((H {a-1)) /3 G a ) P;X; x -aq1.e1.x1. q;X; c • .• + x q1.x1.cee 
(( 2 ) aG a(G a /3 H /qj c•;•/•1•1 -c •1•1 ejxj xi + PjXj x/e,e,qjxj + c.,.l q;X; xi di; 
+ j J j j I j 
IHI 
......... 
IHI 
......... {+) {+) 
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D.2. Perfectly Non-Selective Technology Case 
(-) 
(-) 
(G ( P. (/3-1) a aH ) aH (G P. (/3-1))) dqj x . PP;q;x; ex1· + P1·X1· x· - P1·q1· x . x . - PP;q;x; -
) I ) I dq . 
IDI I] 
.......... 
(-) 
(-) 
IDI 
.......... 
(-) 
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Appendix E 
Baseline scenario 
To gauge the suite of proposed management policies a baseline scenario was developed. 
The baseline scenario assumed that the current limited entry regime remains in place for 
the duration of the simulation. As mentioned earlier, to ensure that the valuable 
demersal stocks (i.e., roundfish and flatfish) do not collapse, the overall effort level is 
reduced by 58 %. Under this scenario, roundfish biomass continues to decline until year 
14 reaching minimum biomass level of 55 million tons, then rising rapidly and 
stabilizing at 840.1 million tons. Flatfish and pelagic stocks increase stabilizing at 76 
and 2,221.8 million tons, respectively. Elasmobranch stocks collapse in year 87. The 
collapse of elasmobranch stocks is not surprising given that dogfish constitute a larger 
proportion of this assemblage. Dogfish grow slowly, mature late, and produce a small 
number of offspring, leaving them vulnerable to overexploitation. 
In terms of harvesting, roundfish stocks initially yield 28.5 million tons rapidly 
dropping to 25.15 million tons in year 14. Subsequently, roundfish stocks increased 
stabilizing at 180.9 million tons. Flatfish catches increase from 2.1 million tons to 4 
million tons. Similarly, pelagic and miscellaneous species catches increased from 9 and 
16.4 million tons to 42.8 and 21.8 million tons, respectively. In contrast, elasmobranch 
stocks yield decreased from 2.16 million tons to zero in year 87. In terms of economic 
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performance, the net present value of discounted quasi rents is normalized to one for 
. . 26 policy companson purposes. 
Technological change scenarios 
Scenario I: Reduction in the catchability of roundfish stocks. 
This scenario considers reducing the gear's roundfish selectivity by 5, 10, 15 and 20%. 
Under this scenario, roundfish profile is shifted to the left in respect to the baseline case. 
Steady state roundfish biomass levels increase with larger reduction in catchability. 
With a 5% reduction in catchability, roundfish steady state levels reached 856.8 million 
tons while with a 20% reduction roundfish steady state levels reached 907.3million 
tons. Flatfish biomass profile under the reduced catchability cases shift upwards around 
year 18 in respect to the baseline scenario. At year 80, flatfish biomass profiles 
converge slightly above the baseline benchmark around 76 million tons. Similarly, 
reducing the catchability of roundfish shifted up the pelagic biomass profile between 
years 18 and 85 in respect to the benchmark pelagic biomass. After year 85, pelagic 
biomass profiles converge to the baseline scenario. At a 5% roundfish reduction, pelagic 
long run stock size reached 2,223 .7 million tons while at a 20% reduction pelagic stocks 
stabilized at 2,230.3million tons. Reducing the roundfish catchability accelerated the 
collapse of the elasmobranch stocks. 
26 The estimated NPV was US$ 4,141.6 million. Assuming a 100-year horizon at a 3 percent discount 
rate. 
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In harvesting terms, reducing roundfish selectivity shifts roundfish harvesting paths to 
the left of the baseline scenario. Roundfish steady state harvest levels decrease with 
increased reductions in catchability. At a reduction of 5%, roundfish stocks stabilize at 
108.70 million tons while at a 20% reduction roundfish stocks stabilize at 93.94 million 
tons. Flatfish catches exhibit a similar pattern to roundfish stocks. At a 5% reduction, 
flatfish harvest levels stabilized at 3.96 million tons while at a 20% reduction flatfish 
harvest levels stabilized at 3.82 million tons. With decreasing catchability, 
elasmobranch catches exhibit decreasing harvest levels. With a 5% reduction in 
roundfish catchability, pelagic and miscellaneous species yielded 5.6353 and 21.7913 
million tons, respectively while with a 20% reduction they yielded 5.3941 and 21.6923 
million tons, respectively. 
Scenario II: Reduction in the catchability of flatfish stocks. 
The second scenario evaluates reducing the flatfish catchability. As in other scenarios, 
we considered a reduction of 5, 10, 15 and 20%. Reducing the catchability of flatfish 
shifts the roundfish and flatfish biomass profiles to the left. Roundfish, flatfish and 
pelagic long run biomass levels exceeded baseline levels. At a 5 % reduction, roundfish, 
flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilize at 840.1, 76.64, and 2,222.6 million tons, 
respectively, while at a 20% reduction, roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilize at 
841.16, 77 .5, and 2,225.1 million tons, respectively. Elasmobranch stocks collapse 
sooner in the presence of policies that curtail the catchability of flatfish. 
138 
At a 5 % reduction, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species catches 
stabilized at 113.03, 3.79, 5.67, and 21.79 million tons, respectively, while at a 20 % 
reduction the catches of these stocks stabilized at 112.93, 3.18, 5.58, and 21.76 million 
tons, respectively. 
Scenario III: Increase in the catchability of elasmobranch stocks 
The third scenario evaluates increasing the catchability of the elasmobranchs. With a 
5% increase in the elasmobrach selectivity, roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks 
stabilized at 840.2, 76.1 , and 2,222 million tons, whereas with a 20% increase they 
stabilized at 840.3, 76, and 2,222.6 million tons, respectively. 
Under the 5 % increase scenario, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species 
landings reached stabilized at 113.07, 4.0, 5.70, and 21.81 million tons, respectively 
whereas with a 20% increase these stocks stabilized at 113.07, 4.0, 5.678, and 21.8123 
million tons, respectively. 
Scenario IV: Reduction in the catchability of elasmobranch stocks. 
The four scenario investigates reducing the elasmobranch species selectivity. With a 5% 
reduction, the roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilized at 840.1, 76, and 2,221 
million tons, respectively. With a 20% reduction, they reached steady state level of 
839.7, 76.0, and 2,220.7 million tons, respectively. 
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With a 5% reduction in elasmobranch selectivity, the harvest of roundfish and 
miscellaneous species stabilized at 113.0686 and 21.8037 million tons, respectively; 
while with a 20% reduction they stabilized at 113.0547 and 21.7982 million tons, 
respectively. In contrast, a 5% reduction resulted in flatfish and pelagic stocks reaching 
a long-term steady state harvest rate of 4 and 5. 7152 million tons, respectively. While 
with a 20% reduction, flatfish and pelagic stocks reached a steady state harvest rate of 
4.0028 and 5.7360 million tons, respectively. 
Scenario V: Increase in the catchability of pelagic stocks. 
The fifth scenario considers increasing the pelagic species selectivity by 5, 10, 15, and 
20%. Increasing the catchability from 5 to 20%, reduces the stock size of roundfish 
from 838.9 to 853.3 million tons. Analogously, the pelagic steady state stock size drops 
from 2,214.3 to 2,191.8 million tons. The flatfish stock size increases from 75.9 to 76.3 
million tons. 
In harvesting terms, augmenting the pelagic catchability from 5 to 20% reduced the 
roundfish steady state harvest level from 112.8673 to 112.2719 million tons and 
increased the flatfish steady state harvest rate from 3.99 to 4.0 million tons, 
respectively. Likewise, steady state pelagic harvest levels increases from 5.98 to 6.79 
million tons while miscellaneous species steady state harvest level decreased from 21.8 
to 21. 79 million tons 
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Scenario VI: Decrease in the catchability of pelagic stocks. 
The sixth scenario investigates decreasing the catchability of pelagic species. As in 
other scenarios, we considered a reduction of 5, 10, 15 and 20%. At a 5 % reduction, 
roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilized at 841.3 , 76.5, and 2,229.2 million tons, 
respectively, while at a 20% reduction, roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilized 
at 844.9, 75.9, and 2,251.5 million tons, respectively. 
In terms of harvesting, reducing the pelagic catchability increased the steady state 
roundfish and miscellaneous species harvest levels, and reduced steady state flatfish and 
pelagic harvest levels. At a 5% reduction, roundfish and miscellaneous species harvest 
levels stabilized at 113.27 and 21.8 million tons, respectively, while at a 20% reduction, 
roundfish and miscellaneous species steady state harvest levels stabilized at 113.86 and 
21.81 million tons, respectively. On other hand, a similar catchability reduction, 
decreases flatfish and pelagic steady state harvest levels from 3.99 and 5.4 million tons 
to 3.98 and 4.6 million tons, respectively. 
Scenario VII: Reduction in the catchability of roundfish stocks with an increase in 
the catchability of elasmobranch stocks. 
The seventh scenario explores the impacts of simultaneously reducing the catchability 
of roundfish and improving the catchability of elasmobranchs. For the purposes of the 
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scenano, the roundfish catchability is reduced by 10% while the elasmobranch 
catchability is increased between 5-20%. 
With a 5 %increase in elasmobranch catchability, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic stocks 
stabilized at 873.36, 75.9, and 2,226.0 million tons, respectively; whereas with a 20% 
increase in the elasmobranch catchability, roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks 
stabilized at 873.8, 76.7, and 2,226.6 million tons, respectively. 
With 5% increase, the long-run roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species 
harvest rates stabilized at 104.05, 3.9179, 5.55, and 21.77 million tons, respectively; 
whereas with a 20% increase, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species 
harvest rates stabilized at 
respectively. 
104.06, 3.9172, 5.5296, and 21.7754 million tons, 
Scenario VIII: Reduction in the catchability of roundfish and elasmobranch stocks. 
The eighth scenano considers simultaneously reducing the gears ability to target 
roundfish and elasmobranchs. This scenario assumed that roundfish catchability was 
reduced by 10% whereas the elasmobranch catchability was reduced between 5 and 
20%. 
In the long-run with a 5% reduction, roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilized at 
873.5, 76.5, and 2,225.6 million tons respectively. With a 20% decrease in the 
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elasmobranch catchability, roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilized at 873.4, 
76.4, and 2,225 million tons, respectively. 
In harvesting terms, an decrease of 5% results in roundfish, flatfish, pelagic, and 
miscellaneous species steady state catch rates reaching 104.0566, 3.9211, 5.5661, and 
21. 76 million tons, respectively. With a 20% decrease, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic, and 
miscellaneous species long run catch rates stabilize at 104.0539, 3.9261, 5.5881, and 
21.7625 million tons, respectively. 
Scenario IX: Reduction in the catchability of roundfish stocks with an increase in 
the catchability of pelagic stocks. 
The ninth scenano considers simultaneously reducing the gears ability to target 
roundfish and increasing the ability to target pelagics. In the long run with 5% change, 
roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stock sizes stabilized at 872.4, 76.6, and 2,218.5 million 
tons while with a 20% change they stabilized at 868.8, 76.5, and 2,196.5 million tons, 
respectively. 
Roundfish and miscellaneous species steady state harvest levels decreased from 103.88 
to 103.35 million tons and from 21.76 to 21.75 million tons, respectively as the pelagic 
selectivity was increased from 5 to 20%. In contrast, long-run flatfish, pelagic catch 
levels increased from 3.9257 to 3.9269 million tons and from 21.765 to 21.7541 million 
tons, respectively. 
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Scenario X: Reduction in the catchability of roundfish and pelagic stocks. 
The tenth scenario studies the effects of simultaneously reducing the catchability of 
roundfish and pelagic. The roundfish catchability reduction was fixed at 10% while the 
pelagic catchability reduction varied between 5 and 20%. 
Under the 5 % reduction scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes 
stabilized at 874.8, 76.3, and 2,233.1 million tons; whereas under the 20% reduction 
scenario, they stabilized at 878.3, 75.9, and 2,254.8 million tons, respectively. 
With a 5% reduction, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state 
harvest levels stabilized at 104.23, 3.92, 5.29, and 21.77 million tons, respectively. With 
a 20% reduction, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species harvest rates 
stabilized 104.75, 3.91, 4.47, and 21.78 million tons, respectively. 
Market-based scenarios 
Scenario XI: Tax scheme on roundfish catches 
The eleventh scenario analyzed was imposing a tax on roundfish landings. The cases 
considered included a 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent tax on ex-vessel prices. Under the 5 % 
tax scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes stabilized at 882.1, 
76.0, and 2,256.4 million tons; whereas under the 20% tax scenario, they stabilized 
at 894.9, 76.9, and 2,261.5 million tons, respectively. 
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With a 5% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state 
harvest levels stabilized at 103.7359, 3.8521, 4.4153, and 21.7231 million tons, 
respectively; while with a 20% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous 
species harvest rates stabilized 100.2338, 3.6670, 4.2199, and 21.4518 million tons, 
respectively. 
Scenario XII: Tax scheme for flatfish catches 
The twelfth scenario investigates the impact of a tax on flatfish catches. Under the 5 % 
tax scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes stabilized at 878.6, 
75.9, 2,255.3 million tons; whereas under the 20% tax scenario, they stabilized at 
879.5, 76.0, and 2,256.9 million tons, respectively. 
Under a 5% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state 
harvest levels stabilized at 104.6478, 3.8910, 4.4357, and 21.7485 million tons, 
respectively; while with a 20% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous 
species harvest rates stabilized at 104.5429, 
tons, respectively. 
3.8700, 4.3956, and 21.7146 million 
Scenario XIII: Tax scheme for elasmobranch catches 
The thirteenth scenario considers a tax on elasmobranch catches. Under the 5 % tax 
scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes stabilized at 878.3, 76.0, 
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and 2,254.7 million tons; whereas under the 20% tax scenario, they stabilized at 878.2, 
76, and 2,254.5 million tons, respectively. 
Under a 5% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state 
harvest levels stabilized at 104.7559, 3.9136, 4.4784, and 21.7812 million tons, 
respectively; while with a 20% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous 
species harvest rates stabilized at 104.7674, 3.9185, 4.4877, and 21.7792 million tons, 
respectively. 
Scenario XIV: Subsidy scheme for elasmobranch catches 
The fourteenth scenario evaluates a subsidy on elasmobranch catches. Under the 5 % 
subsidy scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes stabilized at 
878.4, 75.9, and 2,254.9 million tons; whereas under the 20% subsidy scenario, they 
stabilized at 878.4, 75.9, and 2.2551 million tons, respectively. 
Under a 5% subsidy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state 
harvest levels stabilized at 104.7477, 3.9104, 4.4726, and 21.7824 million tons, 
respectively; while with a 20% subsidy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous 
species harvest rates stabilized at 104.7351, 3.906, 4.4644, and 21.7840 million tons, 
respectively. 
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Scenario XV: Tax scheme for pelagic catches 
The fifteenth scenario investigates a tax scheme on pelagic catches. Under the 5 % tax 
scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes stabilized at 878.4, 75.9, 
and 2,255.2 million tons; whereas under the 20% tax scenario, they stabilized at 878.7, 
75.9, and 2,256.4 million tons, respectively. 
Under a 5% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state 
harvest levels stabilized at 104.7524, 3.9091, 4.4613, and 21.7782 million tons, 
respectively; while with a 20% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous 
species harvest rates stabilized at104.7560, 3.9003, 4.4154, and 21.7679 million tons, 
respectively. 
Scenario XVI: Subsidy scheme for pelagic catches 
The sixteenth scenario investigates a subsidy scheme on pelagic catches. Under the 5 % 
subsidy scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes stabilized at 
878.2, 76.0, and 2,254.4 million tons; whereas under the 20% subsidy scenario, they 
stabilized at 878, 76.0, and 2,253.4 million tons, respectively. 
Under a 5% subsidy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state 
harvest levels stabilized at 104.7515, 3.9150, 4.4892, and 21.7855 million tons, 
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respectively; while with a 20% subsidy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous 
species harvest rates stabilized at 104.7515, 3.9238, 4.5283, and 21.797 million tons, 
respectively. 
Scenario XVII: Tax scheme for roundfish and subsidy scheme for elasmobranchs 
catches 
The seventeenth scenario considers tax/subsidy scheme where roundfish catches are tax 
at a 10 percent while the subsidy level on elasmobranch catches was allowed to vary 
between 5 and 20 percent at 5 % increments. 
Under the 5% subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species 
biomass stabilized at 886.2, 76.2, and 2,258. l million tons, respectively. Under the 20% 
subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species biomass stabilized 
at 886.3, 76.4, and 2,258.3 million tons, respectively. 
Under the 5% subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species 
catches stabilized at 102.6450, 3.7896, 4.3499, and 21.65 million tons, respectively. 
Under the 20% subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species 
harvest rates stabilized at 102.6331, 3. 7866, 4.3420, and 21.6511 million tons, 
respectively. 
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Scenario XVIII: Tax scheme for roundfish and subsidy scheme for pelagic catches 
The eighteenth scenario considered was a tax/subsidy scheme where roundfish catches 
could be taxed at 10% while the subsidy on pelagic catches was allowed to vary 
between 5 and 20 percent at 5% increments. Under the 5% subsidy policy, roundfish, 
flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species biomass stabilized at 886.0, 76.2, 2,257.6 
million tons, respectively. Under the 20% subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic 
and miscellaneous species biomass stabilized at 885.8, 76.1, and 2, 256.5 million tons, 
respectively. 
Under the 5% subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species 
catches stabilized at 102.6487, 3.7932, 4.3675, and 21.654 million tons, respectively. 
Under the 20% subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species 
harvest rates stabilized at 102.6497, 3.8016, 4.4094, and 21.6677 million tons, 
respectively. 
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Appendix F 
Matlab Code 
al=.42; %0.39 
close; 
CCC=[28.55969857 (8.428721918*0.46) 
25 .45322923] 'i 
%Starting values 
T=lOO; %time span 
3.891659726 2.349503273 
x=[ 88.6 5 . 8 171.97 382 O] '; %initial stock size 5.4165 6.366 
y= [ 88. 6 2. 28 170 382 O] '; %lagged initial stock size 
%y=[ 68 5.47 147.21 239.2 0] '; 
%x=[ 68 5.47 147.21 239.2 0] '; 
%X= (737 80 199 2367 l] I 
%=== ================================================================== 
%List of parameters 
%Biological (order: groundfish, flatfish, elasmobranchs, pelagics and 
misc. species) 
%----------
% intrinsic growth00954043 
r=[ 0.557 1.108 (0.409) 0.314 O] '; % ms species original model 
%r= (0. 72 1. 01 3. 95 0. 01 O] '; %single species 
%1.10 8 
% carrying capacities 
K= [ (737) 80 199 2367 l] '; %original model 
%K= (308. 8 60 30 2000 l] '; %single species 
% multispecies interaction coefficient (i.e. t predator-prey)*.94116 
alpha=l*[ 0.000000 0.000000 -0.001561 0.000132 
0.000000 
0.000000 0.000000 -0.002890 0.000000 
0.000000 
-0.000359 -0.000927 0.000000 0.000000 
0.000000 
0.000000 0.000000 - 0.000248 0.000000 
0.000000 
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
0.000000 l i 
% alpha=zeros(5,5); 
% vector of ones to sum multispecies interaction coefficients 
I=ones(5,l) ; %I=[ l 1 1 1 l) '; 
%Economic 
%--------
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% Fish prices 
pr=l.71*(1-0.1); %pr ice roundfish 
pf=2.73*(1-0); %price flatfish 
pe=0.25*(1+0.0); %pri ce elasmobranch 
pp=0.36*(1+0.2); %price pelagics 
po=2.47*(1-0); %price miscellaneous spec ies 
pprime=[l.71 2 . 73 0.25 0.36 2.47] '; 
p=[pr pf pe pp po]'; 
xprice=sqrt([l pf/pr pe/pr 
pr/pf 1 pe/pf 
pr/pe pf/pe 
pr/pp pf/pp 
pr/po pf/po 
1 
pe/pp 
pe/po 
pp/pr po/pr; 
pp/pf po/pf; 
pp/pe po/pe; 
1 po/pp; 
pp/po 1]); 
price=sqrt([prA2 pr*pf pr*pe pr*pp pr*po; 
pf*pr pfA2 pf*pe pf*pp pf*po; 
pe*pr pe*pf peA2 pe*pp pe*po; 
pp*pr pp*pf pp*pe ppA2 pp*po; 
po*pr po*pf po*pe po*pp poA2]); 
%Techonology 
%-----------
% Otter Trawl Fleet (5 -50 GRT ) 
% ----------------------------
%alphaotcl=[(-65 9 . 93-1.5*356) (-54 6.779+1.35*253 .1) (-274 .925 -
0.55*332) (-54.7771+.15*274.925) (-824.601 +0 .8*3 60.2)] Ii 
alphaotcl=[(-659 . 93-1*356.1 ) (-546.779+.3*253.1) (-274.925 -. 9*332 
(-54. 7771+ . 07*274. 925 ) ( -824. 601-0*360. 2 ) ] '. *adjust_alpha; 
%2.3* %1. 7* %0.7 5 %0 *.15* %0*0 . 55* 
betaotcl= [ (26921. 27-. 55*3638. 6) 0 0 0 
0; 
0 (40380.04-.0*2553.0) 0 0 
O; 
0 0 7379.488 0 0; 
0 0 0 (28 . 40943) O· 
' 0 0 0 0 
3 0550. 69] . *adjust; 
portotc1=[21911.55 25713.97 (8200.672) -18699.6 -22369.5 
24313.3 
-21471.2 -38339.4 -38353.7 -39095 . 5 - 39216.9 - 39297.4; 
1371.342 -8978.88 -10299.8 260.6731 -6632.91 6152.152; 
31950.25 2026.795 251.8448 130 . 0317 174.6506 156.981; 
39377.56 4686.713 1737.626 -24967.3 -29039.9 
29219.2] .*adjust_portotcl; 
wtportotcl=[0.0105960 0.0145695 0 . 0145695 0 . 3165563 0 . 4993377 
0. 0092715] ; 
%wtportotcl=[0.0463576 0.0384106 0 . 0516556 0. 5470199 1.6529801 
0.0238411 ]; effort adj. 
stockotcl=diag(adjust_stock'*[(ll .56475 ) 1.0lE-6 l.OlE-6 1 . 0lE-6 
0] ) I i 
seasonrotcl=adjust_seasonr.*[ -37 75 . 79 - 1931.54 -4 870.19 O] '; 
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seasonfotcl=adjust_seasonf.*[ 1361.836 1924.967 2425 .395 OJ'; 
seasoneotcl=adjust seasone . *[ -1932.66 -1573.72 8197.782 OJ'; 
seasonpotcl=adjust_seasonp. * [ 292. 3569 41. 45193 -261. 264 OJ '; 
seasonootcl=adjust seasono.*[ 1234.596 4668.148 1294.316 OJ'; 
seasonotcl=[seasonrotcl seasonfotcl seasoneotcl seasonpotcl 
seasonootclJ ' ; 
wtotcl= [O. 2278146 0. 2927152 0 .1880795 0. 2913907J '; 
%wtotc1=[0.2913907 0.2278146 0.2927152 0.1880795J '; effort adj. 
ntripotcl= al* [172 221 142 220J '/5; 
season 
% Otter Trawl Fleet (51-100 GRT) 
% ----------------------------
%average number of trips per 
ss2=[9.90778476 1. 75279266 0. 78444012 0. 344831133 8. 83936159J Ii 
alphaotc2=[ (-1729.61-1*520.7) (-63.9323+1*49 .0634) (-247.058-
1*100.9) (-17.1677-1*26.0975) (-795.385-1*324.8) J 1 .*adjust_alpha; 
%a lphaotc2=[ (-1729.61-0.1*520.7) (-63.9323-.8*49.06) (-
247.058+.37*100.9) (-17.1677-.445*26.09) (-795.385-1.51*324.8) J 1; 
betaotc2=[(8952.302 - 0.75*5318.7) 0 0 -lE-8 
0. 
' 
0 (1496.814+.1*394.5) 0 0 0. 
' 0 0 (1886.48-0.52*811.1) 0 
-lE-8 0 0 
0; 
0 0 0 
1*2611.8)J .*adjust; 
portotc2=[26464.14 35096.26 10847.09 
63407.32 -27 84.6 ; 
-2784.6 -96.8927 195.9616 
8376.546 -538 .854; 
-1020.93 -772.462 - 912.496 
1881.722 -653.107; 
205.3809 963.1371 45.38551 
2930 .358 -134.8; 
40697.95 20681.01 11251.17 
56209. 89 -4185. 23 J . *adjust_portotc2; 
%wtportotc2=[0.0452656 
% 0.0364896 
effort adj 
0.2600462 
0 . 2092379 
(53 . 55962+0.15 *281.6) 
0 (10343.87-
-6645.04 -4399.6 941.309 
- 337.673 615.788 369.314 
333.6045 -1082.12 206.7435 
-28.038 119.6609 45.31248 
-1664.65 1922.778 3969.381 
0.2494226 
0.2272517 
0.4743649 ... 
0. 0175520J; 
wtportotc2=[ 0.0087760 0.0748268 0.0438799 0.2000000 ... 
0.0064665 0.0309469 0.0595843 0.0032333J i 
stockotc2=diag (adjust_stock' * [51. 53025 1. OlE-6 1. OlE-6 0. 36138 OJ) '; 
seasonrotc2=adjust_seasonr.*[ -7380.46 -3957.21 2563.43 OJ I• 
' 
seasonfotc2=adjust_seasonf.*[ -622.643 -935.603 -740.094 OJ I• 
' 
seasoneotc2=adjust seasone.*[ -533.294 -509.005 1273.239 OJ I• 
' 
seasonpotc2=adjust_seasonp.*[ -1.3904 -88.0273 -269.77 0 J I ; 
seasonootc2=adjust seasono.*[ -5721 .3 4 -7925.34 -6119. 54 OJ I• 
' 
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0; 
seasonotc2=(seasonrotc2 seasonfotc2 seasoneotc2 seasonpotc2 
seasonootc2J 1 ; 
%wtotc2 = (0 1. 0267898 1. 5819861 1. 5510393 J '; 
wtotc2= (0 .1912240 0. 2969977 0. 3113164 0. 2004619J '; 
ntripotc2=a1*(414 643 674 434J/5'; 
% Otter Trawl Fleet (101-150 GRT) 
% -------------------------------
ss3=(8.306704424 3.045217508 0.394546029 0.436494722 8.541146952J '; 
alphaotc3=((-150.617-1*63.1506) (-12.5852+1*6.4888) (-11.0942-
1*2.7057) (-2.8268+1*10.5648) (-108.411-
1*53.7672)J '.*adjust_alpha; %alphaotc3=( (-15 0.617+ .5*63.15 ) (-
12.5852+0*6.488) (-11. 0942+2*2.7) (-2.8268+0*10.56) (-
108.411+0*53.7672)J Ii 
betaotc3=( (1551.076-0.1 *569) 
42.17843; 
36.33482 18.26466 -222.818 
36.33482 (594.1454+1*58.58) -20.6377 214.923 
105.15; 
18.26466 -20.6377 (164.076-1*41.65) -56.8824 
14.97303; 
-222.818 214.923 -56.8824 (-173.267+1.97*128) 
17.4571; 
42.17843 -105.15 14.97303 - 17.4571 (1793.494-
.55*494.6) J . *adjust; 
portotc3=[9264.756 3276.413 568.2496 30.25201 -165.465 4.779799 
8477.559 -233.803 415.5655; 
-40.6156 -2 34 . 302 -304.044 -121.602 815.9928 -130.159 
520.8881 -231.88 -296.462; 
72.48458 -49.3124 -42.4398 106.966 -85.2506 11.75669 
236.0714 -8 .335 15.52872; 
376.5949 15.30252 35.31837 35.26444 73.82621 -12.6 042 
885.6881 -79.0295 -53.0907; 
13715.49 1441.897 740.4387 37.86365 683.1054 220.2205 
7199.631 10156.92 267.8108 J .*adjust_portotc3; 
%wtportotc3=( 0 . 1889297 
0.0043773 ... 
0.2907371 0.7507766 0.1358373 
% 0.7293138 0.2664502 0.0014120 0. 0035301 J; 
wtportotc3=( 0.0199096 0.0618469 
0.1060435 ... 
0.0972889 0.0320531 0.000847218 
0 . 0667890 0. 000282406 0. 000282406J; 
stockotc3=diag(adjust_stock'*( l.OlE-6 l.OlE-6 
0 J ) I i 
seasonrotc3=adjust_seasonr .*( - 497.485 -160.796 
seasonfotc3=adjust_seasonf.*(-122.004 -152.171 
seasoneotc3=adjust_seasone.*(-22.9753 -13.0393 
seasonpotc3=adjust_seasonp.*(-54.0362 72.01692 
seasonootc3=adjust_seasono.*(-547.66 - 893.579 
153 
l.OlE-6 0.569556 
- 393 . 287 OJ'; 
-215 .427 OJ'; 
23. 56345 OJ I; 
- 162 .66 OJ'; 
-1504. 45 OJ I; 
seasonotc3=[seasonrotc3 seasonfotc3 seasoneotc3 seasonpotc3 
seasonootc3] ' ; 
%wtotc3=[1.7158995 1 .8469359 1 .8 047162] '; adj effort 
wtotc3=[0.2438577 0.2661677 0.2780288 0.2119458] '; 
ntripotc3=al* [ 1727 1885 1969 1501] '/5; 
% Otter Trawl Fleet (1 50 + GRT) 
% -----------------------------
ss4=[6 . 57140044 0.608171078 0.094608867 1.329113896 4.245116304] '; 
alphaotc4=[(-213.25-1*24.2797) (-1.21341+1*3.1227) (-5.69854-
1*2.1972) 
(-22.5351+0*23.8834) (-126.73+1*46.3863) 
] '.*adjust_alpha; 
betaotc4=[ (1026.124+0*343.9) 87.31942 58.96083 333.404 -237.842 
87. 31942 (336. 8175+0 .1 *59. 0625) -76. 322 -110. 215 
6.29598 
58. 96083 
19.9323 29.50682 
333.404 
(54.05242+0*374.4) -155.197 
-76.322 (115.0486-1.7*86.5968) 
-110.215 -19.9323 
-237.842 -6 .29598 29.50682 -155.197 
(885. 4309+0*497. 6)]. *adjust; 
portotc4=[ 2363.51 1330.166 612.0636 736.3775 6625.9 
1073.427 -1114.42; 
-284.436 -307.38 -316 .57 -109.969 -170.433 
302.223 -293.547; 
- 56.0717 -69.563 -72.1222 -45.3105 65.85736 
39.1166 108.9576; 
32.46466 9.759805 -24.1633 72.96831 376 . 976 
30002.83 207.8199; 
3864.671 798.8908 876.8434 387.4356 1125.521 
8280.735 2652. 55] . *adjust_portotc4; 
wtportotc4=[0.0993361 0.2152707 0.2885598 0.0311542 0.1355975 
0.0071502 0.000255363 l; 
stockotc4=diag(adjust_stock'*[ 3.572765 8.643869 0.139085 lE-8 
O]) I; 
seasonrotc4=adjust_seasonr.*[473.7387 302.4815 876.1154 O] '; 
seasonfotc4=adjust_seasonf. * (-4. 07991 - 36. 2135 -61.1493 O] '; 
seasoneotc4=adjust_seasone.*[-12.1515 - 5 . 99297 -17.0164 O] '; 
seasonpotc4=adjust_seasonp. * (27. 35761 316. 5499 -14. 0539 O] '; 
seasonootc4=adjust_seasono. * (1059. 278 - 156. 693 -401. 777 O] '; 
seasonotc4=[seasonrotc4 seasonfotc4 seasoneotc4 seasonpotc4 
seasonootc4] ' ; 
wtotc4= [O. 2247191 0. 2842186 o. 2918795 0 . 1991828 ] '; 
ntripotc4=al* (880 1113 1143 780 ] '/5; 
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%Gillnet 
%------- --
ss5= (0. 80603796 0. 058431624 1. 53939396 0. 007941179 0. 002646416J '; 
alphagill=((-103.265+0.5*46.7833) 1.732504 (-195.958+1*130.6) ... 
(-1. 09329-1*1. 0864 (-202. 296-1*75. 9669) J '. *adjust_alpha; 
betagill=( (1322.798-0.01*1322.798) 0 0 0 O; 
0 (-144.553+0.14*451.0) 0 0 O; 
0 0 (22184. 87+ .10*7483 .1) 0 0; 
0 0 0 (35.67559-.19*64.2565) O; 
0 0 0 0 (3946.528- . 6918*4353.9) 
J .*adjust; 
portgill=( 3490.731 2942.576 -8.15234 -245.772 -79.7915 -937.362 
-1296.92; 
97.61999 614.7927 49.34266 137.0019 -41.4263 
145 . 0877 -96.9041; 
-10445 -13822.9 -21450.1 - 21579 -20353.6 
21988.9 -6981. 9; 
43.93175 8 . 127567 -10.1377 - 21.6092 51 . 84492 
53.6602 -37.4023; 
9232.385 4441. 841 -1236.13 -2072. 63 -1243 -3739.7 
-3044. 59 J . *adjust_portgill; 
wtportgill=(0.1115385 0.1423077 0.0102564 0.7256410 0.0051282 
0 . 0012821 0. 0538462J; 
%wtportgill=(0 .725 6410 0.5641026 0.0653846 2.3230769 0.0102564 
0.0012821 0.2935897 J ; %adj. effort 
stockgill=diag (adjust_stock' * ( 1 . 885822 lE-8 lE-8 0. 049063 OJ) '; 
seasonrgill=adjust_seasonr.*(-869.171 -941.022 302 . 2671 OJ'; 
seasonfgill=adjust_seasonf.*(-53.8486 267.6565 -14.2891 OJ'; 
seasonegill=adjust_seasone. * ( -2317. 36 -1146. 69 3291 . 115 OJ '; 
seasonpgill=adjust_seasonp. * (-25. 5854 -48. 2157 -40. 3 73 8 0 J ' ; 
seasonogill=adjust_seasono. * ( 128. 5754 -2481. 87 -1089 .11 OJ '; 
seasongill=(seasonrgill seasonfgill seasonegill seasonpgill 
seasonogillJ ' ; 
Wtgill=(0.1358974 0 . 1756410 0.3256410 0.3628205 ) I; 
%wtgill=(0 .5153846 0.7423077 1.3064103 OJ'; %adj effort 
ntripgill=al* (106 137 254 283 J '/5; 
%Long line 
%--- ---- - -
SS6= (0.198396252 9.68278E-05 0.025768891 3.49617E-05 0.640749996J I; 
alphalong=( -34.9293 -0.0879 2.116814 0.023613 ( - 40.0317-
.12*38.3677) J '.*adjust_alpha; 
betalong=((749.6613-.5*606.9) 0 0 0 0. I 
0 (1.88109-.38*3.0679) 0 0 
0; 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(-64.7747+.04*229.5) 0 O; 
0 (-0.6927+.13*0.6779) O; 
O O 3917.334].*adjust; 
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portlong=[ 136.4355 1346. 681 
-631.917 i 
0.083945 0.247839 
-0.22718; 
50.68681 371.0619 
8.658852 
-0 . 21353 0.04008 
-0.07961 
714.8744 2645.186 
-2561. 15] . *adjust_portlong; 
wtportlong=[0.2514620 0.1169591 
0.0087719 0.2777778]; 
-319.43 -20.0979 -216.241 188.2733 
-0.93487 0.207043 -0.37719 0.099133 
68.13725 38.57052 27.3486 55.62657 
0.149255 0.219146 0.167524 -0.03112 
-2658.44 -3477.52 -3636.59 963.258 
0.0058480 0.5555556 0.0380117 
stocklong=diag(adjust stock'*[ 2.324345 0.054482 lE-8 0.00101 O]) '; 
seasonrlong=adjust seasonr.*(-15.1093 26.63872 18.91855 O] '; 
seasonflong=adjust_seasonf.* (-1.52695 -1.09072 -1.5428 O] '; 
seasonelong=adjust_seasone. * (-25. 7652 10. 66658 220. 8819 O] '; 
seasonplong=adjust_seasonp.*[ 0.068626 0.318993 -0.03712 O] '; 
seasonolong=adjust_seasono.*(-264 . 197 -527.815 183.4074 O] '; 
seasonlong=[seasonrlong seasonflong seasonelong seasonplong 
seasonolong] 1 ; 
wtlong=[ 0.3274854 0.2426901 0.1111111 0.3187135 ] '; 
ntriplong=al* (112 83 38 109] '/5; 
% Counter information 
biomass=x'; 
effort_otcl=[O]; 
harvest_otcl=[O 0 O 0 O]; 
allboat_otcl=[l]; 
Nboat_otcl=allboat_otcl; 
profit_otcl=[lO]; 
effort_otc2=[0]; 
harvest_otc2=[0 0 0 O O]; 
allboat_otc2=[1]; 
Nboat_otc2=allboat_otc2; 
profit_otc2=[10]; 
effort_otc3=[0]; 
harvest_otc3=[0 0 0 0 O]; 
allboat_otc3=[1]; 
Nboat_otc3=allboat_otc3; 
profit_otc3=[10]; 
effort_otc4=[0]; 
harvest_otc4=[0 0 0 0 O]; 
allboat_otc4=[1]; 
Nboat_otc4=allboat_otc4; 
profit_otc4=[10]; 
effort_gill=[O]; 
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harvest_gill=[O O 0 O O]; 
allboat_gill=[l]; 
Nboat_gill=allboat_gill; 
profit_gill=[lO]; 
effort long=[O]; 
harvest_long=[O 0 0 0 O]; 
allboat_long=[l]; 
Nboat_long=allboat_long; 
profit_long=[lO]; 
allprofits=[O]; 
zharvest otcl=[O 0 0 0 0 l ; 
-
zharvest otc2=[0 0 0 0 O]; 
-
zharvest otc3=[0 0 0 0 O]; 
-
zharvest otc4=[0 0 0 0 O]; 
-
zharvest_gill=[O 0 0 0 O]; 
zharvest_long=[O 0 0 0 O]; 
ssl= [ 2.76937473 2.96401222 
%Cost 
theta_otcl=O; 
fcost_otcl=O; 
c_otc1=2111.686; 
1. 05290186 0. 23108738 3 .18420797] Ii 
d_otc1=100+20*73; %1E-8 2966 
lr_cost_otc1=1861.973+1*508.0; %; %31900 
theta_otc2=0; 
fcost_otc2=0; 
c otc2=2195.559 
d_otc2=5000;%1E -8 2462.947 
lr cost otc2= 2462.947+1*361.3; 
theta_otc3=0; %own parameter SAS params suck 
fcost_otc3=0; 
c_otc3=7051.611 ; 
d_otc3=1E-8 ; 
lr_cost_otc3=4707.881-0.1*1836 . 8; %4000 
theta_otc4=0; %own parameter SAS params suck 
fcost_otc4=0; 
c_otc4=3157.229; 
d_otc4=150; 
lr cost otc4= 3061.426+(1* 343.9) ;%7000; 
theta_gill=O; 
fcost_gill=300; 
c_gill=llSO . 91; 
d_gill=O; 
lr_cost_gill=1153.749+1*11.248 ;%8000; 
theta_long=O; . 
fcost_long=O; 
c long= 1187.303; 
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d_long= 40.51+1*10.66; %40.51478 
lr_cost_long=1187.303+1*102; %3000; 
%intermediat e variables 
ei_otcl=[O]; 
hi_otcl=[O 0 0 0 O]; 
s_otcl=(p'*seasonotcl) '; 
ei_otc2=[0]; 
hi_otc2=[0 o o o O]; 
s_otc2=(p'*seasonotc2) '; 
ei_otc3=[0]; 
hi_otc3=[0 O O O 0); 
s_otc3=(p'*seasonotc3) '; 
ei_otc4=[0]; 
hi_otc4=[0 o o o O]; 
s_otc4=(p'*seasonotc4) '; 
ei_gill= [ 0] ; 
hi_gill=[O 0 0 0 O]; 
s_gill=(p'*seasongill) '; 
ei_long=[O]; 
hi_long=[O 0 0 0 O]; 
s long=(p'*seasonlong) '; 
%call program 
%»close; plot(2:t+l, b(2:t+l,1), '0-', 2:t+l,B1(2:t+l,1)) 
myproblem 
for t=l:T; %annual timer 
for i=1:4; %seasonal timer 
for ii=l:5 % sets stock size equal to zero in event of negative 
stocks sizes 
if x(ii)<= O; 
x(ii)=O; 
end; 
end; 
% Selects for individual seasonal effort 
ef_otcl= max((l/(p'*alphaotc1*2-d_otc1*2))*(lr_cost_otcl-
(I'*(betaotcl.*price')*I+stockotcl*(p.*x) ... 
+s_otcl(i,l)*wtotcl(i,l)+p'*(portotcl*wtportotcl'))) ,0); 
ei_otcl=[ei_otcl, ef_otcl]; 
ef_otc2= max((l/(p'*alphaotc2*2-d_otc2*2))*(lr_cost_otc2-
(I'*(betaotc2.*price')*I+stockotc2*(p.*x) ... 
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+s_otc2(i,l)*wtotc2(i,l)+p'*(portotc2*wtportotc2'))) ,0) 
ei_otc2=[ei_otc2, ef_otc2); 
ef_otc3= max((l/(p'*alphaotc3*2-d_otc3*2))*(lr_cost_otc3-
(I' * (betaotc3. *price') *I+stockotc3* (p. *x) ... 
+s_otc3(i,l)*wtotc3(i,l)+p'*(portotc3*wtportotc3'))) ,0) 
ei_otc3=[ei_otc3, ef_otc3]; 
ef_otc4= max((l/(p'*alphaotc4*2-d_otc4*2))*(lr_cost_otc4-
(I'*(betaotc4.*price')*I+stockotc4*(p.*x) ... 
+s_otc4(i,l)*wtotc4(i,l)+p'*(portotc4*wtportotc4'))) ,0) 
ei_otc4=[ei_otc4, ef_otc4) 
ef_gill= max((l/(p'*alphagill*2-d_gill*2))*(1r_cost_gill-
(I'*(betagill.*price')*I+stockgill*(p.*x) ... 
+s_gill(i,l)*wtgill(i,l)+p'*(portgill*wtportgill'))) ,0); 
ei_gill=[ei_gill, ef_gill); 
ef_long= max((l/(p'*alphalong*2-d_long*2))*(lr_cost_long-
(I'*(betalong.*price')*I+stocklong*(p.*x) ... 
+s long(i,l)*wtlong(i,l)+p'*(portlong*wtportlong'))) ,0) 
ei_long=[ei_long, ef_long) ; 
% Selects for individual seasonal harvest 
harv_otcl=(ntripotcl(i)*max((alphaotcl*ef_otclA2+diag(betaotcl*xprice' 
)*ef_otcl+(stockotcl' .*x)*ef_otcl ... 
+(seasonotcl(:,i)*wtotcl(i,l))*ef otcl+(portotcl*wtportotcl')*ef otcl) 
,0)/10A6); - -
for iii=l:4 
if x (iii)<= 0 
harv_otcl(iii)=O; 
end 
end 
hi otcl=[hi_otcl,harv_otcl'); 
ntripotc2=[414 643 674 434)/5'; 
harv otc2= 
(ntripotc2(i)*max((alphaotc2*ef_otc2A2+diag(betaotc2*xprice')*ef_otc2+ 
(stockotc2' .*x)*ef_otc2 ... 
+(seasonotc2(:,i)*wtotc2(i,l))*ef otc2+(portotc2*wtportotc2')*ef otc2) 
,0)/10A6); - -
159 
for iii=1:4 
if x(iii)<= 0 
harv_otc2(iii)=O; 
end 
end 
hi_otc2=[hi_otc2,harv_otc2']; 
harv otc3= (ntripotc3(i)* 
max((alphaotc3*ef_otc3A2+diag(betaotc3*xprice')*ef_otc3+(stockotc3' .*x 
)*ef otc3 ... 
+(seasonotc3(:,i)*wtotc3(i,l))*ef_otc3+(portotc3*wtportotc3')*ef_otc3) 
f 0) /10A6); 
for iii=1:4 
if x(iii)<= 0 
harv_otc3(iii)=O; 
end 
end 
hi otc3=[hi_otc3,harv_otc3']; 
bb4 = [ 3 7 6 . 1 2 2 2 . 6 2 2 8 . 6 15 6] 1 ; 
harv otc4= (ntripotc4(i)* 
max((alphaotc4*ef_otc4A2+diag(betaotc4*xprice')*ef_otc4+(stockotc4' .*x 
)*ef_otc4 . .. 
+(seasonotc4(:,i)*wtotc4(i,l))*ef_otc4+(portotc4*wtportotc4')*ef_otc4) 
f 0) /10A6); 
for iii=1:4 
if x(iii)<= 0 
harv_otc4(iii)=O; 
end 
end 
hi otc4=[hi_otc4,harv_otc4']; 
harv gill=(ntripgill(i)* 
max((alphagill*ef gillA2+diag(betagill*xprice')*ef gill+(stockgill' .*x 
- -) *ef_gill ... 
+(seasongill(:,i)*wtgill(i,l))*ef_gill+(portgill*wtportgill 1 )*ef_gill) 
I 0) /10A6); 
for iii=1:4 
if x(iii) <= O 
harv_gill(iii)=O; 
end 
end 
hi_gill=[hi_gill,harv_gill']; 
harv long= (ntriplong(i)* 
max((alphalong*ef_longA2+diag(betalong*xprice')*ef_long+(stocklong' .*x 
) *ef long . .. 
+(seasonlong(:,i)*wtlong(i,l))*ef_long+(portlong*wtportlong')*ef_long) 
r 0) /10A6); 
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for iii=1:4 
if x(iii)<= 0 
harv_long(iii)=O; 
end 
end 
hi_long=[hi_long,harv_long']; 
end; 
e_otcl=sum(ei_otcl) 
h_otcl=sum(reshape(hi_otcl, 5,5) ')' 
ei_otcl=[O]; 
hi_otcl=(O O 0 O O]; 
e_otc2=sum(ei_otc2) ; 
h_otc2=sum(reshape(hi_otc2, 5,5) ')' 
ei_otc2=[0]; 
hi_otc2=(0 0 0 0 O]; 
e_otc3=sum(ei_otc3) ; 
h_otc3=sum(reshape(hi_otc3, 5,5) ')' 
ei_otc3=(0]; 
hi_otc3=[0 0 0 0 O]; 
e_otc4=sum(ei_otc4) ; 
h_otc4=sum(reshape(hi_otc4, 5,5) ')' 
ei_otc4=(0]; 
hi_otc4=(0 O 0 O O]; 
e_gill=sum(ei_gill) ; 
h_gill=sum(reshape(hi_gill, 5,5) ')' 
ei_gill= (O] ; 
hi_gill=(O 0 0 0 O]; 
e_long=sum(ei_long) ; 
h_long=sum(reshape(hi_long, 5,5) ')' 
ei long=(O]; 
hi long=(O 0 O 0 O]; 
%fleet profit 
prof otcl=(p'*h otcl*10A6-lr cost otcl*e otcl)/10A6; 
prof-otc2=(p'*h-otc2*10A6-lr-cost-otc2*e-otc2)/10A6; 
prof-otc3=(p'*h-otc3*10A6-lr-cost-otc3*e-otc3)/10A6; 
prof-otc4=(p'*h-otc4*10A6-lr-cost-otc4*e-otc4)/10A6; 
prof-gill=(p'*h-gill*10A6-lr-cost-gill*e-gill)/10A6; 
prof-long=(p'*h-long*10A6-lr-cost-long*e-long)/10A6; 
- - - - -
%fleet size 
Nboat_otcl=max(Nboat_otcl+theta_otcl*prof_otcl,O); 
Nboat_otc2=max(Nboat_otc2+theta_otc2*prof_otc2,0); 
Nboat_otc3=max(Nboat_otc3+theta_otc3*prof_otc3,0); 
Nboat_otc4=max(Nboat_otc4+theta_otc4*prof_otc4,0); 
Nboat_gill=max(Nboat_gill+theta_gill*prof_gill,0); 
Nboat_long=max(Nboat_long+theta_long*prof_long,O); 
% Catch proportionality 
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propl= [1. 6 1. 0 1. 0 7. 5 1. OJ ' ; % 3 gears to total landings 
Htran=(h_otcl*Nboat otcl+h otc2*Nboat otc2+h otc3*Nboat otc3+h otc4*Nb 
oat otc4 .. . 
+h_gill*Nboat_gill+h_long*Nboat_long); 
H=Htran. *propl; 
z_otcl=h_otcl ; 
z_otc2=h_otc2; 
z_otc3=h_otc3; 
z_otc4=h_otc4; 
z_gill=h_gill; 
z_long=h_long; 
for n=1:4 
if H (n) > x (n) ; % ; +r (n) . *x (n) -
( (r (n) . /K (n)) . *x (n) . A2) +(alpha (n) . * (y (n) *y')) *I 
HH(n) = H(n); 
H(n) = x(n) ;% ;+r(n) .*x{n)-
( (r{n) ./K(n)) .*x(n) .A2)+(alpha(n) .*(y(n)*y'))*I; 
beta(n) max(H(n)/(HH(n)) ,0); 
h_otcl(n) beta(n)*h_otcl(n); 
h_otc2(n) beta(n)*h_otc2(n); 
h_otc3(n) beta(n)*h_otc3(n); 
h_otc4(n) beta(n)*h_otc4(n); 
h_long(n) beta(n)*h_long(n); 
h_gill(n) beta(n)*h_gill(n); 
else 
h_otcl(n) 
h_otc2(n) 
h_otc3(n) 
h_otc4(n) 
h_long (n) 
h_gill (n) 
end 
end 
%stock dynamics 
h_otcl (n); 
h_otc2 (n); 
h_otc3 (n); 
h_otc4 (n); 
h_long {n); 
h_gill (n); 
x=max (x+r. *y- ( (r. /K). *y. A2) +(alpha.* (y*y')) *I-
(h_otcl*Nboat_otcl+h_otc2*Nboat_otc2 ... 
+h_otc3*Nboat_otc3+h_otc4*Nboat_otc4+h_gill*Nboat_gill+h_long*Nboat_lo 
ng). *propl, 0); 
%counters 
biomass= [biomass, x']; 
xbiomass= [biomass, x'] ' ; 
y=xbiomass (1+ (5* (t-1)) : 5+5* (t-1)); 
effort otcl [effort_otcl, e otcl' 
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l i 
harvest otcl 
allboat otcl 
profit otcl 
[harvest_otcl, h_otcl' ] ; 
[allboat_otcl, Nboat_otcl]; 
[profit_otcl, prof_otcl J; 
effort otc2= [effort otc2, e_otc2']; 
harvest_otc2=[harvest_otc2, h_otc2']; 
allboat_otc2=[allboat_otc2, Nboat_otc2]; 
profit_otc2= [profit_otc2, prof_otc2]; 
effort otc3= [effort_otc3, e_otc3']; 
harvest_otc3=[harvest_otc3, h_otc3']; 
allboat_otc3=[allboat_otc3, Nboat_otc3]; 
profit_otc3= [profit_otc3, prof_otc3]; 
effort otc4= [effort_otc4, e_otc4']; 
harvest_otc4=[harvest_otc4, h_otc4']; 
allboat_otc4=[allboat_otc4, Nboat_otc4]; 
profit_otc4= [profit_otc4, prof_otc4]; 
effort gill= [effort_gill, e_gill']; 
harvest_gill=[harvest_gill, h_gill']; 
allboat_gill=[allboat_gill, Nboat_gill]; 
profit_gill= [profit_gill, prof_gill]; 
effort long= [effort_long, e_long']; 
harvest_long=[harvest_long, h_long']; 
allboat_long=[allboat_long, Nboat_long]; 
profit_long= [profit_long, prof_long]; 
zharvest_otcl=[zharvest_otcl, z_otcl']; 
zharvest_otc2=[zharvest_otc2, z_otc2']; 
zharvest_otc3=[zharvest_otc3, z_otc3']; 
zharvest_otc4=[zharvest_otc4, z_otc4']; 
zharvest_gill=[zharvest_gill, z_gill']; 
zharvest_long=[zharvest_long, z_long']; 
allprofits=[allprofits, 
(prof_otcl+prof_otc2+prof_otc3+prof_otc4+prof_gill+prof_long)J; 
end; 
b=reshape(biomass,5,T+l) '; 
zotcl=Nboat_otcl*reshape(zharvest_otcl,5,T+l) '; 
zotc2=Nboat_otc2*reshape(zharvest_otc2,5,T+l) '; 
zotc3=Nboat_otc3*reshape(zharvest_otc3,5,T+l) '; 
zotc4=Nboat_otc4*reshape(zharvest_otc4,5,T+l) '; 
zgill=Nboat_gill*reshape(zharvest_gill,5,T+l) '; 
zlong=Nboat_long*reshape(zharvest_long,5,T+l) '; 
hotcl=Nboat_otcl*reshape(harvest_otcl,5,T+l) '; 
hotc2=Nboat_otc2*reshape(harvest_otc2,5,T+l) '; 
hotc3=Nboat_otc3*reshape(harvest_otc3,5,T+l) '; 
hotc4=Nboat_otc4*reshape(harvest_otc4,5,T+l) '; 
hgill=Nboat_gill*reshape(harvest_gill,5,T+l) '; 
hlong=Nboat_long*reshape(harvest_long,5,T+l) '; 
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effortotcl=effort_otcl'; 
effortotc2=effort_otc2'; 
effortotc3=effort_otc3'; 
effortotc4=effort_otc4'; 
effortgill=effort_gill'; 
effortlong=effort_long'; 
TT=(hotcl+hotc2+hotc3+hotc4+hlong+hgill); 
HARVEST=(propl*ones(l,t+l)) '.*TT; 
EFFORT=[effortotcl effortotc2 effortotc3 effortotc4 effortgill 
effortlong] ; 
PROFIT=[profit_otcl' profit_otc2' profit_otc3' profit_otc4' 
profit_gill' profit_long']; 
%figure (1), title 'Hola', 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,l) ,plot(b, '-') ;title('Biomass'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,2) ,plot(effort_otc1(2:t+l) ', 1 0 1 ) ;title('Effort from 
otcl'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,3) ,plot(effort_otc2(2:t+l) ', 1 0 1 ) ;title('Effort from 
otc2'); 
%SUBPLOT (2, 2, 4), plot (effort_otc3 (2: t+l) ', 'o'); title ('Effort from 
otc3'); 
%figure (2), title 'Roundfish', 
%SUBPLOT (2, 2, 1) , plot (b (2 : t+l, 1) , ' - ');title ('Biomass of roundfish 1 ) ; 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,2) ,plot(hotcl(2:t+l,1), 'o') ;title('Harvest from otcl'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,3) ,plot(hotc2(2:t+l,l), 1 0-r') ;title('Harvest from otc2'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,4) ,plot(hotc3(2:t+l,l), 1 0-b') ;title('Harvest from otc3'); 
%figure (3), title 'Flatfish', 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,1) ,plot(b(2 :t+l,2), '-') ;title('Biomass of flatfish'); 
%SUBPLOT (2, 2, 2) , plot (hotel (2: t+l, 2), 'o') ; title ('Harvest from otcl'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,3) ,plot(hotc2(2:t+l,2), 'o -r ') ;title('Harvest from otc2'); 
%SUBPLOT(2 ,2,4 ) ,plot(hotc3(2:t+l,2), 'o-b') ;title('Harvest from otc3'); 
%figure (4), title 'Elasmobranchs', 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,1) ,plot(b(2:t+l,3), '-') ;title('Biomass of 
elasmobranchs'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,2) ,plot(hotc1(2:t+l,3), 1 0 1 ) ;title('Harvest from otcl'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,3) ,plot(hotc2(2:t+l,3), 1 0-r') ;title('Harvest from otc2'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,4) ,plot(hotc3(2:t+l,3), 1 0-b') ;title('Harvest from otc3'); 
%figure (5), title 'Pelagics', 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,l) ,plot(b(2:t+l,4), '-') ;title('Biomass of pelagics'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,2) ,plot(hotcl(2:t+l,4), 1 0 1 ) ;title('Harvest from otcl'); 
%SUBPLOT(2 ,2,3 ) ,plot(hotc2(2:t+l,4), 1 0-r') ;title('Harvest from otc2'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,4) ,plot(hotc3(2:t+l,4), 1 0-b') ;title('Harvest from otc3'); 
%figure (6), title 'Pelagics', 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,l) ,plot(b(2:t+l,5), '-') ;title('Biomass of all other'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,2) ,plot(hotc1(2:t+l,5), 1 0 1 ) ;title('Harvest from otcl'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2,3) ,plot(hotc2(2:t+l,5), 1 0-r') ;title('Harvest from otc2'); 
%SUBPLOT(2,2 ,4 ) ,plot(hotc3(2:t+l,5), 'o-b') ;title('Harvest from otc3'); 
% plot(l:t-1, b(l:t-1,1), 1 0-r', l:t - 1, TT(2:t,1 ) ,'-ob') 
%plot(allboat_otcl) ;title('allboat'); 
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